The new class in Vietnam by Cheshier, Scott Colin







The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 





Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For



















Scott Colin Cheshier 
 
Submitted for PhD in Business and Management 
 









Vietnam has posted impressive gains in growth of output, exports and poverty reduction 
over the last twenty years. The standard explanation of this sustained success views 
Vietnam‟s transition from socialism to capitalism as an extension of markets and removal 
of obstacles to their efficient operation. This view of transition is based on a particular 
view of the origins of capitalism, in which capitalism emerges due to the expansion of 
trade, technology and the removal of obstacles to the natural tendencies of human 
interaction. However, this view of the origins of capitalism cannot explain the uniqueness 
of capitalism as a distinct historical social formation. 
 
A Marxist framework will be used, stressing the emergence of a new social division of 
labour based on the emerging class relation between capital and labour. This 
transformation forces a shift to accumulation through the market, requiring capitalists to 
operate under the market imperative in order to survive. This will be combined with 
Djilas (1957) and the concept of communist bureaucracies as a New Class in order to 
investigate the emergence of capitalism in Vietnam. 
 
The research question is how does the appearance and reproduction of the New Class  
provide insight into the development of a specifically Vietnamese capitalism? Data on  
Vietnam‟s largest 200 firms will be analyzed through the New Class lens to explore the  
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Between 1990 and 2007, annual GDP growth in Vietnam averaged 7.5 percent and 
annual export growth averaged nearly 20 percent. Between 1995 and 2007, annual 
growth of gross fixed capital formation averaged over 11 percent, and rose from 24.3 to 
over 37 percent of GDP between 1994 and 2007 (World Bank 2008b). Recorded 
household poverty has fallen from 58 percent in 1993 to 29 percent in 2002 (World Bank 
2006). Vietnam has become one of the leading exporters of rice, rubber, seafood, coffee, 
garments and footwear and is a leading destination for foreign direct investment. On a 
range of indicators, Vietnam has demonstrated a sustained dynamism and growth second 
in the world only to China.  
 
The standard explanation of Vietnam‟s success is based on the extension of markets. De-
collectivization of agriculture in the late 1980s strengthened property rights for farmers, 
resulting in output increases which ended near famine conditions. Vietnam quickly went 
from a net rice importer to a major rice exporter. Following the declaration of the đổi mới 
(renovation) policy and the shift to what would become the „socialist-oriented market 
economy‟ at the VIth Party Congress in 1986 and macroeconomic stabilization in 1989, 
output and trade rapidly expanded. The ability of the government to maintain 
macroeconomic and political stability remains a key feature of Vietnam‟s growth and 
development. Gradual but ongoing liberalization of trade and investment have 
contributed to aligning domestic prices with international prices and attracting significant 
inflows of foreign investment. Reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while sporadic, 
has continued to move forward alongside legal reforms to level the playing field for 
businesses of all ownership types. This has resulted in an explosion of private sector 
firms seeking to take advantage of new opportunities (Dollar 1994; Dollar, Glewwe and 
Litvack 1998; World Bank 2005). The orthodox transition policy triad of stabilize, 
liberalize and privatize appears to be the right recipe for Vietnam. 
 
The transition story for Vietnam is derived from standard theories of transition developed 
for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Successful transition 
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to a market economy is viewed as the removal of obstacles, in particular from the state, to 
the efficient functioning of firms and markets:  
 
In the initial stages of transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,  
the dominant challenge was to reduce and reorient the state‟s role in the economy.  
In particular, the strategies of liberalization and privatization were intended to  
change the way in which the state interacts with firms, shifting from command 
methods to market mechanisms (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2003, p.752). 
 
Private ownership would ensure profit-oriented corporate governance, while  
liberalization of trade and prices would set free the competitive market forces that  
reward profitable activities. Firms would have therefore both internal and  
external incentives to restructure (EBRD 1999, p.16 quoted in King 2002, p.4;  
see also Sachs 1992). 
 
Stabilization, liberalization and privatization entail the extension of markets and retreat of 
the state. As „transition‟ is a move away from central planning, this is not controversial. It 
also explains the attractiveness of such arguments about, for example, agricultural 
liberalization in Vietnam being a fundamental determinant of subsequent growth.  
 
For Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, transition “was often conceptualized as 
a return to something „normal‟ and „proven‟. There were implicit assumptions that the 
simple removal of the market‟s institutional barriers would cause its organic, spontaneous 
development.” (Amsden, Kochanowicz and Taylor 1994, p.171). However, this view of 
the emergence of a market economy is based on a particular formulation of the origins of 
capitalism itself, what King (2002) refers to as „the Smithian transition strategy‟:  
 
If the state withdraws from the economy, markets and market activity will lead to  
capitalist development through voluntary exchanges in the pursuit of profit. In  
this world, there are only two types of economies – state dominated and the more 
„natural‟ market economy (King 2002, p.3-4). 
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Discussing the standard view of the emergence of capitalism in England, Wood (2002) 
refers to this as the commercialization model: 
 
 The most common way of explaining the origin of capitalism is to presuppose that  
 its development is the natural outcome of human practices almost as old as the  
 species itself, which required only the removal of external obstacles that hindered  
 its realization … Capitalism, then, or „commercial society‟, the highest stage of  
 progress, represents a maturation of age-old commercial practices (together with  
 technical advances) and their liberation from political and cultural constraints  
 (Wood 2002, p.11-12). 
 
 Whatever variations are introduced into the story, basically capitalism is just a lot  
 more of what already existed in proto-capitalism and long before: more money,  
 more urbanization, more trade, more wealth (Wood 2002, p.32). 
 
According to the commercialization model, capitalism resulted from the progressive 
development of trade and accumulation of wealth, the division of labour and the 
advancement of science. It was a quantitative expansion of existing natural human 
tendencies rather than a qualitative transformation, with no conception of transition from 
one social system to another (Wood 2002, p.36). Here the connection between standard 
conceptions of current transitions and the link to conceptions of the initial origins of 
capitalism becomes apparent. The central problem is that: 
 
 Almost without exception, accounts of the origin of capitalism have been  
 fundamentally circular: they have assumed the prior existence of capitalism in  
 order to explain its coming into being … In most accounts of capitalism and its  
 origin, there really is no origin. Capitalism seems always to be there, somewhere;  
 and it only needs to be released from its chains … to be allowed to grow and  
 mature (Wood 2002, p.4). 
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This poses a more fundamental challenge to the standard explanation of transition in 
Vietnam. Capitalism as a quantitative extension of natural tendencies through the 
removal of obstacles to their full expression cannot differentiate between different 
periods in history. Land, labour, capital, markets, money, technology – all have existed 
for a very long time in many different places. Periods are simply more or less market 
oriented, corresponding more or less to the essential character of being human.  
 
 If capital were only goods used in production or money needed to buy materials 
 and labour, then capital would be as old as civilization, and there would be no 
 purpose in singling it out as an identifying element of one kind of society, worthy 
 of becoming, in fact, its historical badge. It is precisely the failure to recognize 
 this distinctive aspect of capital … shared by conventional economics as well,  
 which treats capital as a material category of things, or as money, and which  
accords it no special properties that would explain why the social formation in  
which we live is described by the „ism‟ of capital (Heilbroner 1985, p.35-36). 
 
 The commercialization model made no acknowledgement of imperatives specific  
 to capitalism, of the specific ways in which the market operates in capitalism, of  
 its specific laws of motion … There was, in fact, no need in the 
commercialization model to explain the emergence of capitalism at all. It assumed  
that capitalism existed, at least in embryo, from the dawn of human history … If  
the emergence of a mature capitalist economy required any explanation, it was to  
identify barriers that have stood in the way of its natural development, and the  
process by which those barriers were lifted (Wood 2002, p.16). 
 
It is possible at this point to ask why this matters. The standard explanation of transition, 
grounded in a view of capitalism as the removal of obstacles to the realization of natural 
human tendencies to „truck, barter and exchange‟, does capture, it could be argued, some 
of the salient features of the processes at work in Vietnam. For example, de-




However, if the question were instead: what is Vietnam transitioning to?, then the 
problem is fundamental. The standard explanation cannot answer this except as more 
markets. Therefore, a different theoretical framework is required to understand the 
processes at work in Vietnam, one which allows for differentiation of capitalism as a 
unique and specific mode of production. This will allow the answer to the question to be: 
transition to capitalism, where „capitalism‟ actually means something. In addition, it is 
not simply that the standard story suffers from theoretical weakness due to its inability to 
identify the unique features of Vietnam‟s development. As Kitching (1982) argues, poor 
theory leads to poor policy recommendations. Failure to understand the dynamics of the 
emergence of capitalism in Vietnam leads to recommendations that are at best often 
ineffective and at worst can stall the process or fail to mitigate its negative effects.  
 
The remainder of this chapter argues for the importance of using a Marxist definition of 
capitalism, stressing the emergence of a new social division of labour based on the 
emerging class relation between capital and labour. This transformation forces a shift to 
accumulation through the market, requiring capitalists to operate under the market 
imperative in order to survive. This provides a framework capable of capturing the 
unique features of capital as an „ism‟ and provides a guide to empirical investigation. 
However, there is a tendency towards the doctrinaire in Marxism that will be avoided. 
The approach adopted here will be what Pelley (2002) refers to as a „Marxish 
framework‟. While a theoretical model of capitalism is useful, it needs to be applied with 
flexibility in practice. Given unique historical and political circumstances, Vietnam will 
have its own variety of capitalism. Attempting to identify which type or model of 
capitalism is operating in Vietnam misses the point since there is no one correct form. 
The more important question is: what is the nature of Vietnamese capitalism?  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue for an alternative approach to the study of growth 
and development in Vietnam. However, this dissertation has narrow ambitions. The full 
story of the development of capitalism in Vietnam would require examination of the 
economic structure and bureaucracy from at least the 19
th
 century Nguyễn dynasty, 
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tracing its evolution through the period of French colonialism and into two major wars. It 
would also require extensive discussion of the rise of nationalism, along with changes in 
land tenure, the formation of wage labour, and the role of trade and foreign investment. 
The discussion here will only focus on the planning period and subsequent transformation 
in Vietnam, serving as an initial contribution to examining changes in Vietnam as the 
development of capitalism. The main argument of this dissertation is that the capitalist 
class in Vietnam is emerging from within the state. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter Two introduces Djilas 
(1957) and the concept of communist bureaucracies as a New Class. This will be used as 
a lens for exploring the formation of a capitalist class in Vietnam. For Djilas, the New 
Class is based on a contradiction between national property and control over its use. This 
contradiction is predicated on a disjunction between a legal definition of property as 
collective and de facto ownership and control by state bureaucrats and managers. It 
cannot be resolved without jeopardizing the position of the New Class. The foundation of 
New Class power therefore erodes during transition as property is privatized and the plan 
is dismantled. Reproduction of New Class power during transition becomes an issue of 
fundamental importance, and how the Djilas contradiction is resolved influences the 
formation of a capitalist class.  
 
Attempts to reproduce New Class power do not occur in a vacuum. Under a command 
economy, the New Class accumulates based on leveraging access to the state. In Eastern 
Europe and China, resolution of the New Class contradiction during transition followed a 
pattern of state-related accumulation that has its roots in the planning period. However, 
different countries experienced different outcomes, with state continuity a key element in 
orienting this process towards economic growth. The specific methods used to resolve the 
Djilas contradiction in Eastern Europe and China will provide guidance for identifying 
similar processes of capitalist class formation in Vietnam. Discussion will also include 
the development of capitalism in Southeast Asia and its relevance to the emergence of 
capitalism in Vietnam.  
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Chapter Three serves the dual purpose of literature review and discussion of events 
between 1954 and 2006 in Vietnam. It will be argued that, as in Eastern Europe and 
China, a pattern of accumulation based on leveraging access to the state emerged under 
planning. In the initial period between 1954 and 1974 in the north this functioned 
primarily to overcome shortages and improve living standards. However, after national 
reunification in 1975, it expanded into a process of commercializing the state. The 
continued ability to arbitrage price differentials between plan and market by diverting 
inputs and assets from the state system, along with opportunities to engage in smuggling 
through travel abroad, increasingly became sources of capital accumulation. State firms 
and those connected to the state increasingly engaged in commercial activities outside the 
plan. The process accelerated through the 1980s and ultimately destroyed the basis for 
central planning, forcing the Vietnamese Communist Party to attempt resolution of the 
New Class contradiction. 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, temporary resolution of the Djilas contradiction followed a 
relatively straightforward application of the Stalinist definition of socialism as state 
ownership. The state sector would play the „leading role‟ in the economy and this led to a 
state enterprise focused development model. As in China, state-related accumulation 
included both state and private entrepreneurs and shaped the process of capitalist class 
formation. Although based on leveraging access to the state, the growing influence of the 
market imperative, manifested as increased competition, resulted in remarkable economic 
dynamism.  
 
Much work has been done on these issues in Vietnam, but has tended to focus on 
processes occurring at lower levels in the state hierarchy or is based on aggregate 
comparisons between state and private. None have systematically investigated Vietnam‟s 
largest firms. This dissertation will present research on Vietnam‟s 200 largest firms to 
assess how the ongoing attempt to resolve the Djilas contradiction is influencing the 
emergence of a capitalist class from within the state. 
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Chapter Four reviews methodology. The firm is used as the unit of analysis because it is 
in firms that capital and labour meet. Firms are the „vehicles‟ of capitalism. The focus 
will be on large firms because large firms are better able to achieve the economies of 
scale and scope that contribute to international competitiveness. They also invest in the 
acquisition and development of technologies and products and therefore pioneer entry 
into higher value-added activities. In addition, large firms‟ requirements for 
infrastructure, capital and skilled labour have significant and often positive spillover 
effects for the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, competitive large and small firms are 
important to a dynamic economy. However, most of the work done in Vietnam tends to 
focus on small and medium sized enterprises. This dissertation presents research findings 
on Vietnam‟s largest firms in order to address this limitation. The remainder of the 
chapter explains the methodology used for selecting the Top 200 firms. 
 
Chapter Five presents the research results. Two key features emerge. The first is the 
rising importance of the market imperative, with increasing competition forcing firms to 
adapt and improve. In response, Vietnam‟s largest firms have adopted three general 
strategies: upgrading core business into more complex and higher value products; 
expanding markets; and diversifying business areas, often into real estate and finance. 
These strategies are frequently related and most firms are engaging in more than one, 
with some firms pursuing all three strategies simultaneously. Diversification into finance 
and real estate is a fairly common practice, but is particularly pronounced amongst 
Vietnam‟s state corporations and economic groups.  
 
The second feature is the pervasiveness of state-related accumulation. However, state-
related accumulation does not require intentionality on the part of the state. Indeed, the 
historical roots of this process in Vietnam are predicated precisely on a lack of control. 
State-related accumulation also occurs irrespective of ownership type. Private firms 
leverage access to the state just as state firms seize new market opportunities to expand 
and accumulate. In many instances the boundary between state and private is blurred. 
However, political connections and access to the state remain insufficient conditions for 
success. Some firms, even with ample privileges, fail to exploit emerging opportunities.  
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Twelve case studies of individual firms will be presented which illustrate the three 
general adaptive strategies, along with a considerable degree of dynamism. The firms 
reviewed also highlight the centrality of state-related accumulation to the process of class 
formation in Vietnam. This pattern of accumulation comes in a variety of forms 
identifiable from the Eastern Europe and China literature. However, it is not necessarily 
corrupt and can even be quite mundane. Nevertheless, this broad pattern of accumulation 
demonstrates that the capitalist class in Vietnam is emerging from within the state. 
Chapter Six concludes with a summary of the argument and discussion of its 
implications. 
 
1.1 Varieties of Capitalism 
 
The term „capitalism‟ has a contentious history, but has recently come in from the cold.1 
“For many years this term [capitalism] … has been regarded as vaguely obscene. All 
sorts of euphemisms – free enterprise, individual enterprise, the competitive system and 
the price system – are currently in its place. None of them has the virtue of being more 
descriptive and none is as succinct.” (Galbraith 2004, p.4, footnote 1). The rehabilitation 
of the term is in part a result of the „institutional turn‟ in economics. This turn is a 
combination of several strands of theory, including developments in transaction cost 
economics, the economics of information, and economic history, all of which stress the 
importance of institutions in resolving limitations in neoclassical models.
2
 Williamson 
(1985) puts the term in the title with The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.  
 
The emphasis is on moving beyond simply „getting the prices right‟. Particular 
institutions are also required to make markets work, including secure property rights, 
contract enforcement, and rule of law. Capitalism is then defined as an institutional 
configuration which allows the market to function. For transition countries, the focus on 
                                                 
1
 See Swedberg (2005), p.32, footnote 4 for a brief history of the term „capitalism‟. 
2
 See Williamson (1985) on transaction cost economics, Stiglitz (1994) on the economics of information, 
and North (1981) and North (1990) on property rights and economic history. For an excellent but neglected 
overview, which anticipates much of the developments in institutional economics, see Van Arkadie 
(1990a). 
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institutions grew out of the failures of the „shock therapy‟ approach predicated on 




 The conventional wisdom is that markets do not need to be painstakingly  
 constructed by government – they emerge spontaneously … A thriving market  
 economy is not, contrary to what some may say, simply the result of „letting  
 capitalism happen‟ – not something that emerges spontaneously out of thin air. It  
 requires a special set of institutional arrangements that most countries in the world  
 do not have (Olson 1992, p.viii). 
 
However, the critique of the standard „noninstitutional approach‟ (Amsden et al 1994) to 
transition countries tended to conflate institutional form and function, such that one set of 
institutions was specified to correct the limitations of mainstream economic theory.
4
 A 
particular institutional form (e.g. an independent central bank) was directly associated 
with a particular institutional function (e.g. reduced inflation), and capitalism required 
creating these particular institutional forms in order to secure their associated functions 
and allow the market to operate. A country has “a particular historical narrative but with 
common denominators of the essential institutions” (North 2005, p.50). 
 
As the focus on institutions extended beyond economics into comparative politics, 
sociology, and management, emphasis was placed on the variety of institutional 
configurations under capitalism. The „varieties of capitalism‟ literature examines the 
institutional differences between various advanced capitalist countries, often with the 
intention of justifying multiple institutional configurations as „valid‟ capitalisms. 
Typically Japan and Germany as „coordinated‟ capitalism are juxtaposed against the US 
as „free market‟ or „arm‟s length‟ capitalism (Whitley 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001, 
Amable 2003). 
 
                                                 
3
 No attempt will be made to review the large „shock therapy vs. gradualism‟ literature. See Nolan (1995) 
for an overview. 
4
 This is not limited to application of institutional economics to transition countries, but is a feature of much 
of the institutionalist literature. See Cheshier (2004) for a review. 
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The varieties of capitalism approach, emphasizing diversity of institutional forms, found 
its corollary in the transition literature, particularly with regard to China.
5
 Not only did 
China confound the standard transition story by achieving sustained growth even though 
refusing rapid liberalization and privatization, it also confounded the „simple‟ 
institutional story which equated particular institutional forms with specific and necessary 
institutional functions. At the formal level, China‟s transition has been marked by 
ambiguous property rights, high levels of corruption and weak rule of law (Walder and 
Oi 1999). The „essential institutions‟ were not in place and yet China continued to grow.  
 
To explain this apparent anomaly, Rodrik (2003, 2007), building on the work of China 
specialists, argues that neo-classical economic principles are institution free.
6
 Protection 
of property rights, sound money and appropriate incentives via price signals are functions 
of institutions, none of which map into particular institutional forms. “Unorthodox 
institutions work precisely because they produce orthodox results” (Rodrik 2003, p.9). 
China has managed to engineer alternative institutional structures, through trial and error 
contingent on local circumstances, that nevertheless generate the „right‟ functions. For 
Rodrik, there are varieties of institutional forms, but similarity of functions. North (2005) 
supports this view, arguing that “the key is to create the necessary incentive structure, not 
slavishly to imitate the institutions of developed countries” (North 2005, p.51, footnote 
6). 
 
Recognition of institutional variety dependent on historical and political factors unique to 
particular countries represents a positive step in understanding the role of institutions and 
institutional change in generating growth. However, even in the best of this literature, 
capital-ism is not defined, except as a set of institutions that allow markets to work.  
 
In its most basic expression, in the varieties of capitalism literature „capitalism‟ is simply 
equated with markets or market economies. Hall and Soskice (2001) have „capitalism‟ in 
                                                 
5
 The literature on China will be covered in more detail in Chapter Two. 
6
 An important source from the China literature is Qian (2002), one of the few scholars to acknowledge the 
influence of Gerschenkron (1962) on the varieties of institutions literature. For the view that textbook 
economics was right all along and growth in China was due to private firms, see Huang (2008). 
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the title, but in the 540 page edited volume „the market‟ is defined (Hall and Soskice 
2001, p.9) but capitalism is not. Amsden et al (1994) differentiate between markets and 
capitalism, acknowledging that market exchange has been a nearly universal feature of 
economic life throughout history. Not so with capitalism. Markets only require fairly 
simple institutions, but capitalism is unique because it requires “specific, complicated, 
and abstract institutions” (Amsden et al 1994, p.171) such as credit, banks and property 
rights to organize exchange through markets distant in time and space. In capitalism, 
complex institutions facilitate accumulation for long term investment, risk-taking and 
structural change. 
 
In terms of transition countries, the emphasis is on the move „from plan to market‟.7 The 
market remains the key referent, and various institutional configurations exist to enable 
its operation. Planning is portrayed as an institutional distortion. Transition entails the 
removal of obstacles to the operation of the market and institutional transformation to 
ensure the market functions properly.
8
 But capitalism as a unique system is reduced to 
markets and (varieties of) complex institutions. The standard story, with its assumptions 
about capitalism as natural, remains the foundation. All that has been added is another 
layer, emphasizing institutions. However:  
 
 [T]he market is itself an institution. It is still an article of faith … that commodity  
 exchange is an inherent part of the interaction among human beings in a state of  
 nature. The social conditions that make possible the emergence of the institution  
 of generalized market exchange, such as class structure and access to the means of  
 production, remain a closed book (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2003, p.xvi). 
 
Work in economic sociology has attempted to address this. Nee and Swedberg (2005) 
build upon the work of the varieties of capitalism literature and its emphasis on 
                                                 
7
 This was the title of a World Bank report on transition (World Bank 1996) and is something of a stock 
phrase in describing the transition process (e.g. Stark 1990, Fforde and de Vylder 1996). 
8
 Not all of the literature follows the plan vs. market dichotomy. Amsden et al (1994) and Nolan (1995) 
both emphasize the importance of the role of the state in transition and economic growth. Nolan (1995) 
specifically rejects the notion of „planned economies‟, arguing that „command economy‟ is a more accurate 
description of socialist economic systems. Planning, in this view, is an indispensable part of state 
involvement in the economy, whatever the mechanisms for allocating resources (command vs. the market). 
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institutions by incorporating social structure as a way to arrive at capitalism as a unique 
social system.  
 
 [M]uch of the literature on the varieties of capitalism is perhaps better described  
 as studies of the political and economic history of individual Western countries  
 and how these compare to each other, than as studies of capitalism and its specific  
 dynamic … [C]apitalism has to be understood as a social system centred around  
 profit-making, and not as a collection of social, economic, and political  
 institutions for governance (Swedberg 2005, p.30). 
 
The starting point is that the market is the central institution of capitalism (Swedberg 
2005, p.12). Capitalism is a particular institutional order, with political and economic 
institutions as the “scaffolding for modern capitalism” (Nee and Swedberg 2005, 
p.xxxvii). However, institutions are not just a system of incentives that influence 
individual decision making as in North (1981). Rather, institutions are the “embodiment 
of concrete interests and social relations” (Nee and Swedberg 2005, p.xl). The emphasis 
is on social structure as „congealed interests‟, with a “need to set interests and the way 
that these are played out in social relationships at the centre of the analysis” (Swedberg 
2005, p.31).  
 
In institutional economics, institutions generate incentives that influence individual 
decision making. In economic sociology, institutions as „congealed interests‟ determine 
individual behaviour. The difference is that for institutional economics the focus is on the 
individual and how institutions influence interactions between individuals. The individual 
is the unit of analysis and the key agent. For economic sociology, it is the interest groups 
which matter, and interaction between structural groups or blocs that influence outcomes 
rather than individual choices (Swedberg 2005, p.31). “Interests … are always socially 
defined, and they can only be realized through social relations” (Swedberg 2005, p.8). 
Institutions are “not just humanly devised constraints but social structures that provide a 
framework and conduit for collective action by shaping the interests of actors” (Nee and 
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Swedberg 2005, p.xxxviii). These interests “drive the actions of individuals” and “are 
what supply the force to the economic system” (Swedberg 2005, p.5).  
 
While Nee and Swedberg (2005) shy away from using the term „class‟, other work in the 
economic sociology of capitalism and transition freely uses the term (Eyal, Szelényi and 
Townsley 1998; Eyal 2000; King 2002). The notion of class employed borrows much 
from Weber, Polanyi and Bourdieu (but not Marx), and is consistent with the Nee and 
Swedberg (2005) emphasis on structural groups. Again, it is the interaction between 
various interest groups as social relations which determines outcomes. 
 
 The type of capitalism to emerge after the fall of communism was determined by  
 struggles and alliances in the late communist field of power. Where the  
 nomenklatura managed to convert itself into a propertied class via „spontaneous  
 privatization‟, the result was a system of „capitalists without capitalism‟, i.e., a  
 relatively powerful propertied social class thriving in the context of weak,  
 rudimentary, or even absent capitalist market institutions. Where, on the other  
 hand, the nomenklatura was blocked by an independent intelligentsia, the latter  
 began to understand itself and act as a bildungsbürgertum, a cultural bourgeoisie  
 in charge of building capitalist institutions … The result was „capitalism without  
 capitalists‟ (Eyal 2000, p.49-50). 
 
The economic sociology emphasis on institutions as congealed interests embedded in 
social relations leads to a specific definition of capitalism as a unique social system. The 
primary element used to differentiate different types of economic systems is the method 
of distribution (Swedberg 2005, p.7). In capitalism, the market is the central distribution 
mechanism. However, this goes beyond the simple varieties of capitalism substitution of 
markets for capitalism. “In the great majority of societies throughout history, markets 
have indeed played a role, but usually a marginal one … When one speaks of a market 
economy, in other words, what is meant is an economy where the market is not only used 
for exchange; it also dominates production” (Swedberg 2005, p.12). 
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This definition also goes beyond the Amsden et al (1994) view of capitalism as complex 
institutions, which also differentiates between markets and capitalism. For Nee and 
Swedberg (2005), the essential feature of capitalism is exchange based production driven 
by the profit motive.  
 
 Exchange characterizes the capitalist organization of the economy; and this type  
 of economy derives its dynamic from the fact that the end goal of the economic  
 process is not exclusively consumption, but also profit. The more that this profit  
 is reinvested into production, the more dynamic the economy will be. The two  
 key mechanisms in capitalism, in other words, are organized exchange (the  
 market) and the feedback loop of profit into production (Swedberg 2005, p.8). 
 
The link between this definition of capitalism and structural groups occurs through the 
role of profit-making interests and the institutions generated to realize these interests 
(Nee and Swedberg 2005, p.xlvi). In its application to various contexts, for example 
China (Nee 2005) and Central Europe (Eyal et al 1998), the economic sociology 
perspective incorporates the best of the varieties of capitalism literature, with its 
emphasis on multiple institutional forms influenced by history and politics. However, the 
question remains whether or not this perspective, predicated on structural groups and an 
exchange based definition of capitalism, is adequate for understanding the dynamics of 
capitalism.  
 
1.2 Defining Capitalism 
 
The most immediate feature of the economic sociology perspective is its latent Marxism. 
Class, social relations, reinvestment of profits into production – all are elements of a 
Marxian definition of capitalism. Nevertheless, most of economic sociology is quite 
explicit in its rejection of Marx. The reasons for this are irrelevant, it is enough to ask if it 
is warranted. By examining the two central dimensions of the economic sociology 
perspective – institutions as congealed interests embedded in social relations and an 
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exchange based definition of capitalism – it will be argued that a Marxist approach is 
more applicable.  
 
The first pillar of economic sociology, the conception of social relations as interest 
groups, is an important improvement on the methodological individualism of most 
economics. However, social relations – whether called classes or not – are seen as 
discrete and separate categories. The interest groups, blocs, classes invoked are 
disembodied categories, postulated as existing and exerting influence with little 
explanation of how they came into being.  
 
For example, in Eyal (2000) quoted above, the explanation of why the „independent 
intelligentsia‟ awakens as a self-sacrificing „cultural bourgeoisie‟ is based on examination 
of the nationalist writings of the intelligentsia itself. The whole argument, distilled to its 
essence, reduces to an explanation that in Czechoslovakia a self-aware, independent and 
organized intelligentsia cared more about their country than the nomenklatura thieves in 
Russia. Without delving into the literature on the class position of the intelligentsia, it is 
enough to note that „the intelligentsia‟ in any country is itself heterogeneous and requires 
disaggregation and explanation.
9
 Furthermore, it must be explained why „the 
intelligentsia‟ is an enduring bloc capable of acting in the way described by Eyal (2000).  
 
 There can be a flare-up of solidarities in other groups, but if they are quite  
 heterogeneous in character, the ties may disappear once a particular irritant or  
 problem is removed. Thus, a category like … „the intelligentsia‟ could, quite  
 often, share opinions and lines of action but would rarely produce something akin  
 to a stable trade union (Lewin 1995, p.131-132).  
 
Burawoy (1979) criticized this „metaphysical‟ tendency in sociology, arguing that 
analytic categories cannot be assumed. It is necessary to explain how they are produced 
and reproduced.   
                                                 
9
 An enormous debate within the Marxist literature also grapples with the position of the intelligentsia and 




On the second pillar of economic sociology, an exchange based definition of capitalism, 
Brenner (1977) provides an extensive critique.
10
 The economic sociology definition of 
capitalism is not actually a definition, it is simply a description. It does not explain why 
the profit motive is the main driver or why profits need to be reinvested into production. 
Capitalism exists when this happens, when profit-driven interests exists and institutions 
exist to realize them through exchange. Brenner (1977) argues that it is impossible to 
base a definition of capitalism on exchange. Instead, it is necessary to base the definition 
of capitalism in the realm of production.  
 
In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to start with a basic summary 
of a Marxian definition of capitalism and establish some basic concepts. Marx (1976) and 
Marx and Engels (1998) can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Marx‟s enduring achievement was to recognize … that … capitalism … was not  
 simply the result of the natural build-up of scientific and technological advances  
 over the centuries, or of the steady accumulation of wealth following on from  
 specialization, the division of labour and the resulting expansion of markets as  
 imagined by Adam Smith. Marx looked beyond these apparent stimuli to the  
 growth of manufacturing industry to consider the transformation of social  
 relations underlying these changes. For Marx, capitalism‟s unique dynamism  
 stems from a new social division of labour that compels capitalists to compete in  
 markets through investment in innovation and forces workers to sell their labour  
 to meet their subsistence needs. For the first time in history, the extraction of  
 economic surplus from the direct producers could no longer be achieved through  
political, judicial and/or military coercion, but needed economic means to realize  
the increases in labour productivity required for accumulation (Sender and Pincus  
2006, p.45). 
                                                 
10
 Although Brenner (1977) offers a critique of neo-Marxian dependency theory, labeled by Brenner as 
„neo-Smithian Marxism‟, it is equally applicable to the economic sociology perspective. Wood (2002), a 
student of Brenner, developed the „commercialization model‟ to extend Brenner‟s critique to standard (non-
Marxist) views of the origins of capitalism. 
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 No amount of accumulation, whether from outright theft, from imperialism, from  
 commercial profit, or even from the exploitation of labour for commercial profit,  
 by itself constitutes capital, nor will it produce capitalism. The specific  
 precondition of capitalism is a transformation of social property relations that  
 generates capitalist „laws of motion‟: the imperatives of competition and profit- 
 maximization, a compulsion to reinvest surplus, and a systematic and relentless  
 need to improve labour-productivity and develop the forces of production (Wood  
 2002, p.36-37). 
 
While using slightly different terminology, this view of capitalism is quite similar to that 
used in economic sociology. The crucial elements here are the transformation of social 
relations and identification of an imperative that compels capitalists and workers.  
 
Important to the Marxian definition of capitalism is a distinction between absolute and 
relative surplus. Marx divided the working day into necessary and surplus labour. 
Necessary labour is that labour required to produce the wage of the labourer and ensure 
the reproduction of the worker, whereas surplus labour is the additional labour produced 
by the worker which accrues to the owner of the means of production. Surplus labour 
forms the basis for accumulation.  
 
Absolute surplus results from extending the working day. Accumulation can be increased 
by forcing workers to work additional hours. Relative surplus arises from shortening the 
necessary labour component through increased labour productivity. This extends surplus 
labour within a given working day and increases accumulation. The unique feature of 
capitalism is that for the first time surplus is systematically generated through increasing 
labour productivity, through increasing relative surplus. The systematic tendency to 
increase labour productivity is also the source of capitalism‟s dynamism and the main 




It is not simply that capitalists always want to accumulate, it is that they always must. 
Increased productivity by one capitalist forces all others to either catch up or go out of 
business, since increased productivity reduces production costs and increases output. The 
constant attempt to increase productivity arises from the constant need to increase 
accumulation, either to temporarily leap ahead or catch up with others that have already 
done so. This is the source of the need to reinvest surplus in production and capitalism‟s 
tendency towards “unprecedented, though neither continuous nor unlimited, economic 
development” (Brenner 1977, p.30).  
 
However, these are „laws of motion‟ for an already existing capitalism. How do these 
laws of motion arise? Where does capitalism come from? Addressing these questions 
provides a means to deal with the shortcomings of an exchange based definition of 
capitalism.  
 
Brenner (1977) argues that accumulation through innovation, through increasing 
productivity and relative surplus, is the key process in capitalism. Exchange based 
definitions of capitalism mislocate this process in production for profit in the market.  
 
 [T]here is no doubt that capitalism is a system in which production for a profit via  
 exchange predominates. But does the opposite hold true? Does the appearance of  
 widespread production „for profit in the market‟ signal the existence of capitalism,  
 and more particularly a system in which, as a characteristic feature, „production is  
 constantly expanded and men constantly innovate new ways of producing‟[?]  
 Certainly not, because production for exchange is perfectly compatible with a  
 system in which it is either unnecessary or impossible, or both, to reinvest in  
 expanded, improved production in order to „profit‟. … [T]his is the norm in pre- 
 capitalist societies. For in such societies the social relations of production in large  
 part confine the realization of surplus labour to the methods of extending absolute  
 labour. The increase of relative surplus labour cannot become a systematic  
 feature of such modes of production (Brenner 1977, p.32). 
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„Production for profit via exchange‟ is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
capitalism. This is because the social relations of production determine the imperatives of 
the system. The essential condition for capitalism, and its dynamic growth through 
increasing productivity, is the existence of „free‟ wage labour, with labour power as a 
commodity (Brenner 1977, p.55).
11
 The workers must be separated from direct (non-
market) access to the means of production, forced to sell their labour in order to survive.  
 
 [T]he emergence of possibilities for profitable production thanks to the  
 establishment of commerce … does not necessarily mean the movement of  
 producers to take advantage of them. For this to occur … there must be no  
 substantial barriers to leaving agriculture, such as serfdom or slavery. In other  
 words, any direct forceful controls over the movement of the direct producers,  
 arising from the social relations by which the ruling class extracts a surplus from  
 them, must be eliminated (Brenner 1977, p.35). 
 
Brenner (1977) spends considerable time demonstrating how „production for profit via 
exchange‟ in pre-capitalist (especially feudal) relations of production does not result in 
the imperative to increase productivity. This is because, in feudalism, neither the lords 
nor the serfs depended on the market for survival. Serfs retained direct access to the 
means of production, and lords were able to extract surplus from serfs (typically in the 
form of corvée labour) directly. While surplus might be generated and traded, feudal 
relations of production did not require any necessary improvements in labour 
productivity in order to survive. Since surplus was extracted by force, it was 
systematically diverted from reinvestment into production, instead used to expand the 
non-economic capacity to apply force in order to extract additional surplus.  
 
                                                 
11
 For Weber (1992), as for Marx (1976), an essential condition for capitalism is the existence of wage 
labour. The use to which this essential condition is put is quite different between Weber and Marx. Weber 
was interested in understanding the emergence of the „spirit of capitalism‟, the reorientation of the 
economy towards sustained growth and the change in values that underpinned this. Wage labour, rather 
than the profit motive, was a key feature of „bourgeois capitalism‟, part of what differentiated the economic 
process occurring in Europe from all other types of economic organization. See Greenfeld (2001) for 
discussion. Weber will be discussed further in Chapter Two. 
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The crucial point is that it is the relations of production, and not the existence of profit 
driven production for exchange, which determines outcomes and „laws of motion‟. This 
is why the social division of labour is fundamental.  
 
 What therefore accounts for capitalist economic development is that the class  
 (property/surplus extraction) structure of the economy as a whole determines that  
 reproduction carried out by its component „units‟ is dependent upon their ability  
 to increase their production (accumulate) and thereby develop their forces of  
 production, in order to increase the productivity of labour … In contrast, in pre- 
 capitalist economies, even those in which trade is widespread, can develop only  
 within definite limits, because the class structure of the economy as a whole  
 determines that their component units … neither can nor must systematically  
 increase the forces of production, the productivity of labour, in order to reproduce  
 themselves (Brenner 1977, p.32-33). 
 
The “historically developed structures of class relations (relations of surplus extraction 
and property) open up or foreclose different patterns of development” (Brenner 1977, 
p.38). The rise of the market, of production for profit via exchange, cannot explain the 
emergence of capitalism because it does not determine the transformation of class 
relations of production.  
 
 If, then, the class-structured system of reproduction in which labour power is a  
 commodity lies behind capitalist economic development, while „production for  
 profit in the market‟ cannot in itself determine the development of the productive  
 forces, it follows that the historical problem of the origins of capitalist economic  
 development in relation to pre-capitalist modes of production becomes that of the  
 origin of the property/surplus extraction system (class system) of free wage labour  
 – the historical process by which labour power and the means of production  
 become commodities (Brenner 1977, p.33). 
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It is class relations, relations of production, which are pivotal. Capitalist relations of 
production, based on the existence of „free‟ wage labour and the extraction of surplus 
through production for exchange, generate the imperative to increase productivity by 
reinvesting profits. The dynamism of capitalism is located in the realm of production, in 
the relations of production, and not in the realm of exchange. While the economic 
sociology definition of capitalism is a significant improvement on the non-institutional, a-
historical standard view of capitalism as natural, it nevertheless is built upon the same 
foundations. The primacy of relations of production also demonstrates why an 
institutional definition of capitalism is insufficient. It is not allocation through the market 
or varieties of complex institutions which define capitalism, it is the class structure – a 
particular class structure based on wage labour and surplus extraction through production 
– which provide a definition capable of explaining the uniqueness of capitalism and its 
distinct „laws of motion‟.  
 
An important implication of a production based definition of capitalism is that „transition‟ 
is an inadequate term for understanding the development of capitalism. As Brenner 
(1977) and Wood (2002) emphasize, it is the transformation of the relations of 
production which are crucial. This is necessary in order to overcome the limitations of the 
standard story as commercialization model, where capitalism exists everywhere in 
embryo as natural human tendency. It is the essential difference between „transformation‟ 





There is, however, a potential danger in using „capitalism‟ as a unique and specific mode 
of production. In order for capitalism to be an „ism‟, it must have some defining 
characteristics. These have already been elaborated. The danger is getting trapped into the 
classification game: is Vietnam really capitalist?  
 
                                                 
12
 Some authors in the transition literature do emphasize the importance of transformation over transition, 
but not in the same way. For example, Burawoy (2001) does this in the context of Marxist sociology, 
Ellman (1997) occupies a sort of middle ground, while Fischer and Gelb (1991) simply substitute the terms 
and remain focused on the extension of markets and the removal of obstacles.  
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1.3 Ersatz Capitalism 
 
Using a strict or narrow definition of capitalism frequently results in formulation of an 
ideal type of capitalism. Analysis then proceeds to demonstrate how various actually 
existing forms of capitalism are deformed not quite capitalism, lacking the components 
and dynamism of the ideal type. „Ersatz‟ capitalism is a common feature in the transition 
literature, from both the right and left of the political spectrum.
13
 From the ideological 
right, the most frequent modification of „pure‟ or „real‟ capitalism is „crony‟ capitalism 
(Frye and Shleifer 1997). Corruption, opaque connections between governments and 
firms and in the extreme a form of ignorant cultural condescension (the inscrutable 
orient) all disfigure the true potential of the market as capitalism. From the ideological 
left, „gangster‟ capitalism is most often invoked (Greenfield 1994; Walker 2006), but for 
alternative reasons. The difference is that for the right, crony capitalism is a stunted form 
of capitalism requiring the further removal of barriers to allow true capitalism to flourish, 
while for the left, gangster capitalism either prevents the full development of the 
proletariat and forces of revolution or is a dystopian nightmare destroying the idyllic 
former (nominally) socialist days.  
 
Ersatz capitalism takes a particular form within the Marxist literature, in its extreme 
resulting in the rather unhelpful modes of production debates.
14
 Capitalism is composed 
of specific features – class relations of production based on „free‟ wage labour, 
generalized market exchange, competition, and the resulting imperative to increase 
productivity – and any actually existing production system lacking these components is 
therefore not capitalist. For example, Brenner (1977) frequently wields the narrow 
definition of capitalism to highlight how various agrarian structures in Europe were pre-
capitalist rather than capitalist.  
 
The approach is useful in identifying the key elements of capitalism, but can become a 
theoretical straightjacket rather than useful analytic device. “[T]he search for a „pure‟ 
                                                 
13
 The term „ersatz capitalism‟ comes from Yoshihara (1988) and will be discussed with reference to its 
original application to Southeast Asian capitalism in Chapter Two. 
14
 For a brief and excellent overview of the mode of production concept and the classification debates in the 
Marxist literature, see Harvey (2006), p.25, footnote 12. 
 36 
form of capitalism is misleading, if not inappropriate … [as] there is no single path to 
capitalist dominance” (Hewison 1989, p.2). To overcome the limitations of capitalism as 
ideal type, it is necessary to differentiate between a theoretical mode of production and an 
actually existing society.  
 
The formal analysis of the capitalist mode of production seeks to unravel the stark  
logic of capitalism stripped bare of all complicating features. The concepts  
presuppose no more than is strictly necessary to the task. But a social formation –  
a particular society as it is constituted at a particular historical moment – is much  




For example, when Marx analyzes actual historical events, he uses “broader, more 
numerous and more flexible class categories” which are a “far cry from the neat two-class 
analytics laid out in much of Capital” (Harvey 2006, p.26).  
 
An important implication of the complexity of real life is that multiple modes of 
production can exist simultaneously (Lenin 1960, Poulantzas 1973, Sender and Smith 
1986). 
 
In actual historical situations we will certainly find several modes of production  
intertwined or „articulated‟ with each other, even though one mode may be clearly  
dominant. Residual elements of past modes, the seeds of future modes and  
imported elements from some contemporaneously existing mode may all be found  
within a particular social formation … [T]o understand them [actual historical  
situations] we have to adopt a far more complex frame of analysis than that  
dictated by the analysis of any one particular mode of production (conceived of in  
the narrow sense) (Harvey 2006, p.26, footnote 12). 
                                                 
15
 The concept „social formation‟ is important in the „Althusserian‟ tradition of structural Marxism, for 
example Althusser and Balibar (1970). See Harvey (2006), p.25-26, footnote 12 for a brief review. The 
content of the debates on modes of production and social formations is not relevant here. The point is 
simply to highlight that actually existing societies are more complex than the strict narrow definition of the 
capitalist mode of production. This also helps avoid the „vulgar‟ Marxist debates on base and 
superstructure, while still employing a production based definition of capitalism. 
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Identification of the unique features of capitalism is necessary in order to generate a 
definition whereby capitalism is different from previous periods of history and alternative 
ways of organizing productive life. However, this theoretical ideal type need not 
completely correspond to a particular type of actually existing capitalism. The theoretical 
definition is necessary, since it points to specific features to look for in the development 
of capitalism in a particular society, such as the development of „free‟ wage labour.  
 
But dogmatic adherence to theory is unhelpful. While a Marxist theoretical orientation is 
useful for understanding the development of capitalism in Vietnam, “it cannot be true that 
the answers are immutable” (Aronowitz 2003, p.2). It is necessary to identify the unique 
features of Vietnamese capitalism and the development of capitalism in the actually 
existing particular place that is Vietnam. This requires theoretical flexibility rather than 
rigid application of theory. “The aim is not to produce another model, but rather to allow 
a theoretically informed analysis” (Hewison 1989, p.3). 
 
This requires a return to the varieties of capitalism approach, informed by a production 
based definition of capitalism. Rather than agonize over whether or not Vietnam is really 
capitalist, or only kind of capitalist, whether as crony or gangster or something else, 
Minsky (1991) will be used as the orientation for investigating the changes occurring in 
Vietnam: “there are as many varieties of capitalism as Heinz has pickles” (Minsky 1991, 
p.10). It is extremely difficult to maintain that what is occurring in Vietnam, in the 
context of current global capitalism, is not itself the ongoing development of capitalism. 
Attempting to identify which type of ersatz capitalism is operating in Vietnam misses the 
point since there is no one correct form of capitalism. The more important question is: 
what is the nature of Vietnamese capitalism?  
1.4 Summary 
 
The standard story for the success of Vietnam is based on a particular conception of the 
origins, and hence transition to, capitalism. In this conception, which Wood (2002) refers 
to as the commercialization model, capitalism is the default tendency of human beings to 
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exchange. All that is required for its emergence is the removal of obstacles and barriers to 
these natural tendencies. This view informed much of the transition literature, where the 
solution to the problems of central planning pivoted on stabilization, liberalization, and 
privatization to get the state „out of the way‟. 
 
The institutional literature, sharing affinities with the varieties of capitalism literature, 
argued against the simplistic standard story. Capitalism is not just about „getting the 
prices right‟, not just about incentives to individuals, but also entails complex institutions. 
Without these institutions, the market will not function properly. These institutions can 
appear in various forms, influenced by the particular history and politics of specific 
countries.  
 
While an important improvement on the standard story, the institutions literature also 
relies on an exchange based definition of capitalism, with the market as the key 
institution. It is therefore still built upon the foundations of the commercialization model, 
where exchange is the natural state of human beings. However, this view of capitalism 
cannot identify the unique characteristics that make capital an „ism‟, which differentiates 
it from other periods in history.  
 
A production based definition of capitalism is necessary to overcome these limitations. 
Particular class relations of production, predicated on the existence of a „free‟ wage 
labour force separated from direct access to the means of production, define capitalism. 
These class relations force workers to sell their labour power in the market, and force the 
owners of the means of production to reinvest surplus to increase productivity in order to 
survive. This class relation is the essence of capitalism, and its source of dynamism. The 
constant need to „revolutionize the forces of production‟ is why capitalism is oriented 
towards long term investment and growth – accumulation on an „extended scale‟, 





                                                 
16
 This trifecta – „accumulation, innovation and structural change‟ – is borrowed from Brian Van Arkadie. 
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A specific theoretical model of capitalism is required to identify and specify its 
uniqueness, and provide a guide to empirical investigation into its emergence, but needs 
to be applied flexibly in practice. History and actually existing societies are complex and 
necessitate a broader approach, with a theoretically informed return to the varieties of 
capitalism approach rather than using a narrow ideal type of capitalism and its ersatz 
forms. For Vietnam, it is necessary to examine the process and patterns of accumulation, 
and the degree to which this results in long term investment and structural change. Using 
a production based definition of capitalism as foundation, attentive to unique historical 









2 The New Class 
 
A key issue for understanding the development of capitalism in Vietnam concerns 
patterns of accumulation and formation of the capitalist class. The primary hypothesis is 
that the capitalist class in Vietnam is emerging from within the state. This is not simply 
because the state has historically played a central role in the development of capitalism 
(Greenfeld 2001, Chang 2002). It is also because of the role of the state apparatus in the 
accumulation of capital in communist Vietnam.  
 
In 1957, Milovan Djilas, a former high-ranking communist official in Yugoslavia, 
published The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. He argued that a New 
Class develops in communist societies: 
 
 The role of the bureaucracy in society, i.e., monopolistic administration and  
 control of national income and national goods, consigns it to a special privileged  
 position … Ownership is nothing other than the right of profit and control. If one  
 defines class benefits by this right, Communist states have seen, in the final  
 analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or of a new ruling and exploiting  
 class (Djilas 1957, p.35). 
 
 The new class obtains its power, privileges, ideology, and its customs from one  
 specific form of ownership – collective ownership – which the class administers  
 and distributes in the name of the nation and society (Djilas 1957, p.45). 
 
A contradiction emerges between the legal definition of property as collective and the de 
facto ownership of national property by the New Class:  
 
 The new class instinctively feels that national goods are, in fact, its property, and  
 that even the terms „socialist‟, „social‟, and „state‟ property denote a general  
 fiction. The new class also thinks that any breach of its totalitarian authority  
 might imperil its ownership. Consequently, the new class opposes any type of  
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 freedom, ostensibly for the purpose of preserving „socialist‟ ownership. Criticism  
 of the new class‟s monopolistic administration of property generates the fear of  
 the possible loss of power … Property is legally considered social and national  
 property. But, in actuality, a single group manages it in its own interest … This  
 contradiction cannot be resolved without jeopardizing the class’s position (Djilas   
1957, p.65, emphasis added). 
 
How this contradiction is resolved will influence class formation and the development of 
capitalism in Vietnam. The New Class concept will be used as a lens to explore this 
transformation.  
 
2.1 The New Class Context 
 
The term „New Class‟ was coined by Bakunin around 1870 (King and Szelényi 2004, 
p.vii). Using this term associated Djilas with an existing tradition focused on the role, 
class position, and power ambitions of intellectuals. King and Szelényi (2004) identify 
three „waves‟ of New Class theories, locating Djilas in the second „bureaucratic-
technocratic‟ wave of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.17 This „wave‟ attempted to define the 
role of bureaucrats, particularly in socialist systems, and debated the degree to which 
these systems were „socialist‟ or in fact „state capitalism‟. 
 
Although not regularly mentioned in discussions of Djilas, he does refer to communist 
systems as state capitalism when describing the bureaucracy as the New Class (Djilas 
1957, p.33-35). By the time Djilas wrote The New Class, the debate over state capitalism 
had by then been going on for over thirty years.
18
 It originated with Lenin, who argued 
that state ownership and ongoing exploitation of workers by bureaucratic managers was 
                                                 
17





 centuries, including Bakunin, which viewed the supposed vanguard role of intellectuals as 
masking class power ambitions, with intellectuals using the working-class movement to engineer their own 
rise to power through state bureaucracies. The third wave in the 1970s focused on the „knowledge class‟, 
emphasizing the role of scientists and managers in large corporations with diffused share ownership. As 
already mentioned, debates on the role of intellectuals are not the focus here and the discussion will centre 
on Djilas and the second „wave‟. 
18
 This discussion of state capitalism is based on Lewin (1995), chapter 8; Resnick and Wolff (2002), 
chapter 4; and King and Szelényi (2004), chapter 3.  
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state capitalism, but nevertheless was progressive and an important step in the direction 
of socialism. This was debated between Stalin and Zinoviev at the Fourteenth Party 
Congress in 1925, with Stalin arguing for a legalistic conception of property rights in 
which state ownership of the means of production was socialism. The issue of property 




The central issue was the definition of capitalism itself. For those in favour of defining 
socialist systems as state capitalism, public ownership did not necessarily abolish 
underlying capitalist class relations.  
 
Lenin said long ago that the whole problem amounts to the question of who is  
controlled by whom, i.e. which class is controlling and which is controlled. Thus  
it is not possible to accept prima facie as progressive every instance of the State  
undertaking economic activity. If the tobacco monopoly meant socialism,  
observed Engels once, then Napoleon and Metternich should be considered the  
founders of socialism (Sachs 1964, p.58). 
 
Poulantzas (1973) argues that nationalization is only a change in juridical ownership, not 
underlying relations of production. Nationalization in Britain, or the United States during 
World War II, did not make them any less capitalist. Until workers control production 
themselves, socialism does not exist. In the Soviet Union, “collective juridical ownership 
conceals a new form of economic „private‟ ownership” where enterprise directors and 
Party bureaucrats constituted a „new bourgeoisie‟ (Poulantzas 1973, p.29). Cliff (1974) 
argues that the state bureaucracy in Russia performed the historic functions of the 
bourgeoisie, namely, accumulation and proletarianization.
20
 Resnick and Wolff (2002) 
explicitly reject the need for private ownership of the means of production as a 
requirement for capitalism, arguing that in the USSR bureaucrats functioned as de facto 
capitalists since they continued to exploit workers. Central planning is an institutional 
                                                 
19
 In addition to Lenin, Stalin and Zinoviev, important participants in these debates over time were 
Kautsky, Bauer, Trotsky, Poulantzas, Cliff, Bettelheim, and Resnick and Wolff. 
20
 Cliff (1974) is discussed in King and Szelényi (2004), p.51-53. 
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configuration, and ongoing accumulation of surplus extracted from workers is an 
exploitative class relation, it is state capitalism.  
 
Much of the state capitalism literature is driven by an anti-Stalinist orientation, 
disillusioned with purges, charismatic totalitarianism, and ongoing exploitation. Hence 
the need to dispute that socialism existed in Stalin‟s Russia by simple fact of state 
ownership. The emphasis on accumulation through bureaucratic privilege is an important 
contribution, but, as Wood (2002) argues, quoted above, accumulation itself, even if 
occurring through exploitation of labour in production, is not capitalism. It does not 
necessarily generate capitalism‟s imperatives and „laws of motion‟. 
 
An additional position in these debates posits that Soviet-style bureaucratic systems are 
not socialism, nor are they state capitalism. Mandel (1992) argues that essentially these 
bureaucracies are an Asiatic mode of production, in which state appointed officials 
extract surplus but fritter it away rather than reinvest it productively. Konrád and 
Szelényi (1979) take a similar position, and argue that abolishing the centrality of private 
ownership of the means of production to justify the new class as state capitalism 
dissolves Marxian analytic categories of any meaning. If capitalism is simply 
accumulation through exploitation, then capitalism has always existed. Instead they 
argue, extended further in King and Szelényi (2004), for use of the Weberian distinction 
between rank and class. Soviet-style bureaucracies were neo-feudal patrimonial estates, 
with privilege and patronage based on rank in the bureaucratic system, rather than an 
economic class deriving power from economic production. Lewin (1995) argues that the 
USSR was neither socialist nor capitalist, but instead a peasant society force marched into 
industrialization with surplus extracted through extraeconomic direct compulsion, an 
„agrarian despotism‟ turned „bureaucratic absolutism‟.  
 
Ultimately, the state capitalism debates and the communist bureaucracy classification 
game devolve back into the unhelpful modes of production debates. There is general 
agreement that these bureaucracies systematically leveraged privileged positions to 
accumulate, but disagreement about whether this is socialism, capitalism, an „Asiatic‟ 
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form, or something else. Recognition of the features of these systems is important, 
classifying them is not. Of more relevance to the changes occurring in Vietnam is the 
Djilas focus on resolving the contradictions of transition.  
 
2.2 New Class Explanations of Transition 
 
Djilas focused on the emergence of a New Class within communist systems. In transition 
settings, a fundamental concern is the reproduction of class power. Under communism, 
New Class power derived from the disjunction between de jure national ownership but de 
facto private control. This foundation for New Class power erodes during transition, in 
particular due to the move away from national ownership and command based allocation 
systems. What happens to Djilas‟ New Class?  
 
As will be argued in the remainder of this chapter, the New Class under the command 
economy generated a pattern of accumulation based on leveraging access to the state. 
This pattern influenced the ways in which the Djilas contradiction was resolved during 
transition, such that capitalist class formation in Eastern Europe and China continued to 
depend on state-related accumulation. However, important differences exist between 
countries and regions, although the broad pattern holds across them all.  
 
The next section discusses Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It introduces the 
concept of „political capitalism‟, in which bureaucratic authority over state assets is 
converted into private property. This allows for identification of key methods used to 
resolve the Djilas contradiction, for example insider privatization. A major consequence 
of these activities is that the line between state and private property is often deliberately 
blurred. Since different countries experienced different outcomes due to unique historical 
and political circumstances, a review of the empirical evidence is conducted to assess the 
validity of political capitalism in Eastern Europe. The over-riding tendency in the 
literature on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is to view attempts to reproduce 
New Class power as inherently corrupt. However, many of the methods used were 
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technically legal and the section concludes with the observation that it is often difficult to 
distinguish between predatory rent-seeking and more productive activities. 
 
Many of these points also emerge in the literature on China, for example the centrality of 
state-related accumulation, the blurred nature of property forms and the lack of clear 
property rights. Nevertheless, growth in China has been phenomenal. One key difference 
between China and Eastern Europe is state continuity. This played a crucial role in 
orienting state-related accumulation towards economic growth. Another feature of the 
China literature is the wide variety of methods used to resolve the New Class 
contradiction. These are discussed in detail to provide insight into processes of capitalist 
class formation relevant for Vietnam. In contrast to much of the literature on Eastern 
Europe which remains preoccupied with the welfare of cadres and the degree to which 
they acquire formal ownership in private businesses, the China literature includes growth 
of private entrepreneurs through connections to the state. It also includes dynamic state 
enterprises. This represents a more nuanced approach to state-related accumulation. The 
common feature remains accumulation through leveraging access to the state, which has 
its roots in New Class accumulation under planning. The review of the China literature 
ends with brief discussion of recent changes in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
 
Following review of the China literature, the literature on the development of capitalism 
in Southeast Asia is examined. While obviously not a direct New Class story given the 
lack of communist bureaucracies, the Southeast Asia literature is nevertheless relevant to 
Vietnam. The literature on Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in particular is quite explicit 
in arguing that the capitalist classes in these countries were created by the state. This 
shares certain affinities with the notion of state-related accumulation and capitalist class 
formation emerging from resolution of the New Class contradiction. Review of the 
Southeast Asia literature also allows discussion of Weberian notions of capitalist 
development and Weber‟s varieties of ersatz capitalism to contrast with the Marxist 
framework advanced in Chapter One. This is used by Hutchcroft (1998) to differentiate 
between the under-performing Philippines and the more dynamic economies of Indonesia 
and Thailand in the 1980s, in which state capture in the Philippines generates a lack of 
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dynamism similar to state collapse in Eastern Europe. In addition, Yoshihara (1988) – 
who coined the term „ersatz capitalism‟ – is discussed in order to evaluate the claim that 
capitalism in Southeast Asia lacks an indigenous technological base and is oriented more 
towards rent-seeking than upgrading and expanding the complexity of output and exports. 
Ultimately, however, as for Eastern Europe, it is quite difficult to separate rent-seeking 
from productive investment in state-related accumulation. Following the discussion in 
Chapter One, this leads to a rejection of the various ersatz capitalisms. The review of the 
Southeast Asia literature ends with discussion of post-Asian Financial Crisis Indonesia, in 
which a powerful oligarchy captures the state, transforming the once dynamic Indonesia 
into a version of the Philippines. This stands as an example of how the development of 
capitalism can be derailed and provides a warning relevant for Vietnam.  
 
2.2.1 Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
 
Staniszkis (1991) argues that what emerged in Poland is political capitalism, a process of 
„making owners of the nomenklatura‟.21 Political capitalism involves the linkage of 
power and capital, turning bureaucratic power over state assets into private capital 
through conversion of political authority into economic power based on private property 
(Staniszkis 1991, p.46). Iván Szelényi, in his foreword to Staniszkis (1991), refers to this 
process as the „bourgeoisification of the nomenklatura‟. It “was a strategy to change the 
foundation of the dominant position of the ruling apparatus without disturbing the system 
of domination” (Szelényi 1991, p.x). Political capitalism resolves the Djilas contradiction 
by creating a new foundation for class power. 
 
Frydman, Murphy and Rapaczynski (1998) extend the concept of political capitalism to 
all of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, referring to it as „capitalism with a 
                                                 
21
 Nomenklatura is a Russian word meaning „coded list‟ and was the term used to describe Party control of 
high-level appointments, including enterprise managers and government officials. Available positions were 
collected into special lists and appointment to a listed position required approval from the relevant Party 
organ (Lavigne 1999, p.4-5; Eyal et al 1998). For further discussion of theorists of political capitalism see 
Eyal et al (1998). The review of political capitalism starts with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union simply because this is where the idea of transition leading to political capitalism was first discussed. 
Contributions from the China literature will be considered in the next section. The geographic separation of 
the transition literature is artificial, since scholars of Eastern Europe did engage with developments in the 
China literature and vice versa.   
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comrade‟s face‟. They argue that “the nomenklatura has been extremely successful at 
converting its political domination into economic might” (Frydman et al 1998, p.44) and 
that “the old nomenklatura has, indeed, mutated into the new capitalist class” (ibid, p.42). 
 
The development of political capitalism is directly connected to the privatization process. 
An important method for accomplishing this is insider or „spontaneous‟ privatization, the 
process whereby managers and state bureaucrats (and, to a lesser extent, workers) 
become owners of state companies they manage. Prior to privatization in most Eastern 
European countries, state enterprises were transformed into joint stock companies. The 
nomenklatura could then acquire shares in these transformed companies, often at steep 
discounts. Furthermore, managers could split up state companies, spinning off the most 
profitable sections into private companies which they own, leaving the less profitable 
divisions within the hollowed out state enterprise (Lavigne 1999). Additional techniques 
included using state equipment and machinery for private production, in which the state 
enterprise would shoulder much of the overhead costs while the output was sold by a 
private company owned by managers and other officials, and leasing out departments, 
functions and machinery at below cost to private companies owned by state managers 
and officials (Staniszkis 1991).  
 
It is important to note that these methods were often perfectly legal as part of ongoing 
reforms, for example leasing out state machinery and equipment (Staniszkis 1991, 
Frydman et al 1998, Lavigne 1999). The emergence of political capitalism did not require 
outright theft. However, a key element of „making owners of the nomenklatura‟ depended 
on leveraging access to state privilege. This included the ability to shift costs onto state 
enterprises while profits accrued to private firms, and preferential access to large state 
contracts and orders, export licenses, land and investment funds.  
 
Since political capitalism involves leveraging state privilege, often by managers and 
officials remaining in the state sector while shifting assets and revenues to private 
companies, ambiguous property rights are a central feature of the process (Staniszkis 
1991). For example, it becomes extremely difficult to separate insiders from outsiders. 
 48 
“What gradually emerges in the privatized companies is a complex ownership structure 
involving banks, investment funds, other enterprises, state asset management agencies, 
and local governments, with a network of cross-ownership” (Lavigne 1999, p.184). Stark 
(1996) refers to this as „recombinant property‟, “a form of organizational hedging, or 
portfolio management, in which actors respond to uncertainty in the organizational 
environment by diversifying their assets, redefining and recombining resources” (Stark 
1996, p.997). Emerging property rights deliberately blur the boundary between state and 
private and between enterprises (ibid, p.997, 1015). “The results … are not well-defined 
rights of private property, yet neither are they a continuation or reproduction of old forms 
of state ownership” (ibid, p.999-1001). 
 
Leveraging state privilege is a legacy from the planning period. Central planning never 
worked according to the model (Kornai 1979). Chronic shortages and material 
imbalances led to institutionalized disinformation, cheating and negotiation between 
bureaucrats and firm managers (Gerschenkron 1962, Van Arkadie and Karlsson 1992, 
Lavigne 1999). Evading the plan to overcome shortage was required to meet actual 
targets and also led to the emergence of a quasi-legal „parallel‟ or „shadow‟ economy, 
what Gerschenkron (1962) referred to as “the normalcy of Soviet mercantilism, 
concealed beneath a generous veneer of socialist phraseology” (Gerschenkron 1962, 
p.295). Elements of this parallel economy operated within the state planning system, and 
“was based on corruption and pilfering or large-scale stealing of state property” (Lavigne 
1999, p.9-10).
22
 For example, differences between artificially low state prices and higher 
parallel market prices provided significant arbitrage opportunities for firms able to 
dispose of products acquired through the state system. Furthermore, these activities were 
quite pervasive and it “would have been difficult to find anybody not practicing it on any 
scale: moonlighting, use of state buildings, machinery, materials for personal needs, use 
of official positions to derive private advantages” (Lavigne 1999, p.42). The continued 
ability to leverage access to the state for private gain allowed the nomenklatura to 
                                                 
22
 Winiecki (1989) distinguishes between centrally approved and disapproved corruption in Soviet-type 
states. Centrally approved corruption included the privilege to shop at special stores, extra food rations, and 
chauffeured cars. Centrally disapproved corruption included payment for favours in obtaining goods and 
services. 
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overcome the Djilas contradiction posed by transition and re-emerge as „nomenklatura 
capitalists‟ (Frydman et al 1998). As Stark (1996) puts it, “actors in the postsocialist 
context are rebuilding organizations and institutions not on the ruins but with the ruins of 
communism” (Stark 1996, p.995). 
 
However, political capitalism did not produce identical results in all countries. Hanley 
(2000) argues that „cadre capitalism‟ took different forms in Poland and Hungary because 
“the ability of nomenklatura members to accumulate economic assets is greatly 
contingent upon the privatization policies instituted by postcommunist governments, 
which in turn reflect the balance of class forces within a given country at the time of 
transition” (Hanley 2000, p.176). Strong working class power resulted in smaller scale 
nomenklatura privatization in Poland, creating a petite rather than grand bourgeoisie 
(ibid, p.177). In Hungary, stronger managerial power allowed greater scope for siphoning 
assets into private satellite firms and hollowing out state enterprises (ibid, p.177-178). 
The Hungarian nomenklatura was therefore able to acquire a larger share of ownership 
rights over productive assets in Hungary than in Poland (ibid, p.176). Hanley concludes 
that “the claim that the communist-era elite has transformed itself into a propertied class 





Róna-Tas (1994) examines Hungary to determine if cadres have been able to convert 
previous political power into economic advantage. Following an excellent review of the 
then available literature on who benefits from transition, with Staniszkis (1991) in the 
„power conversion‟ school, Róna-Tas uses survey responses from interviews conducted 
in 1989 and again in 1991 to argue for different outcomes in different segments of the 
economy, each with its own pattern of recruitment and reward. In private farming, ex-
cadres have no advantage. In non-corporate enterprises (sole proprietorships and 
partnerships), education is more important than former Party membership, but cadres are 
                                                 
23
 Stark and Bruszt (2001) also argue for empirical investigation of specific countries due to path 
dependency and legacies of planning. These influence but do not determine outcomes and results will vary 
across countries. The importance of planning legacies influencing transition outcomes is also discussed in 
Hare, Ishaq and Estrin (1996); Stark (1996); Frydman et al (1998); Vlachousticos (1999); Lavigne (1999); 
Ericson (2002); Hostetler (2009); and Cheshier and Pincus (2010).   
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more likely to have higher education. In corporate enterprises and limited liability 
companies, cadres have a distinct advantage. They facilitate enterprise creation and 
improve financial performance compared to firms run by non-cadres (Róna-Tas 1994, 
p.62, 65). This occurs because cadres are able to access an informal network to acquire 




King (2002) sets out to explain differences between transition outcomes in Poland and 
Russia based on interviews with senior enterprise officials in both countries.
25
 Part of the 
economic sociology tradition, King argues that transition to capitalism is shaped in each 
country by “the pattern of class and intra-class conflict and cooperation during the 
transition” and that “the internal structure of the postcommunist dominant class 
determines how privatization is carried out, which greatly affects enterprise restructuring 
and firm behaviour, which, in turn, determines the nature of the economy” (King 2002, 
p.6).
26
 The pattern of alliance between three dominant class factions – the bureaucracy, 
the technocracy (including managers), and intellectuals – determines the particular „path‟ 
to capitalism in each country. King argues that in Russia the technocrats aligned with 
bureaucrats to produce „capitalism from above‟, resulting in asset stripping, rent-seeking 
and a patron-client based patrimonial political capitalism. In Poland, however, the 
technocrats aligned with the intellectuals to produce „capitalism from without‟, blocking 
the transmogrification of the bureaucrats into a grand bourgeoisie and instead relying 




This perspective shares a common theoretical approach with Eyal et al (1998), one of the 
more comprehensive attempts to empirically test the concept of political capitalism and 
its variants in different countries.
28
 Finding the argument of political capitalism 
                                                 
24
 Informal networks as an important legacy of planning which provide advantages to cadres are also 
discussed in Stark (1990, 1996), Vlachousticos (1999), Frydman et al (1998), and Lavigne (1999). 
25
 These officials include owners, top management and union officials (King 2002, p.10). King interviewed 
officials from 25 firms in Russia and 23 firms in Poland. 
26
 This is similar to Hanley (2000), who is also part of the economic sociology tradition. 
27
 King identifies a third form: „capitalism from below‟ which grows out of the former parallel economy. 
Bureaucrats allow private actors and lower level elites to accumulate in order to increase the legitimacy of 
the reigning bureaucracy. According to King, this is supposed to be occurring in China.   
28
 One of the co-authors, Iván Szelényi, wrote the Foreword to Staniszkis (1991). 
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intuitively appealing, they set out to discover “what happened to the old nomenklatura” 
(Eyal et al 1998, p.114) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In each country 
they interviewed 1000 members of the 1988 nomenklatura; 1000 members of the new 
economic, political, and cultural elites in 1993; and collected the personal life histories of 
5000 adults randomly selected from each country‟s population. Their general finding is 
one of “massive downward mobility among members of the old nomenklatura” and that 
“the old communist nomenklatura had not established itself as a new propertied grand 
bourgeoisie” (ibid, p.115). They allow that political capitalism may explain outcomes in 
Russia, China and other countries like Romania, Bulgaria, and Belarus, but political 
capitalism does not explain what happened in the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland 
(ibid, p.4, 166). It is worth reviewing their data and theoretical conclusions in more 
detail, since it would appear to falsify the notion of political capitalism as way to resolve 
the Djilas contradiction. Furthermore, Eyal et al have been cited by much of the 
subsequent literature as evidence against New Class and „neo-Marxist‟ explanations of 
transition outcomes, including in Vietnam (e.g. Kim 2008). 
 
In their first cut at the data, in all three countries “only half” (roughly 50 percent) of the 
1988 nomenklatura were in 1993 positions of authority (Eyal et al 1998, Table 4.1, 
p.117).
29
 While it is not clear why this is considered „a little‟ rather than „a lot‟, they 
advance their analysis by disaggregating the nomenklatura into political, economic and 
cultural elites. This is an important contribution to the analysis of political capitalism, and 
is based on the work of Erzsebét Szalai, who argued that the socialist nomenklatura was 
not homogeneous and was in fact divided against itself.
30
 For Szalai, the dynamics of 
social change resulted from the struggle between bureaucratic and technocratic factions. 
Eyal et al built upon this, adding cultural elites – the intelligentsia – into the mix.  
 
                                                 
29
 „Positions of authority‟ comprise high political office, high manager – public, high manager – private, 
high cultural office, low-level manager, and entrepreneur. 
30
 For references to Szalai‟s work, see the bibliography in Eyal et al (1998). Szalai wrote predominately in 
Hungarian and discussion here is based on the summary provided in Eyal et al (1998). Lewin (1995) 
provides a masterful description of factionalization in the Soviet bureaucracy, arguing that the growth of 
autonomous bureaucratic fiefdoms as part of the metastasizing Soviet bureaucracy contributed to the 
overall sclerosis which destroyed the Soviet system. 
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The expectation would be that the political capitalism story would hold for political elites 
(bureaucrats). The economic elite (technocrats and managers) may simply maintain 
„positions of authority‟ due to human capital and experience. However, Eyal et al find 
that the political faction of the nomenklatura was the least successful (ibid, Table 4.2, 
p.120). In terms of who successfully remained in „authority‟, the economic elite were the 
big winners. The same result applied to business ownership, with former members of the 
economic faction more likely to report business ownership than former members of the 
political faction (ibid, Table 4.3, p.121). 
 
For Eyal et al, possession of different kinds of Bourdieu-ian „capital‟ explains this result. 
Bureaucrats have „political capital‟, a form of social capital meant to capture the 
connections possessed by members of the cadre network and the ability to leverage state 
privilege. Technocrats and managers have „cultural capital‟, meaning skills and 
managerial expertise. Regarding business ownership, it is “more closely linked to 
technical-managerial know-how (cultural capital) than to the office held during the 
communist period (political capital)” (ibid, p.122). However, even though the economic 
faction fared much better in terms of business ownership, most of the reported ownership 
was in very small firms. Eyal et al conclude that “a great deal of business ownership 
among former cadres in Central Europe is really petty-bourgeois ownership. Such 
ownership does not indicate the formation of a propertied ruling class” (ibid, p.123). 
Personal enrichment through leveraging state privilege did occur, but was the exception 
rather than the rule and the number of successful „kleptocrats‟ was small (ibid, p.123-
124). 
 
[T]he technocratic-managerial elite does not base its authority on private property.  
They have not rushed to become the new propertied bourgeoisie of Central  
Europe. Rather, they exercise power on the basis of their „expert‟ credentials –  
that is to say, their possession of cultural capital. … [T]his is a relatively weak  
foundation from which to exercise authority. The technocratic-managerial elite  




It is here that King‟s (2002) alliances become relevant. Political capitalism was thwarted 
in Central Europe due to an alliance between the technocrats and intelligentsia (Eyal et al 
1998, p.156).  
 
An immediate issue of concern is the quality of the data, since a lot of the argument 
hinges on ownership in only small firms. The first problem, which they acknowledge, is 
very low response rates on questions related to ownership stakes in firms (ibid, p.244, 
footnote 11) and the size of the firms in which stakes are held (ibid, p.246, footnote 34). 
There are several potential reasons for this, an important one being that respondents are 
unlikely to declare that they stole state assets. If political capitalism is about leveraging 
state privilege for personal gain, which Eyal et al refer to at one point as „kleptocracy‟, 
then low response rates are to be expected. If former nomenklatura members hold stakes 
in large corporations, then political capitalism may be at work, which they also 
acknowledge (ibid, p.122). They try to correct for this by asking about the size of 
housing, believing that respondents are less likely to lie about how many rooms are in 
their house or apartment. They find that former members of the political faction have 
smaller houses (ibid, Table 4.7, p.127), but they do not ask how many houses they have, 
nor compare their values.  
 
Given the difficulties of conducting empirical research in transition and developing 
countries, especially on sensitive issues, data problems are normal. This would be less 
damaging if the theoretical structure erected on this problematic data was more coherent. 
Issues regarding the economic sociology usage of „class‟ have already been discussed in 
Section 1.2 above. The problem of disembodied metaphysical categories applies equally 
well to „bureaucrats‟ and „technocrats‟ as to „intellectuals‟.  
 
First, just as the categories employed are disembodied, so are the various „capitals‟. It is 
not clear why these are „capital‟ in any meaningful sense. In the same way that equating 
capitalism with more markets reveals little of value about the distinctive features of 
capital-ism, use of political and cultural „capital‟ in place of networks or skills simply 
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switches one term for another without specifying their distinctive features.
31
 Second, 
ignoring definitional problems, it is not at all clear why managers of state owned 
enterprises are considered technocrats with cultural capital rather than bureaucrats with 
political capital, especially since “Party officials, high-level cadres of the economic 
administration, and enterprise executives belong to the same nomenklatura, and shared 
the same material and political privileges” (Lavigne 1999, p.30).32 If this distinction does 
not hold, then the attribution of different „capitals‟ to different factions becomes 
untenable and the entire explanation falls apart.  
 
Finally, the commitment to formal private property ownership obscures the complexity of 
political capitalism. According to Eyal et al, since the state remains the majority owner of 
large firms, and the economic elite only have stakes in small firms (apparently), then 
managers are just technical experts and Central Europe has „capitalism without 
capitalists‟.33 For Eyal et al, without formal private ownership there can be no capitalists. 
However, they acknowledge Stark‟s (1996) recombinant property and the importance of 
institutional cross-ownership, particularly by banks and other financial institutions which 
remain connected to the state. “The web of institutional cross-ownership is so dense, and 
the back-and-forth between public and private realms so frequent, that it is often 
impossible to tell what distinguishes public from private ownership” (Eyal et al 1998, 
p.137). If this is true, then the emphasis placed on formal private property is misguided. 
Theoretical limitations and data problems allow for a high degree of skepticism towards 
their conclusions and the political capitalism story remains more compelling. 
 
                                                 
31
 See Fine (2001) for a withering critique of Bourdieu‟s „capitals‟, particularly social capital. 
32
 This is not just a problem in the economic sociology of Eyal et al (1998) and King (2002). Hellman, 
Jones and Kaufmann (2003) make a similar move, for some reason separating state enterprise managers 
from the state. 
33
 In 1993, state ownership remained the predominant form in Central Europe, with more than half of the 
3000 largest firms at least partially state owned, and over 65 percent of firms with more than 300 
employees at least 50 percent state owned (Eyal et al 1998, p.140). In 1993, over two-thirds of the new 
economic elite had previously been communist managers and the CEOs of the 3000 largest firms in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were “very likely to have begun their careers in top economic 
positions under communism” (ibid, p.132). In Hungary, less than two percent of these CEOs in 1993 were 
private entrepreneurs in 1988 (ibid, p.132). No attempt is made to connect this result with Róna-Tas (1994), 
who is only mentioned once as having done some statistical work on cadres converting political power into 
economic privilege.   
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What is to be made of political capitalism? Even though many of the processes identified 
were in fact legal, much of the literature discusses political capitalism in terms of 
„kleptocracy‟ and nefarious insider deal-making (e.g. Frydman et al 1998).34 For 
example, Burawoy (2001) argues that Russia experienced transition without 
transformation. Reforms were only skin deep, “they only peeled off the outer layer of the 
Soviet order” (Burawoy 2001, p.13). The result was a mercantilist „booty capitalism‟ 
based on monopoly rents rather than reinvesting surplus in production. However, it is not 
“a simple matter to distinguish between rent-seeking – taking advantage of control over a 
resource, such as land or a government-granted monopoly, to extract profit without 
productive reinvestment – from capitalism proper” (McVey 1993, p.8).35 This will be 
explored further in the following sections. 
 
The literature on political capitalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
provides a useful starting point for investigating the changes occurring in Vietnam. 
Resolution of the Djilas contradiction, how New Class power can be reproduced in 
transition, involved the continued ability to leverage access to the state in order to 
accumulate. The boundary between public and private property is deliberately blurred as 




The most important difference between China and Eastern Europe is that economic 
reforms in China did not entail political collapse (Nolan 1995, Burawoy 1996). As a 
result of political continuity, the bureaucracy endured. Although reforms commenced in 
                                                 
34
 However, Lavigne (1999) believed that no other alternative existed because of a lack of qualified non-
nomenklatura managers to fill privatized firm leadership posts. Staniszkis (1991) and Frydman et al (1998) 
both view political capitalism as a form of primitive accumulation, and believed that the elite, with its 
power now based in market assets, could become a force for political change. Seeking to consolidate their 
gains, this elite would agitate against the remaining bureaucracy in favour of rule of law and property rights 
security.   
35
 McVey (1993) goes on to argue that “Max Weber employed the term „political capitalism‟ to refer to 
systems in which office and connections were employed to ensure profits; he saw this as a common feature 
of pre-modern economies and illustrated it particularly with China. It would appear, then, that he did not 
see the line between capitalism and the rent-seeking of power-holders to be as absolute as many present 
analysts do” (McVey 1993, p.8, footnote 4). 
 56 
the late 1970s, formal privatization of state firms did not become relevant until the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, similarities exist with the transition process in Eastern Europe. Since 
policies and reform outcomes have varied significantly over China‟s thirty years of 
reform, it is necessary to employ a rather crude distinction between the 1980s and 1990s 




This section begins by examining property rights in the 1980s, discussing at length the 
variety of forms which emerged in China, blurring the distinction between state and 
private and all connected in some way to the state. In then moves to discussion of 
similarities between the processes in China and Eastern Europe, particularly in the 1990s 
as formal privatization becomes more prevalent. However, a key difference between 
China and Eastern Europe is that accumulation through leveraging access to the state, for 
example through political connections, is viewed as growth-enhancing rather than the 
perceived thievery of Eastern Europe. Throughout the discussion the connections to the 
planning period are highlighted. The section then turns to a critique of the China 
literature, in particular its focus on decentralized decision-making and its view of state 
enterprises as moribund. Some state enterprises, for example, recorded impressive growth 
during the 1980s and 1990s due to increased competition. Furthermore, it is now difficult 
to separate many large state firms with interlocking interests in other state, private and 
foreign firms from large private firms which have grown through state connections. The 
section concludes by examining the changing relationship between the Chinese 
Communist Party and the „new bourgeoisie‟.  
 
Following decollectivization of agriculture and implementation of the household 
responsibility system, rural output in the early 1980s grew rapidly. The central 
government also relaxed controls on state monopolies and allowed entry of non-state 
firms into previously protected areas, particularly in manufacturing (Naughton 1994).
37
 
As agricultural productivity improved, labour was released into rural light industry, 
employed in the rapidly expanding Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). While 
                                                 
36
 The focus here is on the period between the 1980s and early 2000s. For discussion of Chinese reforms in 
the 2000s, see Nolan (2004), Naughton (2007) and Steinfeld (2010). 
37
 For a full account of reforms and the sources of Chinese growth during this period, see Naughton (1995). 
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there is disagreement about the property rights status of TVEs, there is general agreement 
that TVEs were not state firms in the full sense, nor were they private firms, but rather 
some form of „rural local government property‟ (Putterman 1995, p.1052) or „local-
government-sponsored firms‟ (Naughton 1994, p.477).38  
 
Why did TVEs grow so rapidly? Ambiguous property rights are not supposed to be 
conducive to investment and growth. Two related answers have been provided. The first 
is that fiscal decentralization generated hard budget constraints for provinces and lower 
levels of government (Wong 1988, Oi 1992). The Chinese central government reduced 
fiscal support for sub-central administrative units while also fixing their tax sharing 
burden with the centre. Local governments could no longer rely on redistributions from 
the centre to cover administrative expenses, but if they managed to grow their local tax 
base they could keep revenues in excess of the fixed share amount. Local level economic 





Walder (1994) argues that these changes form part of a continuum with the command 
economy period, in which enterprise autonomy increased and tacit official approval of 
second economy activity also increased. This opened up space for cadres and managers 
of state firms to pursue market-based activities rather than simply perform bureaucratic 
functions. Nevitt (1996) argues that these reforms created new career opportunities for 
officials beyond the traditional „ladder-of-advancement‟ strategy within the bureaucracy. 
Economic reforms also created the „big fish in a small pond‟ strategy, in which support of 
local business allowed local officials to “increase the wealth, power and independence of 
the territories and organizations over which they exercise authority” (Nevitt 1996, p.38).  
 
Second, “much of the confusion about property rights in the huge rural industrial sector 
has simply been because property rights in the most rapidly growing regions have varied 
in fundamental ways” (Walder and Oi 1999, p.12). Walder and Oi (1999) categorize the 
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 Huang (2008) is an exception, arguing that TVEs were private firms all along. 
39
 See Thun (2004) for a critique of the flexibility provided by decentralization due to constraints resulting 
from institutional inertia. 
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variety of property forms in rural China into three types: corporatist, littoral, and 
hollowed out. In the first form, the fiscal bind created incentives for „local state 
corporatism‟ (Oi 1992). China‟s state sector is not homogenous and administrative 
decentralization resulted in clearer property rights at the lowest levels of government 
(Walder 1995). Local governments operated as market-oriented firms, with TVEs as 
production units of local governments. “Growth will result as long as there are secure 
property rights for some organized unit and sufficient incentives for that unit to pursue 
growth. The impressive growth of collective rural industrial output between 1978 and 





In the littoral form, local government officials are not directly involved in running rural 
industry. Their focus is on supporting the development of private enterprises to increase 
local government revenues. However, “private firms could not grow very large without 
attracting the negative attention of higher officials outside the locality. For these firms to 
grow, their true property arrangements had to be masked for political reasons” (Walder 
and Oi 1999, p.16). This led to the „red hat‟ phenomenon, in which “private business 
worked together with local officials to shield the essentially private nature of local 
industry and commerce by designating private firms as „collective‟ or publicly owned” 
(Walder and Oi 1999, p.14). It is worth departing briefly from Walder and Oi to explore 
this form in more detail because of ongoing confusion over the relative importance of 
state versus private property forms. 
 
Liu (1992) discusses economic development in Wenzhou, the first place in China to 
become dominated by private sector economic activity. The „red hat‟ phenomenon was 
prevalent, and private entrepreneurs in Wenzhou were even invited to join the Party (Liu 
1992, p.296). Particularly in the early days, many private sector activities were semi-legal 
or outright illegal and “without the bold steps taken by local officials to shelter deviant 
                                                 
40
 This phenomenon is also referred to as „state entrepreneurship‟ (Duckett 2001) and „bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship‟ (Tobin and Sun 2005). 
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economic practices, it would have been very difficult for the private sector to come to 
dominate the local economy in Wenzhou” (ibid, p.298).  
 
Local cadres did this because it dramatically increased local government revenues and 
“brought tremendous personal income for local cadres” (ibid, p.304). Personal income 
was generated through extortion, bribery and the „power share‟, where private 
entrepreneurs gave local cadres free shares in their firms in exchange for protection (ibid, 
p.305). In addition, to improve cadre morale the Wenzhou municipal government allowed 
relatives of local cadres to engage in private business. These private firms were usually 
run by cadres themselves (ibid, p.305). Liu (1992) concludes that:  
 
[C]adres are willing to shelter private industry not because of altruism, but 
because this serves their own interests rather well. Either they themselves engage 
in private industry, or they gain illegal benefits from peasants‟ private businesses, 
or both. It seems that it is this coincidence of interest between the local cadres and 
peasants in the private sector which inclines the cadres to tolerate local deviant 
practices and bypass state policies, and to allow private industry in Wenzhou to 




Wank (1999a) examines the development of private traders in Xiamen, a port city in 
Fujian province that was designated a special economic zone in 1980.
42
 Intending to 
discover the property rights underlying booming private trade, Wank instead found that 
“entrepreneurs running private trading companies … must cultivate patron-client 
networks with local state agents in order to maximize profit and security” (Wank 1999a, 
p.i). The obviously memorable interview with Boss Short Pants, operator of a business 
                                                 
41
 This localism is common in rural China. Wenzhou was the pioneer in protecting the local private sector 
and promoting growth of private industry because of its particular history. Wenzhou was liberated in 1949 
by an independent local communist guerilla force which later became incorporated into the larger Chinese 
communist Party. Liu (1992) argues that this unique historical legacy provided Wenzhou cadres with a high 
degree of local solidarity, which translated into ongoing resistance to state-imposed collectivization in 
order to defend local interests. After reforms in 1978, it led Wenzhou cadres to protect local entrepreneurs 
and resulted in the private sector dominating local economic activity. 
42
 Wank conducted fieldwork in Xiamen over an 18 month period between June 1988 and June 1990. 
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group including state and private companies, summed up the local attitude to property 
rights: 
 
Read the damn government policy if you want to know about property rights. … 
Property rights give you only a legal existence. But your market activities depend 
on the social environment. If your connections with officialdom are good, then 
your business can develop, but if they are bad then officialdom squeezes you and 
you can‟t get anywhere (ibid, p.4). 
 
In other interviews, private firms declared themselves public enterprises, public firms 
claimed to be private, and others claimed to be a bit of both (ibid, p.3). Wank concluded 
that “concern with legal property rights was misplaced” (ibid, p.4). More important to 
commercial success were the character of an entrepreneur‟s connections to local cadres.  
 
Personal ties with state agents enhance access to profit opportunities located in the 
state‟s bureaucracy and protect subsequent wealth accumulations. Commercial 
rationality, therefore, also entails the social process of forging and cultivating the 
personal ties to local government through which business-enhancing resources 
flow. Business strategies and competition are patterned by the different 
accumulations of personal ties through social background and skill in the „art of 
social relations‟ of specific firm operators (ibid, p.4-5). 
 
Clientelism had its roots in the redistribution system of the command economy. Rather 
than destroying these relations, reforms resulted in their commodification. Public assets 
and privileges (such as trading licenses) administered by the bureaucracy became subject 
to price calculations. Entrepreneurs accessed these assets and privileges through existing 
relations and by forging new commercial connections with local government officials 
(ibid, p.30).  
 
Patron-client relations reduce uncertainty during transition, since formal rules “specifying 
what is permissible are often vague, incomplete, or nonexistent, while those that do exist 
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can suddenly be changed by the central state or particularistically enforced by local 
agencies” (ibid, p.36). This requires what Yang (2002) refers to as „double 
entrepreneurship‟ in China, encompassing identification of profitable market 
opportunities while also manipulating ambiguous rules and navigating an uncertain 
institutional environment. As in Wenzhou, many trading activities in Xiamen were at best 
semi-legal and patron-client relations provided needed protection. These relations 
stabilize expectations and enable transactions that would not otherwise occur. 
 
Returning to Walder and Oi (1999), the littoral form was not the textbook story of private 
property rights generating private sector growth. Property rights were often deliberately 
blurred for political reasons and the growth of firms was directly linked to the local state. 
 
The third property form identified by Walder and Oi (1999) involves the process of 
hollowing out public property. It comes in two varieties. In the first, public village 
property is transformed by local elites into personal, often family, property (Walder and 
Oi 1999, p.17). In the second, state agencies and state firms use public funds to create 
private firms. In both, “the budgets of state agencies and enterprises, the income and 
living standards of their employees, and the personal wealth of officials have all become 
increasingly dependent upon this „private economic backyard‟ of the public sector” (ibid, 
p.18). This form bears the most resemblance to practices which occurred in Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Wank (1999b) explores the hollowing out process. Using his Xiamen interviews, he tells 
the other side of the story as the entrepreneurial „strategy from above‟, in which cadres 
engage in shifting public assets into private property.
43
 Two particular state property 
forms are used as vehicles to achieve this: branch firms and leased firms.  
 
Branch firms were established by geographically distant state firms to take advantage of 
Xiamen‟s special economic zone. Branch firm operators had user rights to firm assets and 
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 The „strategy from below‟ corresponds to his coverage of private traders in Wank (1999a). Private 
entrepreneurs establish links with government officials to obtain access to scarce information, resources, 
and political protection. 
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limited income rights. Since most operators were current or former government officials, 
they possessed strong government connections and used them in three different ways for 
private gain. The first method was profiteering, taking advantage of the two-price system 
in existence during the 1980s. “[G]oods procured at administrative prices could be resold 
at market prices for a profit” (Wank 1999b, p.256). The second method was „pocket-
swapping‟, facilitated by the weak monitoring of the distant parent firm. In this method, 
the branch operator would invest in “real estate and other fixed assets … which they then 
resell at low prices to affiliated private firms operated by family members” (ibid, p.256). 
The third method was „pulling over connections‟, in which the branch operator would 
shift all of the firm‟s suppliers and customers to an affiliated private firm.  
 
In the leasing method, profits accrued to the private lessee while debts and overhead 
remained with the state firm. Although government regulations stipulated that leasing had 
to be done by open bidding, bids were routinely rigged (ibid, p.257). Furthermore, the 
lease price was frequently undervalued, with the low cost of leasing resulting in increased 
profits (ibid, p.258). In both the branch firm and leased firm, these activities often 
bankrupted the parent state firm while profits for affiliated private firms soared. 
 
Walder and Oi (1999) sought to understand how ambiguous property rights could 
generate growth in China in the 1980s. Their recognition of a variety of property forms, 
connected to the state in different ways, is an important contribution to the literature. For 
the 1980s, they stress the prevalence of the corporatist and littoral forms, arguing that 
while hollowing out was occurring, “the kind of legal maneuvers referred to in Eastern 
Europe as „nomenklatura privatization‟, where officials transfer legal ownership to 
themselves as part of a transition to a market economy, have not been common” (Walder 
and Oi 1999, p.23).
44
 They imply that this process may be becoming more prevalent in 
the 1990s, but leave the question open. 
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 Furthermore, Walder and Oi (1999) argue that „hidden privatization‟ (Nee 1992), similar to the red hat 
phenomenon of disguising private firms as public enterprises in the littoral regions, was not occurring in 
corporatist areas but was becoming more prevalent in the 1990s.   
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Wank (1999b) highlights the similarities between hollowing out in China and political 
capitalism in Eastern Europe. For Wank, political continuity is the primary reason patron-
client networks generated positive growth outcomes in China. Political stability generated 
network stability, from the pre-reform period through the 1980s, stabilizing expectations 
for both cadres and entrepreneurs. Rectification and anti-private business campaigns 
might occasionally sweep through, but central government commitment to political 
continuity meant that system collapse was never imminent. This facilitated longer-term 
and more complex investments, rather than a narrower focus on only stealing public 
assets. In addition, the fiscal bind meant that local governments in China did have an 
interest in successful firms. Cadres had to strike a balance between extortion, bribery and 
other forms of bureaucratic harassment and firm growth. Finally, fiscal and 
administrative decentralization did not mean the central state withered away. In 
particular, the capacity to discipline remained, and local cadres engaged in excessive 
corruption could be dealt with quite swiftly and often very publicly. However, Wank 
notes that “the various entrepreneurial strategies adopted in the nonstate economy of the 
late 1980s mostly by smaller local firms are moving up the state hierarchy to encompass 
larger state-sector enterprises and higher-level officials at the city and provincial levels in 
the 1990s” (Wank 1999b, p.260). 
 
Ding (2000a) confirms this, including the “striking similarities … between Communist 
Party-governed China and the ex-Soviet bloc countries” (Ding 2000a, p.24) in terms of 
asset stripping and nomenklatura privatization, the pace of which “accelerated since the 
late 1980s and continues to expand during the second half of the 1990s” (ibid, p.2).45 
Ding identifies three methods for diverting state assets and state enterprise profits into 
private firms run by managers and officials: organizational proliferation, consortium-
building, and „one manager, two businesses‟. Organizational proliferation covers many of 
the processes identified by Staniszkis (1991), including spinning off the best equipped 
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 Ding (2000a) is based on fieldwork conducted between 1995 and 1997 in seven large and mid-sized 
Chinese cities in the eastern and southern regions, “where economic reform and development were 
generally ahead of the rest of the country, as was illicit asset stripping” (Ding 2000a, p.2). Ding (2000b) 
extends this analysis to include China‟s offshore businesses. Similar to Wank (1999b), Ding (2000a) argues 
that political continuity, lack of a large scale formal privatization programme (until recently), and the 
enduring ability to discipline cadres explain differences in growth outcomes between China and Eastern 
Europe, even though engaged in similar processes.   
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and most profitable segments into new companies and cost shifting, in which the parent 
firm pays the overheads of the affiliate firm (Ding 2000a, p.3). As in Wank (1999b), 
these processes frequently bankrupted the state parent firm while affiliates profited. As 
long as the state remained willing to cover public enterprise liabilities, organizational 
proliferation as hollowing out subsidized this process.
46
 Consortium-building involves 
establishing affiliates, often in the same industry and in close geographic proximity. An 
important function of consortia is to shield revenues from the state through transfer 
pricing. In „one manager, two businesses‟, a state enterprise manager establishes a private 
firm, often run by a relative or close friend. The manager can use state enterprise funds as 
short-term loans to the „second business‟ and also divert lucrative state enterprise 
contracts to the affiliate. Finally:  
 
A rough chronological order can be found among the three broadly defined 
strategies. Organizational proliferation appeared first. It was already occasionally 
reported at the beginning of the 1980s and became widely observable after the 
mid-1980s. Consortium-building emerged in the second half of the 1980s, and the 
early 1990s saw a big surge in its growth. The phenomenon of „one manager, two 
businesses‟ surfaced later, its spread largely starting in the first half of the 1990s 
(Ding 2000a, p.3) 
 
Walder (2002) provides a nice summary of the different strategies of rural elites in the 
1980s and 1990s.
47
 Walder distinguishes between marketization and privatization, two 
distinct patterns of change which generate different outcomes. Marketization comprises 
increased competition and hardening enterprise budget constraints and is associated with 
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 This is similar to the process identified by Stark (1996) in Hungary. 
47
 There is a separate and large literature on the career mobility of officials, beginning with Nee (1989) and 
the Market Transition Theory which asserted that reforms would reduce administrative privilege in favour 
of direct producers (entrepreneurs). This was refined by Nee (1991) and sparked wide debate. Róna-Tas 
(1994) was responding, in part, to Nee. Along with Bian and Logan (1996) and Bian, Shu and Logan 
(2001), the finding is that administrative power is not necessarily reduced in transition and reproduction of 
privilege occurs. Guthrie (2000) provides an excellent review of the literature. However, Walder (2002) 
summarizes it best by noting that “a mixed pattern of elite continuity and change has been found in most 
settings” and conceptual confusion has led to accumulation of empirical studies “without reconciling 
proponents of different views” (Walder 2002, p.8). 
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reforms in the 1980s. Privatization entails the transfer of government property to new 
owners and is associated with reforms in the 1990s (Walder 2002, p.7). 
 
Walder (2002) distinguishes three periods of privatization in rural China: 
decollectivization, followed by the growth of private rural enterprise as creation of new 
private assets, and, by the early 1990s, formal transfer of public enterprises (ibid, p.11-
13). The first two periods are characterized by marketization, while the most recent 
period is privatization proper. This matters because “to the extent that assets are small, 
require intensive work, and call for widely available skills to generate income, those with 
power and influence will have fewer advantages in working them, and will find them less 
attractive” (ibid, p.11). Walder finds that during the 1980s, as small assets acquired 
private owners in the process of marketization, village administrative elites and state 
enterprise managers both tended to remain in the state sector (ibid, p.21-22). They had 
higher incomes relative to the alternatives and could use their positions to assist family 
members into similar high salary state positions. Ordinary (non-cadre) households as 
private entrepreneurs benefited the most during this period (ibid, p.13). 
 
In contrast, to “the extent that assets are large and concentrated, people in positions of 
power and influence will be more likely to have the access and influence necessary to 
seize them” (ibid, p.11). In the 1990s, local cadres began moving into private 
entrepreneurship. However, they did not do so directly, instead assisting „cadre kin‟ 
(family members) into ownership of newly privatized assets. State enterprise managers 
also began shifting into the private sector (ibid, p.21-22). “This shift coincided with the 
early stages in the privatization of public enterprises” (ibid, p.22), indicating the 
emergence of „insider privatization‟ common in Eastern Europe.  
 
There is continuity and change at work here. Zhou (2009) finds that investment in 
„political capital‟ by private entrepreneurs remains crucial to secure access to resources 
through the 1990s and into the 2000s, particularly bank financing. Wank‟s (1999a) 
patron-client networks endure through ongoing reforms, but the source of patronage 
transforms. Opportunities for arbitraging the two-price system or selling import quotas, 
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for example, diminish over time. While direct monopolies over goods and services 
decline, new regulations provide state agencies new forms of control (Wank 1999a, p.34). 
These too become commodified rather than disappearing in the move „from plan to 
market‟.48  
 
These mechanisms can operate over long time periods. Goodman (2000) finds that in 
Shanxi province “cadres are almost universally able to use their political position for 
individual economic benefit” (Goodman 2000, p.164), what Goodman refers to as the 
“hint of a Djilas-described „new class‟ emerging with the inter-generational transfer of 
privilege and power” (ibid, p.164).49 It is inter-generational because to “a large extent, the 
local business elite are the children of the local political elite” (ibid, p.183), following a 
pattern of peasant to cadre to businessman in three generations. 
 
However, this process obviously need not be inter-generational, nor limited to small 
firms. Now beyond „red hats‟, Dickson (2003) examines „red capitalists‟, “entrepreneurs 
with close personal and political ties to the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]. Many of 
the most wealthy entrepreneurs formerly held high-level Party and government posts, and 
some are even the offspring of China‟s leaders. A far larger number of private 
entrepreneurs are former mid-level officials, or simply rank-and-file Party members who 
did not hold formal posts but left their previous jobs to go into business” (Dickson 2003, 
p.4). Dickson identifies two types of red capitalist. The first are xiahai entrepreneurs, 
former Party members „plunging into the sea‟ of private business following Deng 
Xiaoping‟s 1992 southern tour.50 The second are private entrepreneurs co-opted by the 
Party, following Jiang Zemin‟s 2001 call to allow them to join.51 This two-way flow – 
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 For a theoretical formulation of this process, in which privatization does not entail state retreat, see 
Mitchell (1991) and Hibou (2004). Gainsborough (2009b) applies this framework to Vietnam. 
49
 Goodman (2000) conducted interviews with local cadres (sub-provincial, county, and section levels) in 
1996 and 1997 in Shanxi province to assess continuity and change in the social background of the local 
elite.   
50
 It was on this tour to bolster support for his economic reforms that the officially retired Deng supposedly 
said “to get rich is glorious” (see Dickson 2003, p.107). 
51
 As Liu (1992) noted, private entrepreneurs had previously been invited to the join the Party. This was 
officially disallowed as part of the anti-private sector crackdown following the 1989 Tiananmen 
demonstrations. 
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Party members into private business and private entrepreneurs into the Party – is an 
important difference with Eastern Europe.  
 
The result in China is that “the private sector in China now encompasses individually 
owned and operated enterprises at one end and large scale industrial and commercial 
enterprises with hundreds of workers and scope of operations that cover the whole 
country and even the international market at the other” (ibid, p.5). While many of the 
smaller firms are run by private entrepreneurs, many of the large private enterprises are 
run by red capitalists.  
 
China‟s strong and sustained growth record has led to a different perception of the 
„nefarious‟ processes compared to Eastern Europe. Instead of „kleptocrats‟, China has 
„double entrepreneurs‟ (Yang 2002) and „bureaucratic entrepreneurs‟ (Tobin and Sun 
2005) who skillfully navigate and manipulate the uncertainties of transition. Private 
entrepreneurs mobilize patron-client networks to engage in business through the state 
(Wank 1999a). The boundary-blurring between state and private is treated as a growth-
enhancing innovation. While there is general agreement that these processes generate 
significant corruption, productive outcomes resulted from the political continuity of the 
Chinese party-state (Nolan 1995, Burawoy 1996, Wank 1999b, Ding 2000a, Holstrom 
and Smith 2000). 
 
The literature reviewed to this point highlights some important features of China‟s 
transformation. Formal private property rights have played a relatively insignificant role 
in China‟s growth. Deliberate blurring of the boundary between state and private through 
local state corporatism, „red hatting‟, patron-client networks, asset stripping, and „red 
capitalists‟ render the formal ownership categories of „state‟ and „private‟ rather 
irrelevant (Naughton 1994, Putterman 1995, Walder and Oi 1999, Wank 1999a, Ding 
2000a, Dickson 2003). As Breslin (2004) notes: 
 
[D]espite the fact that the non-state sector is now bigger than the state sector, the 
state-economy relationship remains extremely strong in contemporary China. 
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Much of what is considered non-state remains heavily connected to officialdom 
through various mechanisms. Much of the non-state sector in contemporary China 
has its origins in the party-state sector that spawned it (Breslin 2004, p.22). 
 
In addition, legacies from central planning remain strong, for example in the enduring 
clientelist networks discussed by Wank (1999a). Finally, recognition of variation across 
the large geography of China and over the thirty years of reform provides insight into the 
multiple mechanisms and processes at work, moving beyond a linear story of movement 
from plan to market. 
 
However, two issues with this literature need to be addressed. The first issue is the focus 
on local level governments and the central importance attributed to administrative and 
fiscal decentralization. The importance of political continuity has already been discussed, 
but the „centre‟ is frequently relegated to the background, setting the parameters of 
activity through allowing increased competition, altering fiscal arrangements and 
providing more autonomy for managers and officials at lower decision making levels. 
This „space‟ is then mobilized by local governments in different ways, often quasi-legal 
at the time, to drive change from below. Agents of the „centre‟ occasionally sweep 
through localities to conduct anti-private sector campaigns or crack down on corrupt 
officials. But they leave, and business returns to normal (Liu 1992, Wank 1999a).  
 
Cai and Treisman (2006) provide a challenge to this view. The argument will not be that 
local level initiative was irrelevant, or that the Chinese state is somehow unitary and had 
a clear blueprint for reform „from above‟. Naughton (1996) demonstrates the ad hoc and 
reactive process of Chinese reforms, with unintended consequences continually forcing 
adaptation in unanticipated ways. “Chinese leaders have not so much been systematically 
groping for stepping stones in order to cross the river as they have been slogging around 
in a swamp” (Naughton 1996, p.22). The central conclusion of Cai and Treisman (2006), 
a simple inversion of emphasis from decentralization to centralization, does not hold. 




Cai and Treisman (2006) examine the story of Fengyang County in Anhui province. The 
poverty stricken peasants of Anhui province are often held up as an example of „reforms 
from below‟. Risking imprisonment, in 1978 they divided commune land into individual 
household plots. After grain yields rose, the reforms were supported by the provincial 
First Party Secretary. At first the practice was banned by higher level officials, only to be 
rolled out nationwide by Deng Xiaoping as the household responsibility system (Cai and 
Treisman 2006, p.7).  
 
However, at this time in China, local officials were still appointed by higher Party levels 
rather than selected locally. The production team leader in Fengyang who first went along 
with the scheme only did so after securing a pledge from the peasants to raise his children 
should he be imprisoned (ibid, p.8). More importantly, the Anhui First Party Secretary 
was “an old friend” of Deng Xiaoping and one year before the peasants‟ bold move, he 
had published “liberal guidelines on rural economic policy” in a nationwide front-page 
article in the People’s Daily (ibid, p.10, footnote 14). Rather than a battle between local 
cadres and the „centre‟, supporters and opponents of this particular reform spanned all 
levels of the state.  
 
The second issue in the literature that needs to be addressed is the performance of state 
firms. In general, state enterprises are perceived as moribund. „Entrepreneurial‟ cadres 
transform their assets into personal property. Private entrepreneurs engage the state 
bureaucracy and even join the Party. TVEs were not formal state companies but hybrids 
in various forms. While most of the literature avoids the de facto or „hidden‟ privatization 
story of Nee (1992) to explain growth, differentiation is made between „proper‟ state 
enterprises higher up the administrative hierarchy and the dynamic local level firms that 
were crucial to the rural growth story of the 1980s, for example through „local state 




In this model, the old, state-run enterprises are likened to the dinosaurs. Big, 
clumsy, and unable to adapt, they are fated to become extinct, and therefore 
changes that occur within the state-run economy are unworthy of serious 
attention. The corollary is that virtually all economic dynamism is attributed to 
the new private or entrepreneurial forms, which can be likened to emergent 
mammals. Small, plucky, and intelligent, they scurry about the forest floor 
preparing for their eventual hegemony (Naughton 1994, p.471). 
 
However, “far from being dinosaurs, state-owned enterprises have played an important 
and positive transitional role in the economy. The changing role of SOEs only makes 
sense within the context of broader economic changes taking place, but, given those 
changes, SOEs were one of several elements that came together to form a virtuous cycle 
of reform” (ibid, p.472). 
 
The context is what Naughton (1994, 1996) refers to as „growing out of the plan‟. The 
absolute size of the central plan was fixed and government monitoring of state firms 
turned increasingly towards profitability measures rather than plan fulfillment. This 
„freezing of the plan‟ allowed state firms to reorient towards market prices on the 
margins, above the fixed plan quantities (Naughton 1994, p.475). In addition, entry 
barriers were reduced, allowing non-state firms to compete with state firms in a range of 
industries. Market pressure forced state firms to become more productive and diversify 
their output. The result was that state enterprise industrial output grew rapidly during the 
1980s (ibid, p.476), even though other ownership forms grew faster (but starting from a 
smaller base). “Entry of nonstate firms has played a crucial role in China‟s reform 
process by creating markets and competition. Yet the state-owned sector has also 
performed adequately, improving incentives and productivity, and turning in a 
respectable growth performance” (ibid, p.470). 
 
Increased entry competed away previous monopoly rents and resulted in declining 
profitability. However, this relative decline in the state sector was concentrated primarily 
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The state sector, in other words, is increasingly constituted of large firms; a little 
over half of state output came from large firms in 1978, while over three-quarters 
did in 1991. There is a division of labour between state and nonstate industry … 
in which SOEs continue to dominate sectors characterized by increasing returns 
and technological barriers to entry, while relinquishing naturally competitive 
sectors to emerging collective and private firms (ibid, p.481). 
 
Part of the problem is that analysis of state firms tends to rely on aggregate data for the 
whole state sector rather than distinguishing between state enterprises of different sizes 
and operating in different activities (Nolan and Wang 1999, p.170). The Chinese state 
“increasingly focused its planning efforts on a relatively small number of large firms” 
(Nolan and Wang 1999, p.183), resulting in the policy of „grasp the large and let go of the 
small‟ (Nolan and Wang 1999, Breslin 2004). “State industry increasingly concentrated 
on large-scale „upstream‟ activities, such as oil refining, ferrous metals, chemical fibres, 
coal mining, chemicals and machine building. The state allowed the share of non-state 
enterprises to grow rapidly in those sectors with low economies of scale” (Nolan 1996, 
p.18).  
 
Two elements contributed to the relative success of the state heavy industrial sector: 
organizational capabilities and improved incentives. The Party and People‟s Liberation 
Army, both of whom engaged in running the „commanding heights‟, “possessed a rich 
legacy of organizational and motivational skills. Even old Party cadres and army officers 
were able to make the transition to the market economy if given the correct incentive 
structure. Indeed, their lifetime experience of thinking strategically and mobilizing people 
in complex institutions was an invaluable weapon for the construction of an effective 
market-oriented business organization” (Nolan and Wang 1999, p.193).  
 
                                                 
52
 See also Nolan (1996) and Nolan and Wang (1999). 
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The correct incentive structure was „constrained autonomy‟ (very similar to „growing out 
of the plan‟), in which larger state firms were given more autonomy to make decisions, 
but still subject to profit and employment targets. Nolan and Yeung (2001) discuss the 
growth of two large army companies, Shougang (steel) and Sanjiu (pharmaceuticals), 
arguing that the main reason for their success was “not special help from the government 
or the army, but rather the fact that its leadership used their autonomy to construct a 
highly effective business organization” ( Nolan and Yeung 2001, p.443).  
 
They did this because of „first-mover advantages‟ which accrue to large firms able to 
reach minimum efficient scale in an increasingly competitive environment. Once at scale, 
the competitive position of these large firms stabilizes as they begin to reap the benefits 
of increasing returns. “When increased operational independence was granted to SOEs, 
some responded more quickly than others to construct a competitive institutional 
structure. Those that were able to do so rapidly improved their market position … Those 
large firms that are able to take the lead in the „Chinese big business race‟ may well be 
able to maintain their position for a long time to come” (ibid, p.462). 
 
Furthermore, constrained autonomy resulted in the source of state enterprise investment 
funds coming increasingly from „self raised funds‟ under the control of enterprise 
managers.  
 
After the late 1970s there occurred a gradual process of expansion of use-rights 
over state property for economic agents other than central government officials 
and those who formerly answered directly to them at the local level. In this 
evolutionary process, a complex iteration occurred between changes in law and 
quasi law, and spontaneous actions of lower level agents seeking to push beyond 
regulations at each stage. In state industry there emerged a group of institutional, 
corporate entrepreneurs who began to operate capital in order to improve their 
own position through promoting the economic interests of the institution that 
employed them. Many of these, especially the most senior ones, were long-
standing members of the communist Party (Nolan 1996, p.11). 
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The result was that by the 1990s, “a large number of companies had emerged which 
involved interlocking ownership between state enterprises, between state and non-state 
enterprises, and between domestic enterprises and foreign firms” (ibid, p.12). At this 
point, it becomes difficult to tell the difference between these large state firms and 
Dickson‟s (2003) red capitalists. While the development of large state enterprises is not 
an unmitigated success (Pei Sun 2007), and by global standards China‟s large state 
corporations remain small and inefficient (Naughton 1994, Nolan and Wang 1999, Nolan 
and Zhang 2002), from a New Class perspective this convergence is crucial. 
 
Steinfeld (2009) argues that the lesson China seems to have drawn from the Asian 
Financial Crisis was that the East Asian developmental state model, which China 
believed it was the latest incarnation of, would not work in the long run. Rather than 
denouncing the crisis as an example of the failures of capitalism, China concluded that its 
ongoing attempt to save socialism through state-led growth was doomed to failure. This 
led to a shift in the terms of policy debates away from whether or not to implement 
reforms towards of focus on how to do them. And it occurred within an ongoing 
redefinition of the role of the Chinese Communist Party, in which China‟s „quest for 
modernity‟ was increasingly defined in nationalist rather than socialist terms (Steinfeld 
2010). 
 
Breslin (2004) refers to this as “a process of reformulation of class alliances within 
China” (Breslin 2004, p.24). This reformulation became official policy at the Sixteenth 
Party Congress in 2002. The previous year, in a speech commemorating the 80
th
 
anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin introduced the concept of the 
Three Represents to allow private entrepreneurs into the Party (Dickson 2003). “As a 
result, the CCP formally represents not just the Chinese proletariat, but also China‟s 
advanced productive forces, China‟s advanced culture, and „the fundamental interest of 
the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people‟. As a consequence, the CCP is no 
longer just the vanguard of the proletariat, but of „Chinese people and the Chinese 
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nation‟, and membership is open to any „advanced element‟ including private 
entrepreneurs” (Breslin 2004, p.20).  
 
The reformulation of the guiding principle of the Chinese Party occurred, in part, because 
“[t]here is a symbiotic relationship (at the very least) between state elites and new 
economic elites. They have effectively co-opted each other into an alliance that … 
mutually reinforces each other‟s power and influence, not to mention personal fortunes” 
(Breslin 2004, p.24). In China, resolution of the New Class contradiction has generated a 
system where the state facilitates accumulation and “regulates the market to ensure that 
the new bourgeoisie can appropriate surplus value thanks to the bourgeoisie‟s close 
relationship with the party state – capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Breslin 2004, 
p.24). 
 
2.2.3 Southeast Asia 
 
The countries of Southeast Asia obviously do not fit the New Class story, since none of 
them are communist states in the process of system transformation.
53
 Nevertheless, much 
of the literature describes the growth and development of Southeast Asia as a process of 
„transition‟ in terms of the emergence of capitalism.54 Resolution of the New Class 
contradiction is fundamentally about the emergence of a capitalist class, and important 
similarities exist between this process and the changes that occurred in post-colonial 
Southeast Asia. As in Eastern Europe and China, state-related accumulation is central to 
capitalist class formation. However, since the process does not involve dismantling the 
plan, the Southeast Asia literature is much less concerned with issues of property rights. 
It is instead more focused on understanding the relationship between bureaucrats and 
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 Included under the label „Southeast Asia‟ are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are also included, but since they are city states the focus will remain on the four 
countries just listed. The simple geographic relevance of Southeast Asia to Vietnam is obvious, although 
complicated given its historical ties with China. “„If you look at the Vietnamese from Bangkok, they look 
very Chinese‟, observes historian David Marr … „But if you look at them from Quangzhou (China), they 
look very Southeast Asian‟” (Hiebert 1996, p.34). For discussion of these contending influences on 19th 
century imperial Vietnam, see Woodside (1988) and Kelley (2006). 
54
 Lavigne (1999) makes a similar argument for China. Rather than simply a move from plan to market, “it 
could also be a process leading from under-development to development” (Lavigne 1999, p.276) and “from 
stagnation to growth” (ibid, p.271). 
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entrepreneurs that drives accumulation and growth. Given this focus, the literature also 
discusses issues of rent-seeking and corruption versus productive reinvestment, along 
with the related problem of ersatz capitalism. This section will explore these issues and 
their relevance for Vietnam. 
 
Rapid economic growth occurred in Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, including 
strong growth of manufacturing and industrial output, and a dramatic increase in exports 
(Donor 1991, Hawes and Liu 1993, McVey 1993). How can this „transformation‟ be 
explained? One group of authors – Robison (1986) on Indonesia, Jomo (1988) on 
Malaysia, and Hewison (1989) on Thailand – whom Hawes and Liu (1993) classify as 
„structuralists‟, explain this growth as a result of “a growing identification of interests 
between the politico-bureaucrats who control the state and the capitalist class that has 
been created by the state” (Hawes and Liu 1993, p.658).55  
 
This process is different from China. Reforms were initially initiated in China to fix 
socialism, not foster the development of a domestic capitalist class (Naughton 1996). 
Growth in China did not start from a convergence of interests as in Southeast Asia, but 
rather came from relaxing certain controls on the economy and starting from a very low 
base. Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, once unleashed, the process did 
lead to capitalist class formation in China. 
 
Southeast Asian economic growth, according to the structuralists, is due to the rising 
strength of domestic capitalist classes. These capitalist classes emerged as a direct 
byproduct of state intervention, particularly through import substitution policies.
56
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 “[T]he structural approach stresses three different, yet closely connected, variables – the state, the 
domestic capitalist class, and the international economy – that are deemed to be central to any 
understanding of the Southeast Asian political economy” (Hawes and Liu 1993, p.634). It takes “a 
historical approach that traces the evolution of the role of the state and class relationships since the mid-
nineteenth century” in order to “explain the rise of a capitalist class” (ibid, p.635). The focus here will be 
on the post-colonial state and the emergence of a domestic capitalist class. 
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 In Indonesia, this occurred during the 1970s import substitution policies of Suharto‟s New Order 
(Robison 1986). In Thailand it occurred earlier, following a state-led industrialization drive from 1932 to 
1957, resulting in a strong domestic capitalist class in Thailand by the end of the 1950s (Hewison 1989). 
Woo (1991) makes a similar „structural‟ argument for South Korea, including acknowledgement of the 
Japanese colonial legacy on the relationship between the post-colonial South Korean state and the domestic 
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According to Robison (1986), “the general pattern has been for the state to assume 
political leadership of the capitalist revolution given the relative weakness of the 
domestic capitalist class. The bourgeoisie has generally developed within the framework 
of state-led capitalism in which political ascendancy lies with the officials of the state 
itself” (Robison 1986, p.viii).  
 
The definition of „domestic‟ and the role of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian growth 
is subject to some dispute. Studwell (2007) views them as „non-indigenous‟, although he 
does discuss processes of acculturation and assimilation. Yoshihara (1988) sees important 
differences between Southeast Asian countries. In Singapore, there is no distinction 
between „indigenous‟ and „Chinese‟, in Thailand the Chinese have been effectively 
incorporated into Thai society, while in Indonesia, the Philippines and particularly in 
Malaysia the Chinese remain distinct from indigenous capitalists. McVey (1993) argues 
that “[e]nterprise itself has remained largely in the hands of the Chinese: indigenous 
participation increased, but this was largely because of political pressures and patronage” 
(McVey 1993, p.17). However, “the region‟s Chinese are a settled minority and function 
as domestic capitalists. Hence, Southeast Asia‟s capitalism is not affected systematically 
by the ethnicity of its business class” (ibid, p.18). Furthermore, “[d]irect pressures, 
acculturation to the model set by the ruling elite, and the business need for close 
relationships with the state all make for downplaying overt Chineseness, and the line 
between what is Chinese and what is indigenous is becoming increasingly uncertain” 
(ibid, p.20). This has been facilitated by increasing interaction between „locals‟ and 
Chinese business leaders, for example on company boards of directors. “The need to act 
in an increasingly internationalized business world imposes forms and behaviour which 
erode Chinese exclusivity, and both business interests and cultural forces bring together 
overseas Chinese and indigenous elites into a common, cosmopolitan nouveau-riche 
                                                                                                                                                 
capitalist class and the importance of the international context. The emergence of the Nixon Doctrine, 
resulting in reduced financial support for South Korea and reduced protection under the U.S. security 
umbrella, created the political conditions necessary for General Park to discipline both capital and labour 
during the crash industrialization drive of the 1970s. However, the South Korean experience, along with 
Taiwan and Japan, is not directly transferrable to Southeast Asia due to differences in history and the 
generally weaker disciplinary capacity of Southeast Asian states. For a critique of the so-called East Asian 
developmental state model, see Fine and Rustomjee (1996), and Yoshihara (1988) for discussion of the 
differences between East and Southeast Asia. 
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consumer style which offers itself as the high culture model for modern capitalist 
Southeast Asia” (ibid, p.26). Historical and political factors explain the rise of overseas 
Chinese to business prominence rather than innate cultural traits. The focus here will be 
on structural relations rather than ethnicity. 
 
In Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the state created the conditions necessary for 
accumulation and directly supported the development of the domestic capitalist class. 
Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs had a “promotional relationship” (Hewison 1989, p.16) 
and “forged a close alliance (Hawes and Liu 1993, p.636). As McVey (1993) notes, 
“[s]omething happened to cause political-bureaucratic power-holders to believe that their 
interests would be better served by promoting rather than squeezing business” (McVey 
1993, p.30). Why did the state seek to develop the domestic capitalist class? Similar to 
China, “[t]he answer lies in the increasing integration of the state elite with the domestic 
capitalist class, as they act as joint venture partners or monopoly license holders or 
managers of state-owned enterprises. In this way, their political and economic interests 
rest largely upon their ability to control and dispense state resources for political 
patronage” (Hawes and Liu 1993, p.643).57 Granting economic privileges facilitated 
accumulation and growth and provided a source of funds for political patrons to secure 
and reproduce the state.  
 
The Philippines had a similar close relationship between state and capital but with less 
impressive growth performance. Hutchcroft (1998) seeks to explain this difference, 
arguing that “different types of states help to nurture different types of capitalism” and 
“deficiencies in the political sphere can obstruct capitalist development” (Hutchcroft 
1998, p.4). Hutchcroft employs an „alternative‟ structuralism. Rather than the Marxist 
class analysis of Robison (1986), Jomo (1988) and Hewison (1989), he relies on Weber‟s 
theory of capitalist development, which is “basically an institutional theory of capitalist 
development” (Hutchcroft 1998, p.33).  
 
                                                 
57
 Part of the answer is also due to the rise of nationalism. For discussion of nationalism and the emergence 
of capitalism in Indonesia, see Anderson (1991). For discussion of the relation between nationalism and the 
development of capitalism more generally, see Greenfeld (2001). 
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According to Hutchcroft, “[o]ne of Weber‟s primary achievements was to focus attention 
on the political preconditions of capitalist development” (ibid, p.33). The essential 
prerequisite for Weber was „calculability‟, or in more modern jargon, stability of 
expectations. While a high degree of calculability in modern capitalism exists in both the 
realms of production and politics, “Weber generally seems to treat calculability in the 
latter as the prerequisite for calculability in the former. Legal and administrative 
predictability is not just another precondition for capitalist development; it is the most 
basic precondition of all” (ibid, p.33-34). Taming arbitrary political activity is therefore a 
key precondition for advanced capitalism. This is a process intimately bound up with the 
rise of a „rational‟ bureaucracy, involving a clear separation between the public and 
personal, and operating according to rules and procedures rather than the whims of 
officials (ibid, p.5).
58
   
 
 “Where bureaucratic actions are often highly arbitrary, Weber argues, only certain types 
of „politically determined capitalisms‟ are able to thrive” (ibid, p.18). These forms of 
capitalism can reach a high level of development, but cannot achieve the „advanced‟ 
form. Instead, they remain patrimonial capitalisms lacking predictability, with a weak 
separation of public and personal authority, in which personal considerations and 
connections determine outcomes (ibid, p.14). However, since “all capitalism is in some 
sense „politically determined‟” (ibid, p.19), Hutchcroft prefers the term rent capitalism to 
describe these systems. “Rent capitalism can be distinguished from production-oriented-
capitalism according to the relative dominance of rent-seeking and production-oriented 
behaviour” (ibid, p.19). In reviewing the literature, Hutchcroft equates his conception of 
rent capitalism with both „political‟ and „crony‟ capitalism (ibid, p.19, footnote 13).  
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 Like the structural Marxists, Hutchcroft pays particular attention to the legacies of colonialism and the 
influence of the external environment. However, Hutchcroft claims that Marx‟s analysis is insightful but 
confined to the workings of „mature‟ capitalism. Marx and Weber are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
since it is possible to tack on Marx‟s theory of capitalism „proper‟ to Weber‟s theory of capitalist 
development (Hutchcroft 1998, p.33). However, “Weber employs many terms to describe capitalist systems 
that are hampered by the weak degree of calculability in the political sphere, and distinguishes among 
various forms of (not fully rational) capitalist activity according to [where] their „sources of gain‟ 
originate” (ibid, p.45). Weber sees capitalism as very old and widespread, present in a proto-form in 
ancient China, India, Babylon, Egypt, Mediterranean antiquity and the European Middle Ages (Greenfeld 
2001, p.12). This continuum of capitalism, culminating in modern rational bourgeois capitalism, allows for 
a proliferation of stunted capitalisms: commercial, political, booty, adventurers‟, traditional, patrimonial, 
etc. (Hutchcroft 1998, p.46, footnote 2). However, this is ultimately an ersatz formulation.  
 79 
 
Nevertheless, Hutchcroft retains the use of „patrimonial‟ designations in distinguishing 
the Philippines from Indonesia and Thailand. He argues that Indonesia and Thailand – 
and China – had „patrimonial administrative states‟ whereas the Philippines has a 
„patrimonial oligarchic state‟. In the former, “the dominant social force is a bureaucratic 
elite” (ibid, p.47). “Since the major beneficiaries of the process of rent extraction were 
based in the administrative apparatus of the state, this form of rent capitalism can be 
characterized as bureaucratic capitalism” (ibid, p.47-48).59 This is the closest the 
Southeast Asian literature comes to a New Class type formulation. 
 
However, in the oligarchic form, “the dominant social force has an economic base largely 
independent of the state apparatus, but the state nonetheless plays a central role in the 
process of wealth accumulation … In contrast to bureaucratic capitalism, where the major 
beneficiaries of rent extraction are based within the administrative apparatus, the 
principal direction of rent extraction is reversed: a powerful oligarchic business class 
extracts privilege from a largely incoherent bureaucracy” (ibid, p.52). This is booty 
capitalism. 
 
For Hutchcroft, the “Philippines provides a clear-cut example of what kinds of obstacles 
to capitalist development can result when the power of an oligarchic private sector is 
never tamed, and there is no concerted effort to promote the development of the public 
sector” (ibid, p.5).  
 
Throughout modern Philippine history, one finds far more oligarchy building than 
state building: the oligarchic families have had ample opportunities, historically, 
to consolidate their power with the support of external forces, while the state has 
remained woefully underdeveloped. As a result, the state apparatus continues to 
be easy prey to a powerful oligarchic class that enjoys an independent economic 
                                                 
59
 The term „bureaucratic capitalist‟ was coined in the China literature. See Yoshihara (1998), p.72-74, for 
discussion. 
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base outside the state, yet depends upon particularistic access to the political 
machinery as the major avenue to private accumulation (ibid, p.11-12). 
 
The argument is essentially that a state apparatus, although patrimonial, remained 
operational in Indonesia and Thailand, allowing for some growth enhancing outcomes. In 
the Philippines, however, the state remained weak and ineffective, captured by an 
oligarchic class and repeatedly plundered for private gain. There is a rough 
correspondence here with the communist transition literature, in which the Philippines is 
equivalent to Eastern Europe and Indonesia and Thailand are equivalent to China. State 
collapse and state capture did not produce much growth or development in either Eastern 
Europe or the Philippines, while an enduring, if problematic, state in China, Indonesia 
and Thailand facilitated accumulation and growth.  
 
However, there is an important critique of this view of Southeast Asia. The growth 
experience of Southeast Asia, while impressive, will not last because Southeast Asia has 
developed „ersatz‟ capitalism (Yoshihara 1988).  
 
Perhaps the most serious criticism [of Southeast Asian economic growth] 
concerns the shallowness and dependence of the region‟s own economic 
structures … Local capitalists lack independent technological capacity in areas 
outside the tertiary sector and light manufacturing. Entrepreneurs favour opulence 
over excellence, rent seeking and speculation over long-term industrial 
investment. They are, in sum, paper capitalists, compradors of foreign firms. The 
region‟s shortage of technical personnel reflects and reinforces this inattention to 
real industrial development (Doner 1991, p.823).  
 
Yoshihara (1988) acknowledges that the “most dramatic post-war change in the 
economic structure of South-East Asia is the rise of the manufacturing industry” 
(Yoshihara 1988, p.102). Furthermore, government intervention and support facilitated 
expansion of industrial production beyond simple consumer goods, and these activities 
are predominately undertaken by domestic capital (ibid, p.103). Nevertheless, this „big 
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push‟ has occurred at the expense of efficiency, measured primarily in terms of exports. 
While some industrialists have developed export capability, they are only “a few bright 
spots” and “the industrial capital that emerged has generally become a burden on the 
economy rather than a propelling force” (ibid, p.106).  
 
A central problem in Southeast Asia is that industrialization has been „technologyless‟ 
(ibid, p.111). Domestic technical competence remains low. “Industrial capitalists are able 
to run manufacturing plants that require technical competence far beyond what they can 
muster within their own countries because foreign companies can fill the gap” (ibid, 
p.113). Machinery, equipment and even entire manufacturing plants are imported. 
Foreign technicians are hired to set-up and repair them, and train local personnel how to 
operate them. Southeast Asia has almost no domestic technological base to drive their 
economies forward through production and export of increasingly sophisticated products. 
Southeast Asia remains dependent on foreign technology, it is a dependent capitalism 
(ibid, p.118).  
 
For Yoshihara, industrialization has not been a dynamic force in Southeast Asia. Apart 
from the „few bright spots‟, the majority of industrial exports are from foreign-owned 
firms. Small-scale domestic firms operating in activities with low capital requirements 
made significant contributions to the region‟s growth (ibid, p.2). In addition, natural 
resource exploitation (e.g. oil, logging) contributed to growth, but even here many of the 
concessions were granted to foreign firms. Royalties earned were pumped into industrial 
projects and contributed to growth. However, for natural resources in particular, activities 
tended to be predatory rather the motivated by long-term growth considerations (ibid, 
p.119). 
 
Another issue is the low quality of government intervention, resulting in massive 
inefficiency and pervasive rent-seeking (ibid, p.130). 
 
In fact, there are strange breeds of capitalists such as crony capitalists and 
bureaucratic capitalists. In addition, there are political leaders, their sons and 
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relatives, and royal families involved in business. What they seek is not only 
protection from foreign competition, but also concessions, licenses, monopoly 
rights, and government subsidies (usually in terms of low-interest loans from 
government financial institutions). As a result, all sorts of irregularities have 




In addition to rent-seeking, speculation is rife. Industrialists have diversified into real 
estate and property development, banking and insurance. Any sector with promising 
prospects due to restricted competition or monopoly concessions, such as cement or 
shipping, “attracts the speculative interest of rent-seekers” (Yoshihara 1988, p.92). There 
is no clear separation between rent-seeking and speculation. The common feature 
between rent-seekers and speculators is that “both seek quick returns” (ibid, p.92), 
“instead of concentrating on technological improvement and slowly building industrial 
empires” (ibid, p.4). It is far easier to secure profits from speculation and rent-seeking 
than through reducing production costs, improving product quality and increasing 
productivity. 
 
Finally, this situation is unlikely to change. While rent-seeking is not unique to Southeast 
Asia, there is no assurance that the problem “will resolve itself automatically in the 
process of capitalist development” (ibid, p.88). For Yoshihara, in Southeast Asia “rent-
seeking is far more pervasive” than other countries at comparable stages of development 
(e.g. Japan) “and there are no indications … that it will decline” (ibid, p.88). 
Furthermore, the history of industrialization in Southeast Asia in not „recent‟. The 
Philippines, for example, has been promoting the textile industry since the 1950s but 
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 Studwell (2007) argues that this process created a tycoon class of Asian godfathers who “exploit political 
inefficiency for gain” (Studwell 2007, p.xxi). Following Yoshihara (1988), Studwell argues that “there has 
been a heavy dependence on foreign providers of technology and project management because the 
godfathers are so concentrated on finessing deals … that they leave technical execution to outsiders” 
(Studwell 2007, p.xxiv). The tycoon class “generated enormous personal wealth, but did little to promote 
overall economic growth. Instead, growth came from a combination of small-scale entrepreneurs, many 
concentrated in and around manufacturing, and a policy of renting out the local labour force to efficient 
multinational exporters” (ibid, p.xiii). Productivity gains in godfather companies generally lag behind gains 
in the economies in which they operate (ibid, p.xxi). “The big domestic businesses run by the Asian 
godfathers grew up on a diet of protected markets, cartels and non-competitive tenders for public works. 
The result is that, almost without exception … south-east Asia lacks globally competitive companies” (ibid, 
p.xxiv).  
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remains moribund (ibid, p.108). Technological dependency is not a temporary problem, it 
is structural and semi-permanent (ibid, p.112). Southeast Asia “has all the trappings of a 
modern economy – high-tech factories, stunning high-rise buildings, contemporary 
transportation systems and utility providers – but no indigenous, large-scale companies 
producing world-class products and services” (Studwell 2007, p.xxiv). For these reasons, 
capitalism in Southeast Asia is ersatz capitalism. 
 
The issue of rent-seeking needs to be addressed.
61
 In discussing Indonesia, Crouch (1979) 
identifies a process similar to the „red hat‟ phenomenon in China, arguing that “[i]n the 
early stages, a patrimonial political structure need not be an obstacle to capitalist 
economic development. By placing themselves as clients under the protection and 
patronage of powerful members of the ruler‟s court, industrialists can acquire the security 
and predictability they need” (Crouch 1979, p.579). Although corruption is endemic in 
patrimonial states, corruption itself is not the problem. Following Weber, Hutchcroft 
(1998) argues that unpredictability is the problem. Highly variable corruption, rather than 
corruption per se, is the issue. Corruption is much less damaging to economic outcomes if 
expectations are nevertheless stable (Hutchcroft 1998, p.41).  
 
Doner (1991) argues that analysis “should avoid overly sharp dichotomies between rent-
seekers or commercial capitalists on the one hand, and industrialists on the other. Some 
capitalists are clearly more oriented toward short-term profits and tertiary activities than 
others. Yet, throughout Asia, strong industrial firms have emerged from commercial 
capitalists, speculators, and rent-seekers benefiting from government-controlled import 
licenses” (Doner 1991, p.824). 
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 The rent-seeking and corruption literature is vast. For an excellent review and critique of the literature 
see Khan and Jomo (2000) and Khan (2002). Hutchcroft (1998) observes that “rent-seeking theorists … 
tend to make the mistake of presuming that the degree of rent seeking is dependent on one simple variable: 
the more government intervention, the more rent seeking” (Hutchcroft 1998, p.56). He rejects the “laissez-
faire versus statist continuum” (ibid, p.19) since it cannot explain the Philippines, which lacks the capacity 
to implement some of the most rudimentary laissez-faire regulatory policies. However, the ultimate 
problem with the entire rent-seeking literature is that „rents‟ only exist as departures from perfectively 
competitive prices, in which rents are defined in terms of opportunity costs. If equilibrium economics is not 
used, then „rents‟ become much more difficult to define and identify. See Van Arkadie (1990a) and 
Mathews (2006) for discussion. Thanks to Daniela Tavasci for highlight this point. For a view of firms in 
which they actively seek rents as part of acquiring a competitive edge, see Mathews (2006). 
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The fact that origins do not determine industrial strength is illustrated by a 
comparison of Philippine businessman Ricardo Silverio and South Korean 
businessman Pong-chol Yi. Both expanded from commercial origins to create 
major industrial groups with support from power political patrons. Silverio, 
however, became a notorious Marcos „crony‟ who was forced to flee the country 
when his mismanaged and overextended conglomerate fell apart in the early 
1990s. Yi, on the other hand, founded Samsung, South Korea‟s largest chaebol 
based on steady expansion from production of consumer goods to basic industries 
(ibid, p.824, footnote 9). 
 
As already noted, it is not “a simple matter to distinguish between rent-seeking – taking 
advantage of control over a resource, such as land or a government-granted monopoly, to 
extract profit without productive reinvestment – from capitalism proper” (McVey 1993, 
p.8). 
 
All of the commentators on post-colonial Southeast Asian growth acknowledge the 
development of the manufacturing industry. They are all using the same basic data on 
export growth, industrial output growth and GDP growth. According to the ersatz 
interpretation, Southeast Asia is locked into a „technologyless‟ growth spurt, constrained 
by inadequate domestic technological capabilities, massive inefficiencies, and pervasive 
rent-seeking behaviour. Since this is an enduring structural feature and unlikely to 
change, the „ersatz‟ designation reflects a judgment on the limited future growth 
prospects for the region. However, using the same data, McVey (1993) reaches the 
opposite conclusion, arguing that “the features of the bureaucratic polity – its inwardness, 
the indeterminacy of its institutions, its lack of direction – have less the aspect of a 
developmental bog than of a container for fundamental transformation” (McVey 1993, 
p.22).  
 
This optimism emerges from “signs of the gradual crystallization of entrepreneurial 
attitudes, a shift in weight from bureaucratic and political to business values, and the 
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emergence of more long-term commitment” (ibid, p.26). This results from the 
“convergence of interests between the political elite and capital”, particularly “the dual 
roles of the politico-bureaucrats: as power holders, they exhibit their natural patrimonial 
tendency; and as owners of capital, their entrepreneurial impulse emerges” (Hawes and 
Liu 1993, p.642). As in China, entrepreneurs accumulate through connections to 
bureaucrats, and bureaucrats themselves increasingly become entrepreneurs. 
 
According to McVey, Southeast Asian bureaucrats realized “the vexing vulnerability of 
riches based on office holding. The endless jockeying for office and advantage by 
members of the bureaucratic polity may have been disastrous for administrative 
effectiveness, but it was essential for staying in the game. Loss of a patron or a transfer of 
function from one ministry to another could spell economic misfortune; to belong to a 
clique that lost out meant disaster (McVey 1993, p.23). Furthermore, retirement usually 
meant loss of significant non-wage benefits, “and the cessation of access and protection 
made it hard to ensure the prosperity of one‟s heirs” (ibid, p.23).  
 
In an example of Goodman‟s (2000) intergenerational transfer of power discussed in the 
China literature, one solution for Southeast Asian bureaucrats was to enter business. 
“Wisely made, this could provide a safe landing in case of political adversity and a 
guarantee of continuing family fortune” (McVey 1993, p.23). Furthermore, “the coming 
together of political-bureaucratic and entrepreneurial interests was greatly facilitated by 
the organizational characteristics of modern capitalism” (ibid, p.26). The corporation 
allowed political and economic leaders to operate together on company boards and 
facilitated initiation of “the politicians into the mysteries of business behaviour” (ibid, 
p.26). The result was that members of the bureaucratic elite began playing serious 
business roles (ibid, p.22).
62
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 In a comment as relevant today as it was for the 1980s, McVey (1993) goes on to observe that “[o]f 
course, speculative investment and short-term profit taking are rife; this, after all, was the age of the junk 
bond and leveraged buy-out, and Southeast Asian capitalists can hardly be required to be more virtuous 
than their peers. But speculative investment is necessarily short-term, and as we have seen a major motive 
for members of the political-bureaucratic elite turning to business is the continued safeguarding of their 
fortunes. Hence, speculation is likely to be only one aspect of their investment interest, and we can 
probably assume that as their businesses gain solidity and as family members acquire managerial expertise 
they will increasingly settle money in enterprises on a long-term basis” (McVey 1993, p.26-27). 
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But this strategy required two things: first of all, the acquisition of sufficient 
business knowledge to enable the official to oversee the handling of his money; 
and secondly, effective legal guarantees for private property, so that political 
misfortune could not sweep it all away. Both of these conditions worked against 
the continuation of the division between political and economic power, for the 
first meant that members of the political elite (and in particular the offspring of 
powerholders) began taking a serious and active role in business, and the second 
meant ending the … dependency of businessmen on political protectors (ibid, 
p.23-24). 
 
This process constitutes what Hutchcroft (1998) refers to as the „optimistic scenario‟ in 
which “entrepreneurship based on rent-seeking behaviour becomes less important relative 
to entrepreneurship based on productive activity” (Hutchcroft 1998, p.51).63 In “the 
process of economic growth, a more assertive business class emerges” and “elements of 
this business class may demand a certain regularization of relations between the 
government and business interests” (ibid, p.49).64  
 
However, in the „pessimistic scenario‟, a more assertive business class and weakened 
bureaucracy could simply result in capture of the state by an oligarchy (ibid, p.60, 
footnote 23). As McVey (1993) argues, “faced with serious setbacks, entrepreneurial 
optimism may very easily degenerate into asset-stripping defeatism. Southeast Asia‟s 
capitalist development is certainly still fragile enough for this to be a danger” (McVey 
1993, p.31).  
 
It is still early days for most Southeast Asian politico-bureaucrats turned 
businessmen, and it is still difficult to see where the line between rent-seeking and 
real entrepreneurship has been crossed, and whether investment in new enterprise 
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 This potential source of positive change was also discussed by Staniszkis (1991) and Frydman et al 
(1998) for Eastern Europe. 
64
 Hutchcroft argues that this occurred in European development. 
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is spurred by speculation or prestige seeking rather than a serious aim at 
development (ibid, p.26). 
 
Strong growth into the middle 1990s seemed to vindicate the optimistic scenario for 
Southeast Asia. Important changes had been occurring since the 1980s. Import 
substitution was being gradually scaled back. Financial liberalization was undertaken to 
various degrees and combined with a ready pool of international liquidity to ignite a 
lending boom in the region (Palma 1998). Then came the Asian Financial Crisis. Before 
the crisis, patrimonial relations were acknowledged to be corrupt and inefficient but also 
an important component of the growth story. In the wake of the crisis, „cronyism‟ was 
fingered as a key factor contributing to the swift collapse of Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and South Korea (Wade 1998).
65
 What had previously been perceived as 
growth enhancing relations became nefarious, and the fragility of Southeast Asia‟s 
capitalist development had been revealed. 
 
In Indonesia, financial liberalization became a vehicle for unsustainable borrowing and 
circumventing state regulations by shifting assets offshore (Winters 1996, Pincus and 
Ramli 1998). Matsumoto (2006) argues that prior to the crisis, the large state connected 
Indonesian conglomerates became deeply concerned about the inevitable and fast 
approaching post-Suharto world. Political uncertainty led to a process of hollowing out, 
in which the conglomerates mortgaged their Indonesian assets to access readily available 
foreign currency. These borrowed funds were then invested offshore to protect them from 
any unfavourable post-Suharto developments. Financial fragility increased as the 
leverage of the conglomerates skyrocketed, and any downward change in the exchange 
rate would cause devastation. This happened and Indonesia spiraled out of control. In 
1998 the Suharto regime collapsed. 
 
Beyond the crisis and its immediate causes, Indonesia is an example of the „pessimistic 
scenario‟. Although Robison (1986) exhibited qualified optimism about Indonesia‟s 
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 The crisis had different effects in different countries, and „cronyism‟ is only one of several explanations. 
See Booth (2001) for a review of the various interpretations of the crisis.   
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prospects, Robison and Hadiz (2004) argue that “a complex politico-business oligarchy 
emerged from within a system of authoritarian rule, reorganizing its power through 
successive crises, colonizing and expropriating new political and market institutions” 
(Robison and Hadiz 2004, p.xiv). Indonesia transmogrified into the Philippines.  
 
Indonesia under Suharto had a form of „political capitalism‟, composed of a “political 
class of officials and their families, political and business associates, clients and agents 
who fused political power with bureaucratic authority, public office with private interest” 
(ibid, p.53-54). However, the „triumph of the oligarchy‟ occurred between 1982 and 1997 
as part of market reforms – deregulation and financial liberalization. “Such reforms in 
Indonesia … were to provide the very means by which powerful private interests 
emerged from within the apparatus of the state itself to construct their new private 
corporate empires” (ibid, p.13) as “public monopoly was now opened to expropriation by 
private interests” (ibid, p.15). For Robison and Hadiz, post-crisis, post-Suharto 
democracy does not represent a fundamentally new state of affairs. Power and privilege 
were reorganized but not dismantled because “old relations of power may survive, and 
even find new life, within a range of institutional frameworks very different from those in 
which they had originally emerged” (ibid, p.xiv). 
 
Indonesia provides a warning about the dangers of state collapse and how the fragility of 
capitalist development can degenerate into state capture and oligarchy. Southeast Asia 




The literatures on Eastern Europe, China, and Southeast Asia all highlight a process 
identified as political capitalism. Whether emerging from the process of transition or the 
process of economic development, political capitalism involves the conversion of 
political power into economic gain. It follows a pattern of state-related accumulation. 
This runs in two directions: private entrepreneurs who accumulate through connections to 
state officials and state officials who engage in business. The line between them is not 
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clear. Particularly in transition countries, the boundary between state and private is 
deliberately blurred as part of the accumulation process.  
 
One implication of this process is that ownership type provides little information about 
firms. State and private firms shade into each other as red capitalists, cronies, tycoons – 
all benefiting from access to the state. It is time to move beyond the Animal Farm 
formula of state – bad, private – good.  
 
This pattern of accumulation has important implications for class formation. The 
Southeast Asia literature is the most explicit in viewing this process as the emergence of 
a capitalist class. However, the fate of this class remains uncertain and appears to be 
unraveling in particular countries. The Eastern European literature errs on the side of 
kleptocracy, while continued growth in China has seen discussion of „capitalism with 
Chinese characteristics‟. The question is “whether the expropriation of former systems of 
state capitalism and the ending of public monopolies will produce … capitalism or just 
unconstrained predatory rent-seeking?” (Robison and Hadiz 2004, p.13). 
 
The answer appears to depend on the state. In Eastern Europe and post-crisis Indonesia, 
state collapse produced asset grabbing. There are important variations between these 
countries, but the overall pattern holds. In China, state continuity stabilized expectations. 
Although inefficient and corrupt, growth occurred.  
 
However, as should be evident from this chapter, there remain a bewildering array of 
„capitalisms‟: political, bureaucratic, ersatz, rent, booty, nomenklatura, etc. As Chapter 
One demonstrated, it is hard enough to define „capitalism‟ proper. Hutchcroft (1998) is 
right to highlight that all capitalisms are politically determined. The problem with the 
proliferation of capitalisms is one of essentialism, of static characterization. The 
development of capitalism is a process. To fix the process at a particular moment in time 
and label it as not-quite-capitalism misses the point. Capitalism develops in particular 
places which have particular histories and political economies. It changes in these places 
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over time in response to internal and external pressures, and, as post-crisis Indonesia 
demonstrates, even occasionally derails.  
 
This chapter began with discussion of Djilas (1957) and the contradiction of the New 
Class, based on the disjunction between national ownership and de facto control by state 
bureaucrats and managers. The New Class under the command economy generated a 
pattern of accumulation based on leveraging access to the state. This pattern influenced 
the ways in which the Djilas contradiction was resolved during transition, such that 
capitalist class formation in Eastern Europe and China continued to depend on state-
related accumulation. However, different countries experienced different outcomes. How 
this contradiction is resolved in Vietnam will influence class formation and the 
development of Vietnamese capitalism.  
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3 The New Class in Vietnam 
 
The processes at work in China and Eastern Europe are also operating in post-planning 
Vietnam. State-related accumulation is prevalent. Cadres are going into business, blurring 
the boundary between state and private.
66
 Insider privatization, asset stripping and 
hollowing out are commonplace.
67
 Some authors argue that a new business elite is 
emerging from within the state itself.
68
 This is referred to as the rise of a „state business 
interest‟ (Fforde 1993a) and „market-Leninism‟ (London 2009), but with few exceptions 
there is very little mention of capitalism.
69
 This is partly due to underlying assumptions 
along the lines of the commercialization model, in which capitalism is the default state of 
nature of human beings. However, it is also due to the Vietnamese language, in which 
describing the changes occurring in Vietnam as the development of capitalism is difficult. 
 
The term „capitalism‟ (chủ nghĩa tư bản) has a negative connotation in Vietnamese and is 
nearly impossible to use in a positive way.
70
 Capitalism is associated with French 
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 See, for example, Fforde (1993a, 2004, 2007, 2009); Van Arkadie (1993); Greenfield (1994); Fforde and 
de Vylder (1996); Hiebert (1996); Herno (1998); Riedel and Turley (1999); Abrami (2000); Beresford and 
Đặng Phong (2000); Gillespie (2001, 2002); Gainsborough (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004b); 
Painter (2003a, 2003b); Nguyễn Đình Cung, Phạm Anh Tuấn, Bùi Văn and Dapice (2004); Taussig (2005); 
Hakkala and Kokko (2007); Evers and Benedikter (2009); Hayton (2010a, 2010b).   
67
 See, for example, Greenfield (1994); Bùi Tín (1995); Kolko (1997); Templer (1998); Heberer and Kohl 
(1999); Riedel and Turley (1999); Vasavakul (1999a, 2001, 2006); Abrami (2000); Gillespie (2001); 
Gainsborough (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004b); Evers and Benedikter (2009); Hayton (2010a, 
2010b). 
68
 See Fforde (1993a, 2004, 2007, 2008); Greenfield (1994); Bùi Tín (1995); Kolko (1997); Templer 
(1998); Heberer (1999); Riedel and Turley (1999); Vasavakul (1999a, 2001, 2006); Abrami (2000); 
Gainsborough (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004b); London (2009); Hayton (2010a, 2010b). 
69
 Greenfield (1994) is one of the few scholars to use the term „capitalism‟ and not mean something based 
on the commercialization model and more markets. Kolko (1997), a Marxist like Greenfield, discusses the 
emergence of a new economic class from within the state. Gainsborough (2002b) discusses class, but in the 
Barrington Moore sense. Vasavakul (2006) mentions „state capitalism‟ and briefly discusses class 
formation, but it is not developed. However, this was a conference paper presented to Vietnamese 
government officials and not the place to discuss it. Questions of class are discussed in Vasavakul (1999a) 
but more in terms of interest groups. Fforde (2007) discusses capitalism and class formation, but admits 
that the theoretical framework is still under construction. Fforde (2008) also discusses capitalism, but the 
usage collapses back into an institutionalist definition based on Doner and Ramsey‟s (1997) notion of 
„competitive clientelism‟. Kim (2008) discusses the process of „learning to be capitalist‟, and explicitly 
rejects the commercialization model of capitalism as natural. While her attention to informal norms and 
values is useful, capitalism remains essentially defined in terms of markets.  
70
 This discussion has benefited from conversations with several Vietnamese, including a professor of 
Marxism-Leninism and a former member of the Army. Their names have been withheld due to the 
sensitivity of the subject. It has also benefited from discussion with Jason Picard and Ben Wilkinson. 
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colonialism, American aggression and brutal exploitation (Rama 2008). Since the growth 
and development of the Vietnamese economy has been phenomenal, including significant 
improvements in living standards, the negative term capitalism is not appropriate. 
Furthermore, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is uncomfortable with the term 
since it remains formally committed to socialism. During discussions in 1979 on whether 
to increase formal scope for market activities, there was a “fear that reliance on market 
mechanisms would amount to abandoning socialism. It was noted, however, that the 
market predated capitalism, so that it could not be deemed a capitalist invention: it was 
rather an ingenious invention of mankind” (Rama 2008, p.21). And again in 1986, during 
discussions in the run up to the VI
th
 Party Congress and launch of the đổi mới 
(renovation) policy, debate occurred over the difference between „renovation‟ and the 
ideologically unacceptable „peaceful evolution‟ (diễn biến hòa bình). “Moving from the 
subsidy system to market mechanisms was never presented as the rejection of socialist 
principles, but rather as a tool for their implementation. Agreement was reached that 
markets were not a capitalist invention” (Rama 2008, p.29).71 In a rather pragmatic 
adoption of the commercialization model, the Vietnamese Party, as in China, proceeded 
with „socialist oriented‟ reform. 
 
The Vietnamese also have two words for „class‟. The first, giai cấp, is the Marxist term. 
This term only makes sense in the conceptual world of Marxist analysis in which class is 
a social relation. Since capitalism is negative and Vietnam is still officially socialist (xã 
hội chủ nghĩa), the development of a „new business elite‟ is not perceived as the 
emergence of a capitalist class (giai cấp chủ). Instead, it is described using the older word 
for class, tầng lớp, which is rooted in Confucianism and is based on notions of social 
stratification.
72
 One Vietnamese individual went so far as to say that „owners‟ were 
performing a socially positive function by generating wealth and providing higher 
incomes for workers, invoking a quasi-Schumpeterian definition of owner as 
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 Rama (2008) is based on a series of interviews with Mr. Võ Văn Kiệt in the final years of his life. More 
will be said about Võ Văn Kiệt below. The problem, similar to McNamara (1995), is that the story is 
intended for posterity and is therefore a sanitized revision of events. Viewed in this light, many of the 
conclusions of the piece either do not hold or require qualification from additional sources. Nevertheless, 
the historical section of Rama (2008) is based on a background paper prepared by the Vietnamese 
economic historian Đặng Phong and remains very useful. 
72
 This is similar to the income-based usage of „class‟ in English: upper, middle, lower class. 
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entrepreneur to explicitly deny that a process of capitalist class formation as the 
emergence of giai cấp chủ was occurring in Vietnam. 
 
However, Bùi Tín (1995) argues that in Vietnam “what we have now is a „New Class‟ as 
described by Milovan Djilas” and “the „New Class‟ Communists … [b]y running after 
their own advantage they and their families have become „Red Capitalists‟” (Bùi Tín 
1995, p.185-186).
73
 Mention is made of the perks of Party membership during the 
planning period, in which senior officials had access to top quality food products and 
consumer goods, even during times of severe shortage and famine.
74
 Furthermore, these 
shops were run by relatives of top officials.  
 
[T]hese shops were managed by the younger sister of Le Duc Tho as part of his 
Party organizational network.
75
 It also involved one of his brothers, Dinh Duc 
Thien, who having managed the steel manufacturing complex at Thai Nguyen 
north of Hanoi with no professional qualifications, was transferred to the army 
with the rank of general in charge of supplies during the Ho Chi Minh campaign. 
After that he was appointed to head the department responsible for the oil and gas 
industry, of which again he had no knowledge. Meanwhile Le Duc Tho‟s younger 
brother Mai Chi Tho had become Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People‟s 
Committee [1976-1985], also without any prior experience of administration 
(ibid, p.99). 
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 Bùi Tín was a colonel in the Vietnam People‟s Army who fought against the French and later became a 
reporter and deputy editor of Nhân Dân, the Vietnamese equivalent of Pravda. He „left‟ Vietnam for 
France in 1990 (he denies he defected) amidst growing and increasingly outspoken concern over the 
direction taken by the Party. The memoir was written in France. Regarding Djilas, according to Jason 
Picard (personal communication), based on an interview with a Vietnamese writer in Ho Chi Minh City, 
The New Class was translated into Vietnamese by a Buddhist nun and was available in South Vietnam by 
the early 1960s. The translation of „class‟ was giai cấp.   
74
 Nguyễn Văn Huy (2007), in the official publication of the excellent Hanoi Museum of Ethnology exhibit 
Hanoi Life under the Subsidy Economy, 1975-1986, captures the structural privilege of the planning period. 
„Ministers, experts level 9 and equivalent positions‟ were Level 1, Coupon A, and could purchase up to 4.2 
kg of meat and 4 kg of fish. „Vice ministers, General Directors, experts level 7-8 and equivalent positions‟ 
were Level 2, Coupon B, and could purchase 3 kg of meat and 3 kg of fish. „Officers, clerks level 1-2‟ were 
Level 7, Coupon E, and could purchase 0.4 kg of meat and 0.5 kg of fish (Nguyễn Văn Huy 2007, p.49).   
75
 Lê Đức Thọ was a Politburo member and head of the powerful Party Control Commission in charge of 
Party personnel appointments. 
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Bùi Tín comments, “[t]he higher the rank of the cadre, the more privileges, both 
conspicuous and discreet, he enjoys” and “these privileges extended to wives, children, 
grandchildren and in-laws of the nomenklatura” (ibid, p.109).76 As market reforms were 
undertaken, cadres “used the opportunity to benefit themselves first and foremost” (ibid, 
p.147). 
 
The privileges of cadres under planning were also highlighted in Vietnamese literature, 
following a brief relaxation of control in the late 1980s and a literary revival referred to 
as đổi mới literature.77 For example, Dương Thu Hương (1995, 2000, 2002) captures the 
transmogrification of war-time cadres into fat cats and the increasing social stratification 
in the supposedly egalitarian post-war socialist society.
78
 As part of the wider diaspora 
literature, Tưởng Năng Tiến (1986) tells the story of a man released from a re-education 
camp interested in seeing the classless society about which he had heard so much during 
captivity, only to find „Guigoz-canism‟. Guigoz cans were used to carry food. “All 
Guigoz cans were equal in capacity. But when it came to the quality of their contents, 
some were more equal than others” (Tưởng Năng Tiến 1986, p.236).  
 
One day, the man in charge of heating the Guigoz cans of food for the board of 
overseers at the construction site tripped and fell, dropping dozens of cans. Rice 
and meats scattered all over the ground. Those top comrades, the director, the 
political commissar, the engineer, the manager, … made wry faces, embarrassed 
by the flagrant display of their overabundant rations before the hungry eyes of the 
collective (ibid, p.236). 
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 From a mandarin family, Bùi Tín argues that the corruption of the Party occurred due to the misguided 
promotion of „professional revolutionaries‟, a euphemism for uneducated peasants rising through the Party 
ranks due to their „correct‟ class background. With an intellectual‟s disdain, the formal and informal abuse 
of privilege for personal gain is portrayed as the result of ignorance stemming from a kind of jungle 
mentality. He also sees it as a legacy of “Confucian custom whereby gifts are conveyed upwards in the 
hope that power and prestige will subsequently flow downwards” (Bùi Tín 1995, p.107-108). 
77
 The literature cited here is not intended as evidence of historical fact. However, it does illuminate 
perceptions of events and processes at work. Furthermore, given censorship of all published work in 
Vietnam, it is easier to express provocative ideas as fiction rather than non-fiction. A story about cadres 
leveraging privilege may be published as fiction, but would not be approved in the form of historical 
analysis. 
78
 See also Nguyễn Huy Thiệp (1992, 1994) and Phạm Thị Hoài (1997). The works cited here are the 




The narrator comments: “Tell me what you hide in your Guigoz can – I‟ll tell you what 
class you belong to in the classless society” (ibid, p.237). In discussions prior to the VIth 
Congress in 1986, “increasingly bitter public criticisms of the socioeconomic privileges 
of the party-state bureaucracy were finding their way into the press. Some critics even 
argued that the party-state elite constituted a new „ruling class‟” (Porter 1993, p.147; see 
also Kolko 1997). 
 
While mention of Djilas-type issues is rare, those that do mention them portray them 
almost exclusively as negative. For Bùi Tín (1995), the New Class and its metamorphosis 
into „Red Capitalists‟ represents a betrayal of the sacrifices made by ordinary Vietnamese 
during decades of war. Instead of red capitalists, Vietnam deserves democracy and 
equality.
79
 For Greenfield (1994) and Kolko (1997), the betrayal is against the sacrifices 
made to achieve socialism. However, none of these accounts can explain the incredible 
economic growth that occurred in Vietnam. According to these portrayals, Vietnam, full 
of corrupt and self-serving behaviour, should resemble Zimbabwe.  
 
In addition, two Vietnam scholars explicitly reject use of New Class explanations for 
understanding developments in Vietnam. Abrami (2002) argues against analyzing the 
changes in Vietnam through a New Class lens. However, her portrayal of New Class-type 
perspectives is over-simplified, presented as a kind of vulgar Marxism which reads 
political outcomes off the legacies of the redistributive base of planning. Her analytic 
preference is to privilege political sentiments, which then determine economic outcomes. 
Abrami‟s attention to issues of political ideology and its influence on business attitudes 
and behaviour is important and illuminating. Her explanation of why the private sector in 
China grew rapidly after reforms while in Vietnam it did not remains very compelling 
and will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. Nevertheless, if privileging 
the economic base over the political and cultural superstructure represents a vulgarity, 
then so must its inversion.  
                                                 
79
 Hiebert (1996) contains a chapter entitled „Red Capitalists‟, but the tone is exactly the opposite of Bùi 
Tín. Where Bùi Tín views the New Class as a betrayal, Hiebert, at that time a reporter for Far Eastern 
Economic Review, viewed „red capitalists‟ as part of the dynamic growth story of 1990s Vietnam. 
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Kim (2008) also rejects a „structural neo-Marxist‟ reading of Vietnam, citing Eyal et al 
(1998) as undermining this position. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, Eyal et al 
suffers from serious limitations and does not represent a refutation of New Class 
explanations. As with Abrami, Kim also argues for the importance of attitudes, beliefs 
and values, but remains interested in their interaction (rather than determination) with 
material conditions. The issue, however, is an old one from anthropology – namely, how 
to define and ascertain culture and beliefs. Hostetler (2009) also makes a compelling case 
for the importance of attitudes and beliefs in understanding outcomes in Vietnam, 
emphasizing, as Kim (2008) does, the importance of informal norms in determining how 
formal institutions function. However, Hostetler describes a „mental mode‟ – the project-
based mentality – which is the opposite of Kim‟s „social cognition‟ of the market. For 
Hostetler, the project-bias results in personal enrichment, siphoning and skimming off 
contracts within private firms to the detriment of product quality and attention to 
upgrading, while for Kim the market-based entrepreneurial mentality of private property 
developers in Ho Chi Minh City and certain fellow travelers in local government explains 
the dynamic growth of the property market. Like Abrami, Kim‟s work provides useful 
insight into Vietnam. However, it does not negate the viability of the New Class concept 
as a lens to explore capitalist class formation.  
 
This chapter provides the historical context in which to locate the New Class analysis. It 
also serves as a review of the literature on Vietnam, in particular the transition literature 
following the end of central planning. Three historical periods have been selected. The 
next section discusses the period between 1954 and 1974, beginning with the 
formalization of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the north, moving 
through the establishment of the planning apparatus, and ending on the eve of victory in 
1975. It will be argued that, as in Eastern Europe and China, planning in Vietnam never 
really worked properly and this created a pattern of accumulation based on leveraging 
access to the state. However, during this period, leveraging access to the state functioned 
primarily to overcome shortages and improve living standards. Nevertheless, it 
established a pattern that would influence subsequent activity. 
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The second period encompasses events between 1975 and 1989, beginning with national 
reunification, moving through attempts to establish and expand planning to the entire 
country, and ending with abolition of the command economy. It will be argued that the 
pattern of accumulation established between 1954 and 1974 transformed into a process of 
commercializing the state. The continued ability to arbitrage price differentials between 
plan and market by diverting inputs and assets from the state system, along with 
opportunities to engage in smuggling through travel abroad, increasingly became sources 
of capital accumulation. State firms and those connected to the state increasingly engaged 
in commercial activities outside the plan. The process accelerated through the 1980s and 
ultimately destroyed the basis for central planning, forcing the Vietnamese Communist 
Party to attempt resolution of the New Class contradiction. 
 
The final period discusses events between 1990 and 2006. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
temporary resolution of the Djilas contradiction followed a relatively straightforward 
application of the Stalinist definition of socialism as state ownership. The state sector 
would play the „leading role‟ in the economy and this led to a state enterprise focused 
development model. As in China, insider privatization, constrained autonomy, hollowing 
out and the rise of a new business elite turned state-related accumulation into a process of 
capitalist class formation. Although based on leveraging access to the state, the growing 
influence of the market imperative, manifested as increased competition, resulted in 
remarkable economic dynamism.  
 
3.1 Creating the Limits of National Liberation, 1954-1974 
 
The 1954 Geneva Accords ended the First Indochina War and the era of French 
colonialism. Vietnam was partitioned along the 17
th
 parallel, formalizing the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in the north and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the south. Class 
warfare based land reform, which had been implemented in Viet Minh controlled 
territory since 1953, was stepped up and continued until 1956 in the north. A 300-day 
regroupment period was instituted, allowing free movement between north and south, 
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with the intention of national elections in 1956. The domestic capitalist class in Vietnam 
had always been exceptionally weak, and the majority fled south before consolidation of 
DRV control.
80
 Elections did not occur, generating an ongoing debate in the DRV about 
whether to prioritize building socialism or focus efforts on continuing the struggle for 




The DRV inherited an extremely under-developed economy. “The French had left behind 
very little modern industry and, while there were a few mines and some up-country 
plantations, in the main this was a region of poor peasants” (Fforde 2007, p.13). 
Furthermore, what little industry that had existed prior to 1954 had either been destroyed 
by the war or taken south by the French (Fforde 2007, p.14). By 1958 the Party had 
established control over the economy and began implementing the socialist economic 
model (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000).82 A three year plan (1958-1960) was 
implemented to nationalize the economy. By the start of the First Five Year Plan (1961-
1965), the DRV had established its state monopoly in production and trade, and 90 
percent of peasant families had been organized into producer cooperatives (Fforde and 
Paine 1987, p.4). 
 
However, northern Vietnam had long been characterized by population saturation, small 
plot farming and small agricultural surpluses. This placed a fundamental constraint on the 
viability of „neo-Stalinist‟ forced industrialization (Fforde and Paine 1987). Since 
domestic resources in the north were insufficient to fund industrialization – there was 
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 See Fall (1963) and Abrami (2002) for discussion of economic developments in Viet Minh controlled 
territory in the north prior to 1954. See also Kahin (1986) for a review of this period, and in particular how 
the temporary division between north and south became a political division. Land reform ended with the 
„rectification of errors‟ campaign and an admission of mistakes issued by Hồ Chí Minh. Trường Chinh was 
forced to step down as Party General Secretary. The reconciliation message was delivered in person at 
rectification meetings throughout the north by General Võ Nguyên Giáp and published in the Party daily, 
Nhân Dân. The fundamental problem was that the Viet Minh was a nationalist front organization. Land 
reform, particularly at its height, saw many non-communist supporters of the Viet Minh, especially 
landlords, denounced and shot. In addition, many „first generation‟ Party members came from intellectual, 
„petty bourgeois‟ and even landlord backgrounds, creating tensions between the „second generation‟ 
members largely from poor peasant backgrounds (Abrami 2002). See Fforde and Paine (1987), Bùi Tín 
(1995), and Abrami (2002) for discussion. See Picard (forthcoming) for discussion of the regroupment 
period. 
81
 For discussion of this tension, see Turley (2009). 
82
 At this time the Party was the called the Vietnam Workers‟ Party (Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam). It became 
the Vietnam Communist Party (Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam) after reunification in 1976. 
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very little to „squeeze‟ out of the agricultural sector – the planning system in the DRV 
quickly became heavily dependent on foreign aid from fraternal socialist allies, primarily 
the Soviet Union and China (Fforde and Paine 1987, Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000).83 
State monopoly control of foreign trade therefore became central to the planning effort.   
 
Import of investment goods received priority and the productive potential of the DRV 
steadily improved. The problem, however, was supply of current inputs. The domestic 
industrial system did not produce nearly enough, nor were imported inputs sufficient to 
meet demand. The result was that much of the DRV industrial system operated well 
below potential, combined with systemic competition for inputs. This created what 
Fforde and Paine (1987) refer to as „aggravated shortage‟, combining the well known 
features of shortage in centrally planned economies described by Kornai (1979, 1992) 




Fforde and Paine (1987) identify several reasons why the „outside economy‟ (kinh tế 
ngoại) continued to exist. First, the essential prerequisite for market based activity was 
the availability of cash (Fforde and Paine 1987, p.49). “Over the period 1958-1962 the 
volume of money in circulation rose rapidly, laying the foundations for the growth of 
„outside‟ production” (ibid, p.66). Two main sources created pressure on the DRV state 
to increase cash expenditures: procurement of agricultural products and the state sector 
wage bill. Between 1956 and 1961, the average procurement price of rice increased 20 
percent annually. However, this did not result in increased grain supplies and the price 
rises did not keep pace with inflation. In addition, between 1960 and 1965 the number of 
„workers and functionaries‟ on the state wage bill nearly doubled. State employees were 
paid in cash, and this increase not only expanded the government wage bill but also 
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 A blockade of the DRV by most Western countries was in effect during this period, so socialist regimes 
were not only ideologically amenable to supporting the DRV project, but also the only available source of 
external assistance (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.21). 
84
 It is unclear whether Fforde and Paine (1987) see „aggravated shortage‟ as unique to Vietnam. That the 
planning system in Vietnam was always weaker and less pervasive than in other socialist economies is not 
in dispute, and in its operations it resembled „reform socialism‟ more than „classic‟ Stalinist planning (see 
Kornai 1990, 1992 for discussion). However, the relationship between shortages (and hoarding and 
misinformation) and markets (parallel, shadow, secondary) had been discussed with reference to the Soviet 
Union as early as 1960 by Gerschenkron (see Gerschenkron 1962, which is a compilation of his earlier 
essays).   
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increased the demand for food (ibid, p.66). From the very beginning, the state was 
pumping cash into the hands of the general public which “supported the growth of 
buoyant effective demand for non-plan activities” (ibid, p.71). 
 
Second, Party control at the grass-roots level was weak, partly as result of the land reform 
campaign which left confusion, bitterness and disarray in its wake (ibid, p.36). This made 
enforcement of agricultural collectivization difficult. The terms of trade were turned 
against agriculture to support the industrialization effort, reducing the incentives to 
participate in collective production. Agricultural cooperative members were allowed to 
produce on their own account, the so-called „5 percent land‟. They actively, and often 
successfully, sought to expand these plots beyond the statutory five percent limit to 
increase local autonomy and control. “Such strategies required protection against 
interference from higher levels and supervisory bodies, and the cooperatives themselves 
frequently played this role and acted as „protective intermediaries‟; as such, their real 
social functions became quite different from those intended by official policy” (ibid, 
p.101). The result was widespread „nominalization‟ of collectives, facilitated by 
inaccurate and misleading reports to higher levels (ibid, p.101). Furthermore:  
 
At low levels of real income where workers spend a high proportion of their 
incomes on food it is very difficult to restrain spontaneous expansion of the free 
market in food during and after price rises during the inevitable bad harvest years. 
At the same time the minimal levels of capital needed to finance trade, coupled 
with the persistence of direct off-farm marketing (via the private-plots in the case 
of neo-Stalinist collectivized agriculture) … encourage petty-trade. In the DRV 
large-scale commerce was nationalized early on, helped by its dependence upon 
imports and the state‟s effective control over foreign trade. Small-scale trade was 
far more difficult to manage (ibid, p.47-48). 
 
The normal response to this is usually the use of violence to enforce compliance, for 
example the „liquidation of the kulaks‟ campaign in the Soviet Union (Fforde 2007). 
However, the systematic use of force to implement and enforce the plan in the DRV 
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during this period did not occur. As war in the south intensified in the 1960s, the use of 
force on the domestic population to generate compliance became even more improbable, 
since the government needed popular support to mobilize the personnel required to 
continue the war effort. The enduring presence of rice markets throughout the period 
testifies to this (Fforde 1993a). 
 
Abrami (2002) argues that the concept of „class struggle‟ in Vietnam also precluded the 
use of force. Class struggle in Vietnam was defined in terms of nationalism and social 
unity against the Americans and the southern regime (Abrami 2002, p.330).
85
 As such, it 
tended towards vertical administrative control mechanisms, a kind of rational-scientific 
„managerial socialism‟, rather than the class warfare as „continuous revolution‟ approach 
in China.
86
 Therefore, “as a strategy of rule enforcement, class struggle assumed no 
regulatory role in the Vietnamese economy. Instead, „pre-socialist‟ conventions of 
economic regulation, including occupation-based social ties and sentiments of religion, 
village and kinship remained an ever forceful means of governing economic exchange 
and entitlement in Vietnam – even at the height of state economic planning” (ibid, p.321). 
Not only did the DRV state fail to eradicate „outside‟ activities, “the low cost of non-
compliance in Vietnam meant that illegal business networks could serve as an integrative 
element of the Vietnamese planning system” (ibid, p.322). This led to what Abrami 
(2002) refers to as the emerging „commercialization of the public economy‟.87  
 
Third, the DRV government lacked the administrative experience necessary to run the 
system. Plan enforcement was uneven and delineation of responsibilities and authority 
was unclear. “In practice the apparently clear legal distinctions of the DRV‟s various 
property-forms became extremely blurred. Basic administrative principles were also 
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 There are long running debates about the relative importance of nationalism and socialism in Vietnam 
(see Marr 1981), often discussed in terms of the motivations of Hồ Chí Minh. See Duiker (2000) and 
Quinn-Judge (2003, 2004) for discussion.   
86
 Abrami (2002) follows Fforde and Paine (1987) in arguing that opposition to Chinese-style class warfare 
campaigns was a legacy of the errors of land reform. 
87
 This is different from China, where class warfare led to self-policing and a sharp division between state 
and illegal private activities. Cadres and criminals in this „outside‟ sphere operated independently of the 
planning system, engaging it through bribery and other means. Abrami (2002) characterizes this 
relationship as „commodification of the public economy‟. In Vietnam, the state and „outside‟ sectors were 
intertwined, thus „commercializing‟ the state sector. 
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extremely under-developed, especially those associated with the Ministries‟ areas of 
authority. The use of foreign models tended to give an impression of surface order whilst 
day-to-day practice reflected quite different ways of getting things done” (Fforde and 
Paine 1987, p.43). The result was a widening gap between institutional form and function 
which made implementing the plan even more difficult. State enterprises actively resisted 
interference from supervising ministries and engaged in quasi and strictly illegal 
activities to secure inputs necessary for fulfilling plan targets and to accumulate cash 
balances needed for future „outside‟ transactions.  
 
The overall pattern of events appears in hindsight to have been fundamentally 
chaotic and certainly not „planned‟. State enterprises were set up and equipped 
with aid-financed equipment and then expected to operate in an increasingly tense 
economic environment where domestic supplies of various current inputs through 
the state distribution system were becoming more and more unreliable. If such 
supplies could be imported, then some of the installed capacity could be utilized, 
but typically much of it could not be. „Output maximization‟ was therefore deeply 
conditional on supply availability. Since this was unreliable, state enterprises 
actively often depended upon the extent to which local substitutes could be found 
in order to give the existing work-force something to do. In an aggravated 
shortage economy this often involved the creation of illegal „circuits‟ … relying 
upon free-market transactions. Such behaviour was limited by the extent to which 
such activities were politically tolerated. Acceptance of it, however, could be 
secured through appropriate use of the resulting output (especially if it consisted 
of consumption goods). … With the possibility of such behaviour always present, 
it is no wonder that there was no clear legal definition of enterprise rights with 
regard to „their‟ fixed assets (Fforde and Paine 1987, p.91-92). 
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 See Picard (2004) for discussion of illegal Viet Minh activities, including opium smuggling and currency 
speculation, during the First Indochina War to fund weapons purchases. 
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[T]he variety of economic activities outside the formal scope of the plan … are 
usually described somewhat misleadingly as „free market‟ activities. This 
description is adequate if referring to activities such as petty-production for the 
market using minimal capital inputs and means of production also acquired on a 
market. But they also include a great variety of activities that are not so isolated 
from the administratively-supplied sectors. They shade off into such „semi-
socialist‟ activities as (illegal) horizontal links between state enterprises aimed 
frequently at securing resources for plan implementation, but which operate 
outside the formal control of the system of planned material supply. Crucial to 
such activities … is the possibility at some stage of relatively free exchange of 
goods or services for money. But elements of an interrelated set … of these 
activities may be based upon swops, favours and even manipulation of the pattern 
of resource allocation within the shortage economy (ibid, p.49). 
 
These tendencies were exacerbated over the period, particularly after the beginning of the 
U.S. bombing campaign against the north and escalation to full-scale war with the arrival 
of official U.S. combat troops in 1965.
89
 Industrial facilities (and large segments of the 
urban population) were relocated throughout the countryside to reduce the effects of 
bombing (Abrami 2002). Population growth was rapid during the period and “only 
around one half of the rising labour force was absorbed into some form of officially 
recognized employment over the period 1965-75. The remainder was available for 
„outside‟ work” (Fforde and Paine 1987, p.78).  
 
Staples output growth was slow and the DRV went from near self-sufficiency in food 
production in the early 1960s to import dependence, with 10-15 percent of staples 
received as imported aid by the mid-1970s (ibid, p.69). Rice prices increased nearly 100 
percent between 1965 and 1974 and by the middle 1970s the free market rice price was 
ten times the state buying price (ibid, p.71). The continued rise in state employment 
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 The first bombing runs against the DRV occurred in 1964 as a response to the Tonkin Gulf „incident‟. 
The full-scale bombing campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, began in the first part of 1965 followed by 
the arrival of the U.S. Marines later in the year. See McNamara (1995) for discussion. 
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increased demand for food, and “dependence upon staples imports reflected this 
fundamental imbalance” (ibid, p.105). The DRV economy became increasingly aid 
dependent, both for food supply and complementary inputs. A dramatic increase in aid to 





Given the importance of leveraging access to the state in order to engage in extra-legal 
„outside‟ activities, whether through cooperatives acting as „protective intermediaries‟ for 
private agricultural production or state enterprises diverting assets and „securing‟ political 
toleration, a system of patron-client relations emerged to provide cover for these 
activities. This system was known as the „umbrella‟ (ô dù) system. It “protected officials 
at every level of the bureaucracy who were taking advantage of subsidized prices to make 
money. The sponsorship of a higher-level Party official brought lower-level cadres quick 
promotions, salary increases, and special privileges and allowed them to escape 
punishment for blatant corruption and thievery by obtaining transfers to other, often 
higher, positions” (Porter 1993, p.137-138). 
 
In addition to manipulation of resource allocation in the planned economy and increasing 
„outside‟ activities, the period 1954-1975 saw the emergence of unofficial trade 
(smuggling) with the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe.
91
 Following formation of 
the DRV government in 1955, Vietnamese students, technicians, cadres and diplomats 
began to travel in large numbers to socialist countries in order to study and work 
(Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000). At this time, unofficial trade was barely even trade at 
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 The bombing campaign and war effort did not halt economic growth in the DRV (Fforde and Paine 1987, 
Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000). “Rising import dependency was not primarily the result of the 
substitution of imports for war-hit domestic output, but arose inevitably as an integral part of a dynamic 
pattern of structural change in the domestic economy” (Fforde and Paine 1987, p.71). Industrial output 
nearly doubled, with gross industrial output in 1973-1975 almost 100 percent higher than the 1960-1965 
average. However, the war did matter. Fforde and Paine (1987) acknowledge this, but stress that that 
imbalances in the DRV economy were a structural result of planning, not war. This point is accepted, but 
the impact of the war on the development of the DRV economy during the war years between 1965 and 
1975 cannot be dismissed. The lack of a five year plan after 1965 demonstrates this, along with the all out 
import drive to sustain the war effort (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000). A simple example is that Fforde 
and Paine (1987) discuss the rapid rise in „state employment‟ in the 1965-1975 period and its impact on the 
economy, with no mention of the war effort or increase in army personnel. 
91
 Smuggling has a long history in Vietnam (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). However, it took on a novel 
form through interaction with socialist bloc countries. 
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all. “[T]he Vietnamese market before 1975 was characterized by circulation, on an 
extremely limited scale, of goods brought home from the socialist countries in the 
baggage of individuals. Nor did the individuals concerned have the capacity to 
accumulate capital. They certainly became wealthier than those living on domestic 
salaries, but they could not acquire enough capital to become business persons” (ibid, 
p.75). Consumer goods were brought back to Vietnam for personal use or to be sold, but 
funds were mainly used to cover living expenses and provide modest improvements in 
standards of living. A consumer market existed due to the „outside‟ economy, and 
“people would seek out recent returnees to see if they could buy highly valued items like 
bicycles, motor cycles, radios and so forth” (ibid, p.75). While small scale during this 
period, a pattern became established and „going west‟ (đi Tây) increasingly became 
associated with profitable opportunities. 
 
On the eve of victory in 1975, the DRV economy was heavily dependent on external aid. 
From the very beginning, central planning had never worked to the degree intended. The 
“spontaneous behaviour of the DRV economy had prevented implementation of Party 
policy” (Fforde and Paine 1987, p.60). Given the structural imbalances in the economy, 
particularly regarding lack of inputs, „outside‟ activities facilitated plan fulfillment. 
However, inflation of free market prices over the period increased the tendency to divert 
assets and output away from plan fulfillment to arbitrage differences between artificially 
low state prices and market prices (Porter 1993).
92
 This was predicated on access to state 
resources and political protection through the patronage-based umbrella system, creating 
a pattern of accumulation that would influence how planning worked following national 
reunification, what Fforde and Paine (1987) refer to as „the limits of national liberation‟. 
 
3.2 Commercializing the State, 1975-1989 
 
In April 1975 the Second Indochina War ended and the long struggle for national 
reunification was over. Prior to victory a mass exodus of southern officials, businessmen, 
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 This is of course a tendency present in all centrally planned economies. But the unwillingness to use 
systematic violence to enforce the plan during this period meant that these activities were not only difficult 
to eradicate, but tended to increase over time. 
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intellectuals and high ranking military personnel occurred. In June the first re-education 
camps appeared for those who remained behind. In 1976 the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (SRV) was created and the decision was taken to implement the socialist system 
of the DRV in the newly liberated south with the launch of the Second Five Year Plan 
(1976-1980). However, the south was given a three year transition period to implement 
nationalization and agricultural collectivization.
93
 Northern managers and cadres 





The year 1978 was pivotal. The campaign to implement socialist transformation in the 
south began in earnest. In the previous year border clashes with the Khmer Rouge 
intensified and diplomatic relations with Cambodia were severed. In December 1978 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia and by January 1979 had deposed Pol Pot and taken Phnom 
Penh. The Vietnamese would remain in Cambodia for nine years, withdrawing in 1989. 
The Chinese were strong supporters of the Khmer Rouge regime and Chinese aid to 
Vietnam was terminated in 1978.
95
 As part of rapidly increasing tensions between China 
and Vietnam, the boat people exodus began. As economic conditions worsened, this 
exodus expanded over the next decade to include former businessmen, officials, 
intellectuals, and anyone who wanted to escape the new regime in the hopes of a better 
life elsewhere. As in the DRV after 1954, Vietnam lost a large segment of its capitalist 
class. In response to these events, China invaded northern Vietnam in early 1979. 
Attempts to normalize relations with the United States failed and Vietnam became a full 
member of the socialist bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading 
regime in 1978. 
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 For a chronology of events, see Bùi Tín (1995). 
94
 Northerners in the south are referred to as bắc kỳ, which literally translates to „northern‟ but has a 
pejorative connotation roughly equivalent to the American Reconstruction era term „carpetbagger‟. The 
term has its roots in the French colonial divisions of Vietnam: the protectorate of Tonkin in the northern 
region (Bắc Kỳ), the protectorate of Annam in the central region (Trung Kỳ) and the colony of Cochinchina 
in the south (Nam Kỳ). 
95
 For a journalist‟s account of the these events from the Khmer Rouge perspective, including the relations 
between Cambodia, China and Vietnam, see Short (2004). 
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The euphoria of victory led to the overly ambitious Second Five Year Plan, with its heavy 
emphasis on construction projects. However, the promise of victory – rapid 
reconstruction and growth – quickly evaporated. Immediate post-war growth was based 
primarily on southern industrial capacity. By 1977 growth had begun to stagnate and by 
1979 Vietnam was in economic crisis. Resistance to collectivization in the south saw 
agricultural output plummet. By 1981, growth rates were negative, due in part to the 
inability to obtain necessary inputs and spare parts (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, 
Fforde 2007). The legacies of the DRV planning system and the limits of national 
liberation were at hand. 
 
At the same time that ethnic Chinese Vietnamese were fleeing the country, the leadership 
of Ho Chi Minh City‟s (HCMC) District Five, Chợ Lớn, the historic centre of ethnic 
Chinese in Vietnam, authorized remaining Chinese traders to activate their overseas 
networks in order to resolve bottlenecks in the new system.
96
 They purchased agricultural 
and fishery products in Vietnam to pay for imports of tobacco, fabric and gasoline. “To 
evade control by the centrally managed customs authority, goods were traded at „sea 
mark number zero‟, with no transaction recorded. After a few successful deals of this 
sort, the People‟s Committee of the City authorized lower levels of government to 
establish companies with names beginning or ending in „imex‟, to directly handle foreign 
trade. Soon, some of them were booming” (Rama 2008, p.17, see also Stern 1985).  
 
Activities which came to be known as „fence-breaking‟ (phá rào) - bending the rules and 
operating outside the plan – proliferated. This undermined attempts to impose central 
planning, for reasons similar to those in the DRV before the end of the war.
97
 For 
example, in 1979 HCMC Party Secretary Võ Văn Kiệt sat down for breakfast with a 
small group, including a representative from the local branch of the state bank, to create 
the „rice smuggling committee‟ in order to secure sufficient rice supplies for the city 
(Rama 2008, p.17). “In Ho Chi Minh City, Mrs. Ba Thi, a decorated heroine of the war in 
South Vietnam who was then deputy director of the city food department, formed a food-
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 After reunification, Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. 
97
 See Porter (1993), p.118-127 for discussion of several fence-breaking „models‟. 
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purchasing company that violated fundamental economic policy as well as the 
prerogatives of the state trade sector. It hired rice merchants to buy rice from farmers at 
market prices instead of the lower state purchase prices and distributed it through the 
local women‟s association” (Porter 1993, p.125). During the breakfast, it was agreed that 
the bank would finance these activities, administrative „formalities‟ would be covered 





In the late 1970s, members of Doan Xa commune in northern Hai Phong province voted 
to implement a „sneak contract‟, distributing land to individual households and 
implementing production contracts. The result was a six-fold increase in output. District-
level authorities learned of the scheme, came to investigate, and decided not to renew the 
Party membership of the local cadres. However, the model spread and eventually was 
implemented throughout the district. By 1980 word of these activities had reached 
provincial Party Secretary Bùi Quang Tạo, who not only extended the model throughout 
the province but also began to lobby the central government on its merits (Rama 2008, 
p.16).
99
 “What had been treated as a dangerous deviation in the late 1960s started to be 
seen as innovative” (Rama 2008, p.16). 
 
In 1979 these issues forced a decision in the context of economic crisis, occupation of 
Cambodia, „emigration‟ of ethnic Chinese, loss of Chinese aid and a border war with 
China. Furthermore, a large increase in official import prices would occur in 1981 due to 
a change in CMEA policy. During the war, the DRV‟s trading partners agreed not to raise 
prices, in what was known as the „stop price‟ system. “Within CMEA, trading prices 
were normally established for each five-year plan based on average world market prices 
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 Võ Văn Kiệt also promised to assist Mrs. Ba Thi should she be arrested (Rama 2008, p.17). 
99
 Rama (2008) argues that these experiments were conducted within the authority relations of the Party 
apparatus as a means to improve the economic feasibility of the planning system. Almost all of the 
champions of fence-breaking activities were politically „bullet proof‟. For example, Võ Văn Kiệt was from 
a poor farming family and thus had the correct class background, had distinguished himself during the war 
as a top aide in Lê Duẩn‟s southern Party apparatus, became a member of the Central Committee in 1976 
and was promoted to full membership in the Politburo at the V
th
 Party Congress in 1982 (Porter 1993). 
However, the senior leadership still had to be convinced. For discussion of how this was achieved, see 
Rama (2008). For discussion of the decision making process in communist Vietnam more generally, see 
Đặng Phong and Beresford (1998). 
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in the previous five years. … Thus, during Vietnam‟s First FYP [Five Year Plan], prices 
were based on world market prices for 1956-60. These prices remained fixed, however, 
not only during the First FYP, but until the war ended (hence the name „stop price‟)” 
(Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.25-26). Vietnam had negotiated an extension of this 
system through 1980 to facilitate recovery. Given the rise in prices over the period, the 
system was equivalent to a subsidy by Vietnam‟s trading partners. Not only was the state 
trading monopoly being eroded by the „imexes‟, but the planning system, so dependent 
on imports, was about to receive a massive shock.
100
 In August 1979, the 6
th
 Plenum of 
the Central Committee “implicitly endorsed fence-breaking actions by issuing a policy of 
„untying production‟” (Rama 2008, p.27), including recognition of production contracts 
in agriculture and horizontal (non-plan) linkages between state firms (Porter 1993, Fforde 
2007, Rama 2008). Although intended to restore growth within the socialist economy, the 
decision “effectively sanctioned a variety of spontaneous and illegal processes which 
were destroying the central-planning system” (Fforde 2007, p.22). 
 
This was followed by several important decrees over the next two years. In February 
1980, decree 40-CP was issued to stimulate exports by breaking the central state 
monopoly on foreign trade and allowing lower levels to trade directly. This effectively 
legitimized the „imexes‟ and created “quite a large hole in the fence” (Beresford and 
Đặng Phong 2000, p.40). In January 1981, 100-CT legalized production contracts in 
agriculture and 25-CP legalized the ongoing commercialization of state enterprises 
through what came to be known as the „three-plan system‟, allowing state firms to 
expand non-plan and above-plan output (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.43).101 By 
1981, only nine percent of families in the south were organized in collectives (Porter 
1993, p.119) and 40 percent of reported state enterprise output came from market-based 
activities (Fforde 2007, p.20). “[T]he overall impact of these reform measures was to 
increase the legal scope of non-plan production and investment activities, to expand the 
area of exchange carried out at market prices and to reduce the extent of distribution of 
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 When “the new CMEA prices were applied in January 1981, the average unit price of all imports rose by 
210 per cent, while that of Vietnam‟s exports rose by only 18 per cent” (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, 
p.26). 
101
 For discussion of 25-CP, see Fforde (2007), p.135-140. 
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goods via the rationing system” (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.39). The entire 
edifice of central planning was undermined because of the “increased need to use market 
prices as basis for domestic exchanges” (ibid, p.41). 
 
These decisions created what Fforde (2007) refers to as a „trap‟, “from which traditional 
Vietnamese socialism was not to recover. …[T]he legalization of SOE participation in 
markets, just like the legalization of farming-family-based production in agriculture, has 
to be seen as creating the conditions for the emergence of capitalism, which must also be 
seen as hostile to the socialist regime” since it “threatened the economic aspect of the 
institutional basis of the Party – central planning” (Fforde 2007, p.22).  
 
These conditions were shaped by coexistence of plan and market in the Vietnamese 
economy, what Fforde (2007) refers to as the „transitional model‟. Arbitraging 
differences between low state prices and higher market prices led to the increasing 
commercialization of state enterprises (Porter 1993, Fforde 2007). While these conditions 
existed prior to 1975, after reunification, and in particular after the decisions taken 
between 1979 and 1981, their scope (and legality) increased dramatically. This led to “a 
more general problem facing the Vietnamese state in the transition from a planned to a 
market economy, that is, the effective „privatization‟ of parts of the state apparatus” 
(Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.17). This was determined by the nature of the 
transition. “Given that under the planning system, capital accumulation took place within 
the state sector … the transition to the market inevitably meant a decentralization of 
control over state assets. This happened initially in the SOE sector and among local 
authorities through the accumulation of rents based on the supply of state goods at 
subsidized prices which could be used either for direct resale in the free market or to 
produce low cost outputs for sale in the market” (ibid, p.17-18). 
 
This process was facilitated by an increase in unofficial trade (smuggling). After 1975, 
awareness of trading opportunities by Vietnamese going abroad increased and it began to 
take the form of two-way trade. “After the liberation of the south, the southern market 
was flooded with Western goods, particularly those left behind by the Americans and 
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Japanese. Later, following the outflow of „boat people‟ and the establishment of the 
Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia, the goods left behind by Americans would be 
supplemented by new inflows of goods sent by overseas Vietnamese to family members 
and by goods smuggled through Cambodia from Thailand” (ibid, p.76). These goods 
were of higher quality and cheaper than those produced in socialist countries. “People 
wanting to obtain motor cycle, bicycles or fans need no longer go to the Soviet Union or 
Germany. They could go to the south” (ibid, p.76). These goods not only spread into 
northern Vietnam but became the basis for new unofficial trade relations. “Cadres and 
students going abroad at this time began to calculate on taking with them some goods 
purchased from the south for resale in Eastern Europe” (ibid, p.76). As a result, the goods 
brought back to Vietnam changed. Since higher quality and cheaper consumer goods 
were available in the south, returnees began to focus on importing needed raw materials 
and production inputs such as brewer‟s yeast, dyestuffs, spare parts, and machine tools 
(ibid, p.77). 
 
The period 1975-1980 thus saw the beginnings of capital turnover. However, the 
rate of turnover was still slow because the links in the chain were not yet stable. 
One person going abroad to work could complete only one circuit: taking goods 
out – returning to sell – conversion into Vietnamese currency. The capacity for 
continuous circulation was as yet absent because the sufficient conditions for 
regularizing connections on both sides were lacking (ibid, p.77).  
 
Additional developments furthered the increase in unofficial trade. In 1980, following the 
crisis with China, the Brezhnev – Lê Duẩn declaration resulted in rapid growth of the 
numbers of cadres and students going to the Soviet Union (ibid, p.78). Following 
criticisms of favouritism to Party members aired in the Vietnamese press, the selection 
process became more equitable, in particular expanding opportunities for those in rural 
areas to travel abroad (ibid, p.79). Furthermore, in order to repay external debt, in 1980 
Vietnam began exporting labour to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. At roughly the 
same time that Vietnam legalized the direct foreign trade activities of the „imexes‟, tens 
of thousands of guest workers started going abroad. “The number of guest workers was 
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ten times as great as that of cadres and students and this was the most important factor in 
the sudden growth in the volume of trade” (ibid, p.79). The opportunity to go abroad “led 
to a big mobilization of capital among family, relatives and friends to facilitate two-way 
trade” (ibid, p.79).  
 
As with arbitraging price differentials between plan and market, the ability to benefit 
from unofficial trade depended on leveraging access to the state. It required the 
“extraction of goods and wealth from power” (ibid, p.82).  
 
[I]n the traditional economic model, circulation and distribution were linked to 
social power and a certain social function. A person selling goods or tickets, an 
institute director, a district president or a customs officer all had a social function 
which was closely connected to their power to allocate in the name of society. 
Under normal conditions it was only social power, but once „infected‟ by the 
market economy and private profit, this power had 101 ways of turning itself to 
private advantage (ibid, p.82).  
 
Most people “going abroad as guest workers did not normally come from very wealthy 
families. The task of getting one‟s name on to the list was difficult and costly, but people 
saw the expense as part of the „capital investment‟. For the most part, when people met 
the criteria set by the enterprise, army unit or office, then there was no need to pay 
bribes” (ibid, p.84). Those that did not meet the criteria could bribe their way onto the 
list. Wealthier individuals often went as cadres and students. In all of these forms, access 
to the state list mattered. Furthermore, “[o]ver time, development of trading relations by 
the private sector became more and more important. These activities also originated in 
initiatives taken by elements of the state. The export of labour to pay debts to Iraq, the 
Soviet Union and other countries, for example, enabled guest workers living in foreign 
countries to begin trading on their own behalf. What began as a state export nourished 
private imports and exports, both supplying the domestic market with needed goods and 
gradually promoting the accumulation of capital in the private sector” (ibid, p.151). 
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Loosening of controls in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the early 1980s created 
more space for market-based activity, into which stepped increasing numbers of 
Vietnamese cadres, students and guest workers turned „traders‟ (ibid, p.80). However, in 
the early 1980s Vietnam still forbid “individuals to export on a commercial basis, so all 
goods had to be carried as personal luggage” (ibid, p.84). Even though the rules were 
very restrictive, very clever ways were found to get around them, including wearing 
several pairs of Thai jeans onto the airplane or several Seiko wristwatches under the 
sleeves of several sweaters and jackets. The individual returns remained low in this 
period but the number of people going abroad rose significantly and the volume of 
unofficial trade increased dramatically. 
 
A recentralizing reaction quickly followed, associated with the V
th
 Party Congress in 
1982.
102
 In July, 113-HDBT was issued, demanding that all foreign trade activities have 
permits from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. “This formed a legal basis for the effective 
termination of Ho Chi Minh City‟s own foreign trade corporations” (Fforde 2007, p.35), 
and led to the creation of state import export companies („imexes‟). Following this, all 
foreign trade had to go through a state „imex‟. In addition, in August 146-HDBT sought 
to control state enterprise non-plan relationships with suppliers and customers. In 





Nevertheless, Pandora‟s box had been opened. Inflationary pressures continued in the 
domestic economy, and rising market prices “and a rapid appreciation in the free market 
value of hard currency were creating strong disincentives to supply resources to state 
trading organs” (Fforde 2007, p.33). Once again the planning system was disintegrating 
and by 1985 Vietnam had lurched back into crisis. This led to the famous VI
th
 Party 
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 Fforde (2007) argues that the 1981 reforms were actually the beginning of the reaction. While 
authorizing many of the market-based activities, they also contained language (and sufficient ambiguity) 
permitting future recentralization. See also, Abrami (2002). The process of reforms relaxing control, 
followed by clampdowns, followed by further reforms during this period is documented in great detail in 
Fforde (2007). Only the broad picture is covered here. 
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 In 1982, security forces surrounded the office of Mrs. Ba Thi of HCMC Food Products Company fame 
in an effort at intimidation, although she remained protected by high level officials (Porter 1993). 
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Congress and launch of the đổi mới (renovation) policy and shift to what would 
eventually become the socialist-oriented market economy. 
 
Fforde (2007) argues that the ongoing commercialization of state enterprises created a 
„state business interest‟ that became politically powerful during the 1980s.104 “[T]he 
defeat of the reaction was to do with the creation of a constituency within the Party … 
that favoured commercialization and a market-oriented solution rather than the traditional 
central-planning programme. This constituency was a combination of local state interests 
with elements centred upon SOEs that had benefited from economic liberalization” 
(Fforde 2007, p.39). 
 
From 1986 onwards the VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party] thus returned for a 
while to supporting (as it had in 1979 and early 1980) rather than trying to inhibit 
the strong commercializing trends within the economy. A series of decrees in 
1987-1988 improved the operation of internal markets, conferred greater 
freedoms upon SOEs and gave back much economic power to farmer families in 
cooperatives. Policy towards the non-state sectors was liberalized, though in 
practice very little had changed. Foreign trade was decentralized, and since it was 
now SOEs that benefited real change was far more substantial. Levels of subsidies 
were reduced to clean up the full-scale shift to a market-oriented order” (ibid, 
p.41). 
 
Decree 217-HDBT of November 1987 was an important pillar of the đổi mới programme. 
It increased state enterprise autonomy and independence by granting full rights over 
capital, including retained profits (ibid, p.199). This was a major step, since it recognized 
that state enterprise „own capital‟(vốn tự có) belonged to SOEs.105 It also introduced 
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 This builds on Fforde (1993). Fforde (2007) is a compilation and update of previous work, and is 
therefore most frequently cited here. 
105
 The legal definition of „own capital‟ has changed over time. In essence, it refers to profits made by 
SOEs from funds not provided by the state – i.e. profits which SOEs have earned on their „own‟ 
investments. For example, loans – and profits made on investments with these loans – even if from state 
owned commercial banks, are considered own rather than state capital. The category of „own capital‟ was 
officially abolished in 2003 with the state claiming that all SOE capital was state capital, even though 
enterprises continue to consider it very important.  
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profit-based accounting and abolished direct budgetary support (Fforde and de Vylder 
1996; Vũ Quốc Ngữ 2002; Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003; Cheshier, Penrose, and 
Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga 2006). In 1987, checkpoints on internal trade were removed and 
the first Foreign Investment Law was promulgated. In 1988, Resolution 10 legalized 
household farming, including distribution of land use rights to farmers for a minimum of 
fifteen years, and a two-tier banking system was created by establishing four state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) separate from the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) (Riedel and 
Turley 1999). 
 
The nature of unofficial trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also changed 
during the middle and late 1980s, becoming increasingly organized and centralized. The 
scale of accumulation correspondingly increased. “[P]eople going abroad and trading 
informally changed gradually into a continuous chain increasingly well-organized at both 
ends. Goods no longer needed to accompany people as there were now many ways to 
transport goods from Vietnam to other countries” (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, 
p.87). By 1983, intermediaries had appeared in most large Soviet and Eastern European 
cities to broker deals, receiving a percentage for their services (ibid, p.86). Throughout 
the 1980s the Vietnamese established control over many of the underground markets in 
the Soviet Union (ibid, p.83).
106
 By this time, “connections had formed which tore holes 
in the legal apparatus, opening doors in the customs departments, for example, on both 
sides” (ibid, p.87) and “goods could go by container from Saigon or Haiphong to 
Vladivostok, then by train across Siberia to Moscow. From Moscow a network was ready 
to distribute goods very quickly to the far provinces of Russia, to Minsk, Kiev, 
Leningrad, Baku and to Eastern Europe” (ibid, p.88). 
 
This trade became a force for “concentrating domestic capital funds which for many 
years had lain idle in the form of hoards. On an individual basis, it was a small capital 
source scattered among families in the shape of a few chỉ of gold, a little saved money, a 
few household things. The demands of the trade, however, caused this capital to step out 
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 Although very little is known about the Vietnamese mafia, this must have played a part in its 
development and its ongoing links with Russia. 
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of its grave and join the current of economic life” and unofficial trade “was one of the 
primary forms of capital mobilization and accumulation in Vietnam‟s market [outside] 
economy” (ibid, p.94).107 It also stimulated domestic production as SOEs diverted 
capacity and small private workshops appeared to supply Soviet and Eastern European 
demand. While unofficial trade served to alleviate shortages in the Vietnamese economy 
throughout the 1980s (ibid, p.95), it also “contributed to the cracking up of the old 
centralized planning mechanism. It was one of the agents adding life to the free markets, 
pushing the economy more strongly towards the market mechanism” (ibid, p.96).108 





Official decentralization after 1986 formalized much of the existing de facto autonomy in 
the economy (Van Arkadie 1993, Fforde 2007). But the planning apparatus still existed 
and the old habits of arbitraging the two-price system continued, along with asset 
stripping, speculation, smuggling and similar activities.  
 
After 1986 it [accumulation] also occurred through a legal process of 
„corporatization‟ in which SOEs have gained increasing autonomy in economic 
decision-making. But, since 1986, the private sector has also gained legal status in 
Vietnam and there have been strong incentives for actors within the state sector to 
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 A chỉ weighs about 3.75 grams (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.92). 
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 Beresford and Đặng Phong (2000) argue that Vietnamese smuggling undermined central planning in 
both Vietnam and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, since “it promoted disorder and anti-social 
activities such as bribery, theft, smuggling, sabotage of public property, disintegration of the administrative 
apparatus” (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.95). In order to facilitate conversion of roubles into a form 
that could be repatriated to Vietnam, Russians began stripping gold from equipment and the Order of 
Lenin, which was 100 percent gold and weighed about five chỉ, was sold to Vietnamese. Kilns were 
established to separate and purify gold, including in the student accommodations in Moscow that had been 
taken over by Vietnamese traders (ibid, p.92). 
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 Unofficial trade with Russia and Eastern Europe died out in the early 1990s. With Russian markets now 
open, the Thais could export jeans directly without the need for Vietnamese smugglers. “[B]y the mid-
1990s only the few powerful smugglers who were able to find alternative trade routes in Russia via Hong 
Kong, Singapore or Bangkok remained” (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, p.89). “In place of the former 
large population of students and cadres, the number of Vietnamese traders remaining in each city could be 
counted on ten fingers. They were important fingers, however, since they represented people who had by 
then accumulated millions of US dollars in capital” (ibid, p.90). Unofficial trade continued with other 
countries, notably China after 1989. Beresford and Đặng Phong (2000) estimate that for the period 1992-
1994 unofficial trade was as much as 37 percent of officially recorded trade (Beresford and Đặng Phong 
2000, p.14). 
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continue to divert resources away from economic activities in which they cannot 
operate effectively to higher profit areas. … Technically such investments remain 
within the state, but the reality is that central government attempts to influence the 
direction of economic development through its plan are largely ignored in the 
short-term profit-oriented decisions of SOEs (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000, 
p.18). 
 
In addition, Decree 217 permitted lower levels of government to establish SOEs. The 
result was an explosion of small, often district-level state firms. It is impossible to 
determine the degree to which these firms engaged in arbitrage opportunities, but many 
of them did report losses and constituted a significant drain on the state budget (Van 
Arkadie and Mallon 2003). By the late 1980s inflation was turning into hyperinflation 
and near famine conditions existed in some areas.
110
 Once again, an economic crisis was 
developing. 
 
The year 1989 was also pivotal. Not only were communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
collapsing and the Chinese shooting pro-democracy demonstrators to maintain power, 
Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia and began the processing of re-establishing its 
international relations with the West. Exports to convertible currency countries increased 
118 percent and for the first time Vietnam was a net rice exporter (Riedel and Turley 
1999). The border with China was opened to „small volume trade‟ and unofficial trade 
between the two countries exploded, with Chinese imports flooding Vietnamese markets 
(Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000). Furthermore, Soviet aid was drastically reduced. 
Combined with increasing internal economic problems, hyperinflation in particular, the 
planning system in Vietnam could no longer pretend to function. An orthodox 
macroeconomic stabilization package was implemented and Decree 195-HDBT abolished 
the two-price system (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). The „transitional model‟ of 1980-
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 The consumer price index rose 774 percent in 1986, 232 percent in 1987 and 394 percent in 1988 
(Riedel and Turley 1999, p.19). Poor weather and a bad harvest in 1987, combined with continuing 
problems in collective agricultural production, created near famine conditions that lasted into 1988 (Ngô 
Vĩnh Long 1993, Riedel and Turley 1999). 
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1989 was over and central planning was effectively dead (Fforde 1993a, Beresford and 
Đặng Phong 2000, Fforde 2007). 
 
The pattern of accumulation that began after 1954 in the north as leveraging access to the 
state in order to overcome shortage and improve living standards became, after national 
reunification in 1975, a process of commercializing the state. The ability to arbitrage 
prices and divert inputs and assets from the state system or engage in smuggling through 
travel abroad increasingly became sources of capital accumulation. State firms and those 
connected to the state increasingly engaged in commercial activities. The process 
accelerated through the 1980s and ultimately destroyed the basis for central planning. 
The fundamental issue after 1989 therefore became resolving the Djilas contradiction. As 
Fforde (2007) succinctly puts it: “Upon what would the state rest once it had lost its 
power, through central planning, over the economy in general and over SOEs in 
particular? How could there be a „Party without the plan‟?” (Fforde 2007, p.200). 
 
3.3 Resolving the New Class Contradiction, 1990-2006 
 
The pace of change in the Vietnamese economy after 1989 was extraordinary. Expansion 
and diversification of agriculture and aquaculture products lead to a strong and sustained 
increase in exports. Light manufacturing output increased, garments and footwear in 
particular, contributing to the export boom. Crude oil exports expanded, rising from USD 
79 million in 1988 to USD 756 million in 1992 and reaching USD one billion by 1995, 
accounting for 20 percent of total exports (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003, p.181-182). 
Foreign direct investment rose steadily. Inflation stabilized in 1992 and Vietnam 
experienced strong economic growth combined with macroeconomic stability into the 
late 1990s (Riedel and Turley 1999, Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). 
 
In 1990 a Company Law was promulgated, providing a legal framework for private 
firms. In 1991 the National Assembly approved a pilot programme to begin equitization 
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(cổ phần hóa) of state enterprises by transforming them into joint stock companies.111 
The Law on Foreign Investment, originally issued in 1987, was amended in 1990 and 
1992. In 1992 the Constitution was amended, recognizing a role for the private sector in 
the Vietnamese economy. In 1993 a Land Law and Bankruptcy Law were promulgated. 
That year also saw the return of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to Vietnam. In 1994 the U.S. trade embargo was lifted and relations with the United 
States were normalized in 1995. In 1995 Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The 
turnaround from international isolation and looming macroeconomic collapse in 1989 
was remarkable. 
  
The early 1990s are characterized as the birth of Vietnamese capitalism (Greenfield 1994, 
Fforde 2007, Fforde 2008). However, the tone of analysis changes. With the end of 
central planning, the main economic problems are now seen as those of a market 
economy (Fforde 2007, p.4). What were dynamic and innovative quasi-legal activities 
that undermined the viability of central planning now become barriers to growth and 
development. The much heralded commercialization of the state becomes „economic 
parasitism‟ (Riedel and Turley 1999). “Party members and relatives, state agencies, 
ministries, people‟s committees at district and province levels, and the army, own, 
control, or manage a very large slice of the economy” (ibid, p.50), creating “an emerging 
class of notables with stakes in privilege” (ibid, p.49). The pattern of accumulation that 
emerged is now a distortion, and discussion focuses on reforms needed to correct this. 
 
This attitude is best captured in Fforde (2007), who argues that the early 1990s represents 
a missed opportunity. Since the „state business interest‟ consisted of decentralized and 
autonomous state firms, the end of central planning provided an opportunity to privatize 
nominally state enterprises and undertake political reform (Fforde 2007, p.45). However, 
as regime continuity and survival is the top priority of the Party, events in Eastern Europe 
indicated the dangers of such an approach. Furthermore, “[i]t is unimaginable that putting 
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 Although equitization is often perceived as a Vietnamese euphemism for privatization, this is not always 
the case. See Cheshier, Penrose and Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga (2006) for discussion. 
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political liberalization first would have been preferable for Vietnam, considering its 
recent national division, weak middle strata, and feeble civil society” (Riedel and Turley 
1999, p.9). Instead of wholesale economic and political change, the 1990s saw a 
continuation of the pattern of accumulation established under planning in a new setting. 
 
Two empirical „irregularities‟ require mention. During the early 1990s, Vietnam 
experienced a „paradox‟ (Fforde 2007). Low inflation and high growth combined with an 
increase in state sector output (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003, Fforde 2007). This is 
contrary to standard expectations, since state firms are presumed inefficient and therefore 
require subsidies to maintain operations. Subsidies represent a drain on the state budget, 
fuelling inflation and macroeconomic instability. However, the opposite occurred. 
Second, throughout the 1990s the private sector grew very slowly. Between 1990 and 
1995, the recorded non-state share of manufacturing output actually declined. While the 
„non-state‟ sector accounted for 60 percent of GDP, this was predominately household 
production. The private corporate sector only accounted for one percent of GDP (Riedel 
and Trần 1997). By 1998, the private corporate sector only accounted for one percent of 
employment and seven percent of GDP (Webster and Taussig 1999). 
 
In the 1990s, temporary resolution of the Djilas contradiction following the end of central 
planning followed a relatively straightforward application of the Stalinist definition of 
socialism as state ownership. The state sector would play the „leading role‟ in the 
economy (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003, Cheshier et al 2006). This led to a state 
enterprise focused development model (Riedel and Turley 1999, Fforde 2007). In 
addition, while central planning did end with abolition of the two-price system in 1989, 
the „market‟ economy of the 1990s was still highly regulated. Licenses, quotas, official 
approval of business activities, and access to land and credit provided significant scope 
for leveraging connections to the state. Foreign investment increased significantly in the 
1990s and was directed into partnerships with state firms. While arbitraging differentials 
between plan and market prices was no longer feasible, a wide array of opportunities 
remained available for preferential treatment.  
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London (2009) views post-1989 Vietnam as engaged in a transition to „market-
Leninism‟. “In market-Leninist regimes, communist parties pursue their political 
imperatives through market institutions and market-based strategies of accumulation 
while maintaining Leninist principles and strategies of political organization” (London 
2009, p.376). Furthermore, “[r]apid economic growth, increasing state investments, and a 
growing domestic market broadly benefited state-owned businesses, while state policies – 
and especially practices – effectively stunted the development of a truly autonomous 
private sector. Instead what occurred was the development of a business class within the 
state. The classic market-transition scenario developed through which political capital 
transformed into economic capital” (ibid, p.387). Citing Gainsborough (2002b), London 
(2009) notes that “[b]y 1995, Hồ Chí Minh City‟s top 100 companies were nearly all state 
owned enterprises, many of which had commercialized their operations during the early 
period of đổi mới, and were now active across a range of fields, from real estate to trade, 
and from retail to banking” (London 2009, p.387). 
 
For Abrami (2002), the „commercialization of the public economy‟ under planning 
resulted in a private sector made up of insiders – state workers and relatives of cadres. 
The private sector was not autonomous, but was instead dependent on access to the 
state.
112
 This continued after the end of central planning and stunted the growth of a „real‟ 
private sector. Beresford and Đặng Phong (2000) emphasize a similar legacy of planning:  
 
[A]s the markets became open and established … personal relations [forged under 
planning] developed into more or less organized and institutionalized networks, 
albeit still often based on connections between family members, neighbours and 
colleagues. … [T]he development of institutions through these mechanisms has 
had a profound effect on the way they continue to operate today. While attempts 
at legal regulation and sanction have had relatively little impact, market 
institutions continue to be characterized by highly personalized relations and 
networks of trust established over a relatively long period (Beresford and Đặng 
Phong 2000, p.152-153; see also Herno 1998). 
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 For a similar argument, see Hy Văn Lương and Jonathan Unger (1998). 
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Fforde (2007) attempts to explain both empirical irregularities through the failure to 
capitalize on the „commercial renaissance from the inside‟ (Fforde 2007, p.42). At the 
beginning of the 1990s, Vietnam‟s state enterprises were “largely treated by their 
effective owners as private in nature, and so capable of performing under competitive 
conditions without economically destabilizing state support” (ibid, p.214). However, the 
supposed „missed opportunity‟ of wholesale privatization occurred because state firms 
were perceived as the support base for the regime. As with Abrami (2002), the 
dependence of the private sector on state firms, a legacy of planning, therefore continued 
in the 1990s (Fforde 2007, p.204). The state enterprise focus of the 1990s blocked the 
emergence of a „true‟ private sector (ibid, p.194). 
 
One puzzling aspect of this account is what happened to the „state business interest‟. It 
was this interest within the Party that apparently forced đổi mới and ended central 
planning. However, in the story of the 1990s this interest is overwhelmed. Fforde (2007) 
argues that the emphasis on state firms in the 1990s was accompanied by a process of 
recentralization in which “the centre of gravity … moved „upwards‟ and away from 
interests close to and within SOEs. This was experienced as a reduction in SOE 
autonomy” (Fforde 2007, p.214).113 This is portrayed as against the will of the de facto 
private and competitive commercialized state sector. Fforde argues that this process of 
recentralization was fiercely resisted, but nevertheless occurred. It is a story of imposition 
from outside, with the state clawing back control over autonomous nominally state firms 
who for unknown reasons want simply to compete in markets.  
 
A more compelling explanation is provided by what Riedel and Turley (1999) refer to as 
the „power of satisfied interests‟:  
 
Interests and power converged in the late 1970s and continued throughout the 
1980s around proposals for partial reform, and as demands were met some 
supporters of reform in earlier periods drifted into indifference or opposition. This 
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 This is referred to as „re-statization‟ in Fforde (2004). 
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explains why many of the same province-level Party organizations and state 
enterprises that supported reform in the 1980s defected to the status quo collation 
in the 1990s (Riedel and Turley 1999, p.10). 
 
Nevertheless, Fforde (2007) is right to highlight the recentralizing tendency of the 1990s. 
Gainsborough (2003a) makes similar observations regarding recentralization, but without 
the implicit assumption that this necessarily represents a move away from a potentially 
efficient (albeit de facto) „private‟ sector towards inefficient state control.  
 
An early and important signal of the recentralization process was Decree 388-HDBT 
issued in November of 1991 following the VII
th
 Party Congress. This decree was directed 
at correcting the excesses of Decree 217 in 1987, which had resulted in a rapid expansion 
of small, local and predominately loss-making state firms.  
 
Most of the loss making SOEs that drained state resources and contributed little to 
state budget revenues were smaller SOEs attached to departments of line 
ministries or lower levels of government over which the central government had 
little control. Transforming smaller SOEs was an attempt to improve economic 
performance and also a means through which the central government could break 
the power of lower levels of government that had used smaller SOEs as tools for 
asset stripping and rent distribution (Cheshier et al 2006, p.6; see also Porter 
1993; Painter 2003a, 2003b; Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). 
 
Decree 388 forced existing state firms to apply for new operating licenses, with re-
registration approval predicated on business viability.
114
 The result was that “[b]etween 
1991 and 1994, nearly half the recorded SOEs were transformed, with the total number 
falling from around 12,000 in 1991 to around 6,000 in 1994. Roughly 3,000 SOEs were 
liquidated and 2,000 merged into other state firms” (Cheshier et al 2006, p.7). The 
majority of these were small state firms. The total assets of liquidated state enterprises 
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 For the full text of government decrees, decisions, circulars and laws discussed in this chapter, see the 
Official Gazette (Công Báo). See also, Cheshier et al (2006) for summary and further discussion. 
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has been estimated at less than four percent of total state assets (CIEM and World Bank 
2002, Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). The period 1991 to 1994 saw the single largest 




Another component of the recentralization process was the creation of General 
Corporations (GCs) (tổng công ty). Inspiration for the General Corporations most likely 
came from the Korean chaebol and the creation of state business groups in China in the 
early 1990s. The legislation creating the General Corporations was promulgated in 1994, 
and over the next several years GCs were established in a variety of sectors. These 
corporations were predominately created from existing state firms and enterprise unions 
(Fforde 1995b, Marukawa 1999, Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003, Hahn and Lee 2006). 
 
Two types of General Corporation were created. Decision 90-TTg established the so-
called GCs 90 under the authority of ministries and provincial People‟s Committees. 
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 For discussion of data problems regarding the number of state enterprises, particularly with regard to 
equitization, see Cheshier et al (2006), Box 1, p.7-8. 
 125 
Table 1: Original 18 Decision 91 General Corporations 
Corporation Acronym 
Electricity of Vietnam EVN 
Northern Food Corporation Vinafood 1 
Southern Food Corporation Vinafood 2 
Vietnam Paper Corporation Vinapimex 
Vietnam Airlines Corporation Vietnam Airlines 
Vietnam Coffee Corporation Vinacafe 
Vietnam National Cement Corporation VNCC 
Vietnam National Chemical Corporation Vinachem 
Vietnam National Coal Corporation Vinacoal 
Vietnam National Gem and Gold Corporation Vigego 
Vietnam National Shipping Lines Vinalines 
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Corporation Vinatex 
Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation Vinataba 
Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation Petrovietnam 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation VNPT 
Vietnam Rubber Corporation Geruco 
Vietnam Shipbuilding Corporation Vinashin 
Vietnam Steel Corporation VSC 
Source: adapted from Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003), Table 10.1, p.134 
 
The intention was to pool investments and create production synergies between member 
firms. General Corporations 91 in particular were meant to play the „leading role‟ in their 
sectors. However, in this early form, the General Corporation head offices functioned 
primarily as administrative units above member companies rather than facilitating 
improved performance (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003, Cheshier et al 2006). In addition 
to the 1994 decisions on state corporations, the 1995 Law on State Enterprises created a 
State Capital Management Department under the Ministry of Finance to oversee state 
capital (vốn nhà nước) invested in state enterprises (Gainsborough 2003a, Fforde 2007). 
Taken together, Decree 388 and the creation of General Corporations represent an effort 
during the 1990s to shift control over state enterprises upwards in the hierarchy, 




 However, given the intensely political nature of this process and the 




Nevertheless, the pattern of accumulation based on leveraging access to the state 
continued unabated. Gainsborough (2003a) identifies two related processes operating in 
Ho Chi Minh City: local elite privatization and siphoning of public funds and assets into 
private firms. Taken together, they represent a process of „hollowing out of public 
ownership‟ (Gainsborough 2003a, p.28). In addition, companies established by city 
departments, districts and Party organizations began to engage in rampant diversification 





Firms also engaged in “profiteering, speculation (often involving foreign exchange and 
land) and smuggling” (Gainsborough 2002a, p.231). Mrs. Ba Thi, celebrated fence-
breaker of HCMC Food Corporation fame, was forced into retirement in 1993 “when it 
was revealed that the company had accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars in 
overseas debts and had misallocated millions more … In total USD 60 million has been 
stolen from the enterprise, including USD 4 million worth of machinery which was 
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 The emphasis on recentralizing tendencies in this literature was meant to counter the dominant view of 
the 1990s as a story of de-centralization. Vietnam has a long history of provincial autonomy and 
decentralized decision making. This was exacerbated by constraints on communication and control during 
the wars, leading to lower levels taking decisions on their own and often ignoring directives from the centre 
(Kolko 1997, Đặng Phong and Beresford 1998). The story of the 1990s is therefore not only one of 
recentralization, and the reforms of the 1990s formalized elements of this long standing de facto provincial 
autonomy. For example, Beresford and Đặng Phong (2000) describe the emergence of a decentralized trade 
monopoly in the 1990s. As Riedel and Turley (1999) note, “[f]rom just 80 in 1987, the number of firms and 
organizations authorized to engage in foreign trade swelled by 1990 to 212, of which central ministries 
controlled 60 and people‟s committees of provinces, municipalities, and districts controlled 152. 
Authorization in 1991 for private as well as state enterprises to establish direct links with foreign markets 
vastly increased the number of companies with licenses to trade and further decentralized the trade 
structure. Regional direct trade grew faster than that of the large centrally-managed state companies until it 
drew even with the latter in 1994” (Riedel and Turley 1999, p.30). By 1997, “1,900 state-owned companies 
and 6,000 private ones had license to trade” (ibid, p.53, footnote 15). For discussion of the rising formal 
power of provinces in the Party Central Committee, see Abuza (2002) and Abrami, Malesky and Zheng 
(2007, 2008). The 1996 State Budget Law also granted more authority to provinces with regard to 
expenditure decisions. 
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 For detailed discussion of this process in Ho Chi Minh City, see Gainsborough (2003a). 
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 There was a land market boom in the early 1990s, making moves into real estate very profitable. 
Gainsborough (2003a) notes that “43 per cent of all housing built in Ho Chi Minh City during 1975-99 
occurred in 1991-95” (Gainsborough 2003a, p.21). This boom occurred before the 1993 Land Law. For 
discussion, see Kim (2008). 
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moved to private factories” (Greenfield 1994, p.214).119 “[T]he term „primitive 
accumulation‟ comes to mind as capturing something of the 1990s in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Certainly, there seemed to be a fair number of members of the elite – and others – getting 
rich on the back of such things as the emergence of the land market, the craze to establish 
banks, or generally exploiting their public positions in state enterprises and the 
bureaucracy for private gain” (Gainsborough 2003a, p.ix). 
 
For example, a post-planning version of Lê Đức Thọ‟s family running specialty Party 
shops is provided by the son of former Party General Secretary Lê Duẩn, who studied 
aviation in the Soviet Union. Upon his return to Vietnam he worked for state owned firm 
Cotec, which did business with the USSR and after 1991, with Russia. He then founded a 
private company, also called Cotec. This firm invested in the Technological and 
Commercial Joint Stock Bank (Techcombank) and Lê Duẩn‟s son became chairman of 





In another example, Gainsborough (2003b) traces the rise and fall of Tan Binh 
Production Service Trading and Export Company (Tamexco). Tamexco was established 
in 1989 as a general trading company under Ho Chi Minh City‟s Tan Binh District Party 
Committee. It imported fertilizer, construction materials and automobiles, exported 
seafood, and operated real estate and tourism ventures. In 1992 Tamexco established and 
became the leading shareholder in Tan Viet Joint Stock Commercial Bank (Tacombank).  
 
In 1996 the director of Tamexco was arrested on charges of corruption in connection with 
Tamexco losses estimated at USD 25 million.
121
 This prompted a run on Tacombank. 
Following this the director of private company Dolphin, which had conducted business 
with Tamexco, was charged with bribery and corruption. Specifically, the director of 
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 Whether or not this was an attack against Võ Văn Kiệt is not known. For discussion of the use of 
corruption cases as political weapons, see Gainsborough (2003b). 
120
 Information on Techcombank and the role of Lê Duẩn‟s son was graciously provided by Dr. Martin 
Gainsborough. The information was obtained during interviews conducted by Dr. Gainsborough in 1999, 
along with relevant data from several Vietnamese newspapers by Dr. Gainsborough.   
121
 Vasavakul (1997) puts the figure at USD 40 million (Vasavakul 1997, p.116, footnote 74). 
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Dolphin was charged with bribing the head of Notary Office No. 1 in Ba Ria – Vung Tau 
to certify artificially inflated land values. This allowed Tamexco to increase its bank 
borrowing. In October 1996 the deputy director of state owned Bank for Foreign Trade of 
Vietnam (Vietcombank) in HCMC, who was also chairman of the joint venture bank First 
Vinabank, along with the head of Vietcombank‟s Vung Tau branch, who was deputy 
director of First Vinabank, were also charged for continuing to lend to Tamexco despite 
its high and rising debts. Vietcombank was the primary Vietnamese investor in First 
Vinabank. Twenty individuals ended up facing charges in connection with the case. 





However, there is a tendency to view these processes as happening under the nose and 
against the wishes of the state. This is implicit in Fforde‟s decentralized and autonomous 
„state business interest‟ and Gainsborough‟s „local elite privatization‟. One of the 
important contributions of Gainsborough‟s work on Ho Chi Minh City was to show how 
top city officials were connected into the central apparatus. Arguing against the dominant 
centre versus province perspective, Gainsborough (2003a, 2004a) moves the division 
lower in the hierarchy, with department and district level firms engaging in myriad 
„unsanctioned‟ activities.123 The meticulous tracing of connections between local officials 
and local businesses, and the difficulty in identifying clear connections between top city 
officials and business interests, led Gainsborough (2003a) to conclude that lower level 
officials were engaged in the bulk of the dirty work.
124
 While acknowledging that “a 
central umbrella generally provides more protection than a local one” (2002b, p.5; 2003a) 
and that Party Congresses are best viewed “as occasions when access to patronage and 
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 For a fascinating account of the legal arguments used in the case, and how the inherent ambiguity of 
Vietnamese socialist law was wielded to make the government‟s case, see Gillespie (2001). 
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 Ho Chi Minh City is rank equivalent to a province in Vietnam‟s administrative hierarchy. 
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 This follows Nevitt (1996) on China, in which market reforms opened up new career opportunities for 
local officials. Gainsborough argues that top city officials continue to follow the traditional „ladder-of-
advancement‟ strategy. For connections between HCMC officials and businesses, see Gainsborough 
(2003a), Table A3.1 „Biographical data on HCMC politicians‟, p.124 and Table 3.2 „HCMC politicians 
with identifiable business interests‟, p.128.   
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political protection are circulated” (Gainsborough 2007a, p.6), the story remains 




Greenfield (1994) is more explicit in viewing this process as a broad pattern of “primitive 
accumulation leading to capitalism” (Greenfield 1994, p.215), the general “exercise of 
state power against the working class in the interests of the new bourgeoisie emerging 
from within the ranks of … state enterprise managers and the most powerful segments of 
the party-state bureaucracy” (ibid, p.203). This includes the upper reaches of the state, 
with “[n]early all ministries, government departments and research institutes … involved 
in various types of profit-making activities” (ibid, p.210-211). Greenfield is one of the 
few scholars to highlight the dark side of this process, including the rise of prostitution, 
widespread bribery in education and healthcare, and the emergence of sweatshops in 
appalling conditions to exploit predominately rural workers.
126
 For Greenfield, the story 
of the 1990s is one of increasing alignment of state officials with the interests of capital, 
predicated on exploitation of the working class. In classic Leninist fashion, The Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labour (VGCL), the only authorized union, is oriented towards 
the state rather than workers. One of its primary functions is to suppress labour in the 
interests of capital, particularly foreign investors.  
 
[T]rade union cadres, managers and state officials have „degenerated into thieves‟. 
Thriving on corruption and shifting state assets into the private sector, „they have 
betrayed their class‟, turning against the working class which brought them to 
power. But the roots of this betrayal lay in the formation of the post-revolutionary 
state which established a structure of power that – through crisis and reform – 
gives rise to the embourgeoisement of the staff of the state (ibid, p.225-226). 
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 There is widespread disagreement over how to characterize patron-client networks, blocs, factions, 
interest groups, etc. in Vietnam. For conflicting formulations, see Porter (1993), Vasavakul (1997, 1999a); 
Đặng Phong and Beresford (1998); Riedel and Turley (1999); Beresford and Đặng Phong (2000); Appold 
and Dinh The Phong (2001); Gillespie (2001); Gainsborough (2003a, 2003b, 2007a); Abrami, Malesky and 
Zheng (2007, 2008); Fforde (2007); Rama (2008); and London (2009). 
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 For an alternative view, in which some young women prefer sweatshops to the drudgery of life in the 
rice fields, see Kabeer, Trần Thị Vân Anh and Vư Mạnh Lợi (2005). For further discussion of these issues 
in Vietnam, migration and wage employment in particular, see Pincus and Sender (2007). 
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Although the „working class‟ proper in Vietnam has always been small relative to the 
total – still largely agricultural – population, part of Vietnam‟s growth story is about 
„freeing‟ labour and shifting the massive rural labour force into waged employment 
(Riedel, Bui Tat Thang, and Nguyen Van Phuc 2000; Pincus and Sender 2007). In 
addition, Vietnam‟s young and growing population pumps nearly one million new 
entrants to the labour force each year (World Bank 2005). Greenfield (1994) is right to 
emphasize the growing exploitation of the working class, and insider privatization, 
corruption, and exploitation of labour as part of the process creating a “nascent 
bourgeoisie whose power remains symbiotic with the structures of state power” 
(Greenfield 1994, p.223). However, Greenfield‟s story is one of betrayal, with an almost 
exclusive focus on the nefarious side of the development of capitalism. This account is 
missing an explanation of the dynamism of the 1990s. 
 
Gainsborough (2003a) provides the best account of the complicated interaction between 
leveraging privilege and economic dynamism. “In the 1990s being successful in business 
owed a great deal to a company‟s bureaucratic and political background. Some of this 
had to do with the superior initial endowment enjoyed by these companies (e.g. 
possession of property or land). However, it is also the case that a company‟s 
bureaucratic background carried with it certain additional benefits, such as political 
protection and easier access to licenses, contracts and capital” (Gainsborough 2003a, 
p.29). Without these connections, “a company‟s prospects for expansion were 
undoubtedly limited” (ibid, p.29).127 Nevertheless, a high degree of competition existed 
and increased throughout the 1990s. Firms became very responsive to the market and 
increasingly perceived profit opportunities from doing business rather than simply rent-
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 There is widespread recognition that connections between officials and firms exist, but disagreement on 
their effects. Nguyễn Đình Cung, Phạm Anh Tuấn, Bùi Văn and Dapice (2004) differentiate between 
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former are seen as acceptable and to be expected, while the latter are detrimental to firm growth and 
dynamism. Malesky and Taussig (2009b) argue that political connections influence lending decisions by 
bank loan officers and although rational given the incentive structure, it is inefficient and a drag on growth. 
Fforde (2008) argues against this interpretation of their data, viewing connections as necessary for 
acquiring a rent, but this rent is then dissipated in Vietnam‟s highly competitive economy. Both Webster 
and Taussig (1999) and Kim (2008) see connections as a kind of necessary but insufficient condition. 
While they might get one into business, they are not the key determinant of firm performance. Firm 




 Gainsborough stresses that it is very difficult to separate productive business 
activity from rent-seeking and corruption in Vietnam (ibid, p.11), and “[w]hile anti-
competitive practices remained an everyday feature of the business environment in Ho 
Chi Minh City in the 1990s” (ibid, p.28), competition produced dynamism and 
contributed to economic growth. 
 
For example, in a chapter entitled „Red Capitalists‟ Hiebert (1996) discusses Saigon 
Jewelry Company. The company was established in 1988 under the HCMC Department 
of Trade and run by Mr. Nguyễn Hữu Định, a man who would come to be known as „Mr. 
Gold‟.129 One of the few companies authorized to import gold through quotas issued by 
the State Bank of Vietnam, Mr. Định quickly moved to establish shops around the 
country. Saigon Jewelry‟s gold bars, which have a distinctive dragon emblem, became 
the standard not only in HCMC but throughout the country, used for large purchases such 
as houses, cars and motorbikes (Hiebert 1996, Gainsborough 2003a).  
 
Saigon Jewelry, like Tamexco, rapidly diversified. In 1991 its subsidiary International 
Trade Centre purchased an Intershop in downtown HCMC from a bankrupt state firm.
130
 
The store was quickly turned into a success, selling everything from groceries to 
electrical goods (Gainsborough 2003a, p.23). Saigon Jewelry also linked up with foreign 
property developers, becoming the primary Vietnamese investor in the Diamond Plaza 
shopping mall in HCMC. It acquired shares in Exim Bank, Asia Commercial Bank and 
Danang Bank and established Saigon Finance Company. In 1994 it invested in 
International Beverage Company, the firm which bottled and distributed Pepsi following 
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 Gainsborough‟s argument is similar in some respects to Fforde (2007), who explains the dynamism of 
the 1990s through commercialized state enterprises. However, the implication of Fforde‟s recentralization 
story is that as the state re-takes control over enterprises, this dynamism will be reduced. Commercialized 
state enterprises are dynamic because they are de facto private, and as they become progressively „more 
state‟ their performance will presumably suffer. Gainsborough (2003a) does not view recentralization and 
the contest over property rights as necessarily detrimental to firm performance. 
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 For discussion of the contest over control of Saigon Jewelry, in which the role of Mr. Định is 
subordinated to political maneuvering in the HCMC Party hierarchy, see Gainsborough (2003a). 
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 Intershops were special government stores selling imported luxury goods at fixed exchange rates. They 
were also key links in smuggling operations. For discussion of Intershops, see Beresford and Đặng Phong 
(2000). 
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the end of the U.S. trade embargo. Saigon Jewelry was also the distributor for Canon 
products, operated hotels, and produced decorative stone for construction projects.  
 
By 1995, only seven years after it was established, Saigon Jewelry ranked 11
th
 in Ho Chi 
Minh City in terms of turnover and was the largest local state business enterprise in 
HCMC. Its annual turnover increased an average of 43 percent between 1989 and 1996 
(ibid, p.24). In 1996 the State Bank stopped issuing quotes in order to halt commercial 
import of gold. Following this decision, no company had the right to legally import gold. 
However, there was no corresponding decrease in supply of gold to commercial markets, 
implying that Saigon Jewelry and other gold companies were accessing smuggling 
networks to circumvent SBV regulations (ibid, p.38).  
  
The dynamism of Saigon Jewelry is not in question. However, as Gainsborough (2003a) 
notes, it is difficult to imaging Saigon Jewelry‟s success without its links to the HCMC 
Party and state apparatus (Gainsborough 2003a, p.31). Hiebert (1996) concludes from his 
review of Saigon Jewelry that “[s]tate companies are evolving in a variety of 
configurations, and the once clear line between private and state capital is becoming 
fuzzy” (Hiebert 1996, p.74). Hiebert observes that: 
 
Even the keepers of Communist orthodoxy have joined in the national 
preoccupation with making money. The central committee … operates the An Phu 
trading company to fund its activities. The army runs factories and construction 
companies, while the security police – an organization charged with stifling any 
dissent – owns the Pacific Company, which operates a chain of hotels, some of 
which have the country‟s liveliest discotheques (ibid, p.10). 
 
Another example of the state-related growth comes from the Party itself. In 1989 the 
Communist Party‟s Commission of Administration and Finance established An Phu 
Services and Production Company.
131
 The firm upgraded luxury villas belonging to the 
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 The information presented here is from the questionnaire completed by An Phu and from an interview 
with the firm‟s senior management in April 2007as part of the Top 200 firms research project. See Chapter 
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former southern regime and leased them to foreigners. The An Phu Compound is now 
one of the premier foreigner enclaves, located in Ho Chi Minh City‟s District Two. An 
Phu also exported agricultural products like rice and coffee and imported iron and steel. 
In 1995 the An Phu Corporation was created, with An Phu Services and Production as a 
subsidiary. The corporation imported steel, medical equipment and chemicals and 
become one of the largest exports of rice and coffee in Vietnam. It used the profits from 
trading to establish the Pomina Steel Joint Venture, holding a 24 percent stake. The joint 
venture included Dong A Bank and a private steel firm. An Phu also established the Tay 
Do Steel Joint Venture and went on to joint venture with a Taiwanese towel producer.  
 
In 2004 An Phu Services and Production equitized, becoming An Phu Joint Stock 
Company. An Phu Corporation held 50 percent, with most of the remaining shares held 
by two real estate firms, Hiep Phuc and Tan Hiep. An Phu began to shift focus, reducing 
its trading activities and moving into real estate development, although it continues to 
import steel for its steel joint ventures and to sell in the domestic market. An Phu is now 
engaged in building industrial zones (IZs) and apartment and office buildings. It is in the 
process of building three 19-storey high-class apartment buildings in HCMC, and an 18-
storey office building in HCMC‟s District Three. An Phu plans to joint venture with 
Kuok Group of Singapore to build luxury apartments in District Two, and Keppel Land, a 
Temasek company, to build yet more apartments in HCMC. An Phu will contribute 40 
percent in land and capital to each joint venture, with each project estimated at USD 80 
million. It also has plans to move into finance and securities. The Party in business, and 
more particularly An Phu‟s shift into real estate and finance, is a common feature of 
Vietnam‟s large firms and will be discussed further in Chapter Five.  
 
As Hiebert (1996) points out, the military is also a key player in the socialist-oriented 
market economy. Indeed, the military has been engaged in business since its inception in 
1944 (Vasavakul 1999, Thayer 2000).
132
 The role of the VPA in business changed 
                                                                                                                                                 
Four for discussion of methodology. See Appendix Three for the interview schedule and Appendix Four for 
an example of the questionnaire used. 
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 Following its creation, the Vietnam People‟s Army (VPA) produced food and equipment primarily for 
its own use. After 1954 is became involved in managing state farms producing industrial crops. Following 
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dramatically in the late 1980s following the launch of đổi mới, the end of central 
planning, and the loss of Soviet aid. By 1989 the military was heavily engaged in 
commercial operations. “During the two-year period ending in August 1989 so many 
military enterprises had become involved in economic production activities that the table 
of organization of the Economic General Department [of the VPA] had to be changed 
four times” (Thayer 2000, p.13). In 1989 military firms were put under the same legal 
framework as state enterprises and nearly 20 percent of the military budget came internal 
sources, primarily the more than 300 military companies engaged in commercial activity 
(Thayer 2000, p.13). However, most military enterprises can only sell up to 20 percent of 
their output to the military and were therefore forced to compete in order to survive 
(Vasavakul 1999, Thayer 2000). 
 
By 1993 military firms were engaged in “building houses, hotels, roads, bridges and 
ports; mining coal, tin and precious stones; catching and processing seafood; transporting 
oil workers to offshore rigs by helicopter; producing cement and asphalt; manufacturing 
garments and vehicles; real estate development; running hotels and nightclubs; and joint 
ventures with foreign companies” (Thayer 2000, p.17). Army companies employed 
70,000 troops, accounting for over 12 percent of active duty soldiers, exported USD 90 
million in coal, rubber and manufactured goods, and the military was one of the biggest 
landowners in the country (Hiebert 1996, p.18).  
 
In 1993 the Military Bank was established, and it has since created its own insurance 
company. Military Bank, like most banks, now includes subsidiaries in real estate, asset 
management and securities. Investors in Military Bank include the army firms Military 
Telecom Corporation (Viettel), Military Petrol Company (Mipec) and Saigon Newport, 
                                                                                                                                                 
reunification in 1975 the VPA was tasked with participating in national reconstruction and development, 
including involvement in building roads, railways, pipelines, industrial plants, airports, ports, land 
cultivation, livestock breeding, reforestation and forest exploitation, and production of consumer goods. 
The People‟s Navy helped expand Vietnam‟s fishing fleets, repaired freighters, contributed to the oil and 
gas exploration programme and transported goods between north and south (Thayer 2000, p.7). The VPA 
also engaged in production during this period to overcome the shortages prevailing in the planned economy 
and participated in smuggling operations via Cambodia after 1978 (Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000). 
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along with state corporations Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group (Vinacomin) 




In 1994 “the VPA was tasked with developing a national defence industry and producing 
dual-use technology. The VPA therefore became heavily engaged in electronics, 
computing and telecommunications” (Thayer 2000, p.6). In 1995, following Decree 388, 
the VPA launched a reform drive to consolidate small military enterprises and close loss-
making units. It also began construction of economic-defence zones, emphasizing border 
protection and rural development (Vasavakul 1999, Thayer 2000). By 1997, as part of the 
restructuring process, the number of military enterprises had dropped to 193, was further 
reduced to 164 companies, and has since fallen to around 100 firms (Thayer 2000, BBC 
News 2007). Even with the drastic reduction in the number of firms, the total revenues of 
military companies consistently increased, rising from USD 27 million in 1991 to USD 
600 million in 1998 (Thayer 2000, Table 1, p.21).  
 
However, in 1997 the army newspaper criticized military companies for waste and 
corruption. Army firms were spending profits on luxury items rather than reinvestment. 
These luxury expenditures included new cars, expensive imported appliances, renovating 
guest houses, building new conference halls, and throwing lavish parties (Thayer 2000, 
p.23). Nevertheless, military firms‟ growth has indeed been impressive and army firms 
stand as examples of what Vasavakul (1999) refers to as „red entrepreneurs‟.  
 
These examples highlight dynamic state-related accumulation, along with the difficulty 
of separating rent-seeking activities from more productive endeavors. They demonstrate 
the Party in business, the army engaging in commercial operations, and individuals 
running firms connected to the state. This has been a key element of the post-planning 
period in Vietnam. 
 
Economic growth, inflows of foreign direct investment and increased trade continued into 
the middle 1990s. However, the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997 and Vietnam 
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 Military firms are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
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experienced a significant slowdown in 1998. Growth of GDP slowed to 3.8 percent, 
exports actually fell 12 percent even though Vietnam devalued its currency 17 percent, 
and FDI inflows dropped dramatically, with 1998 disbursements half of those in 1997 
(Webster and Taussig 1999, p.7). This represented something of a crisis for the state led 
growth model of the 1990s. 
 
The year 1998 was the beginning of another turning point. First, Lê Đăng Doanh (2009) 
argues that the impact of the Asian crisis on Vietnam forced a rethink about the state led, 
FDI dependent development strategy of the 1990s. The state recognized that the private 
corporate sector would have to begin contributing seriously to economic growth. The 
result was the 1999 Enterprise Law, which came into force in January 2000. The law 
streamlined company registration procedures and reduced bureaucratic red tape, resulting 
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 For further discussion, see Carlier and Trần (2004) and Malesky and Taussig (2009a). 
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Figure 1: Private Company Registrations, 1992-2007 
 




In addition, after 1998 bank lending to the domestic private sector increased significantly. 
 
Figure 2: Domestic Credit to the Private Sector, Percent of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2008b) 
Note: no values reported for 1990, 1991, and 1994 
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 „Partnerships‟ are excluded because of their small numbers. „LLC‟ refers to limited liability companies, 
„LLC-1‟ to Limited Liability Companies with One Member, and „JSC‟ to Joint Stock Company. 










































































































Equitization of state firms also picked up dramatically. In late 1991 the National 
Assembly approved a pilot equitization programme and Decision 202-CT in 1992 
initiated the process. However, as Table 2 shows, early results were not encouraging, 
with only 15 firms equitized by 1997. In 1996, Decree 28-CP ended the voluntarism of 
the pilot programme and tasked ministries and relevant authorities in all localities to 
begin equitizing state firms under their jurisdiction. This was updated and reissued with 
more detailed instructions in Decree 44/ND-CP in 1998, and the number of equitizations 
began to increase (Cheshier et al 2006, p.9). In 1998 alone, over 100 firms equitized, in 
1999 around 250 equitized and in 2000 around 210 state firms equitized (Cheshier et al 
2006, Table 3, p.8).
136
 Over time, inducements were offered to equitize, including tax 
holidays on Corporate Income Tax (CIT), debt-rescheduling and write-offs, permission to 
implement worker redundancies with access to a state-funded compensation programme, 
and continuing investment preferences and low interest rates. In addition, insider 
privatization was also formal policy, with preferential access and discounts offered to 
state managers and workers based on position and seniority.
137
 The overall momentum 
therefore continued throughout the 2000s. 
 
Table 2: Estimate of State Enterprise Transformation 
  1991-1997 2001-2005 
SOEs, beginning 12,000 5,655 
SOEs, end 5,500 3,200 
Restructured 6,500 3,349 
Equitized 15 2,188 
Source: Cheshier et al 2006, Table 2, p.6 
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 The imprecise figures are due to inconsistencies in counting equitized firms. For discussion, see 
Cheshier et al (2006), Box 1, p.7-8. 
137
 For a summary of the changes in the legal framework governing equitization, see Cheshier et al 2006, 
especially Appendix 2, p.27-32. Hiebert (1996) recounts the story of The General Forwarding and Agency 
Company, one of the first state firms to equitize in the early 1990s. “Some 42 percent of the company‟s 
shares were purchased by the firm‟s employees, 18 percent were retained by the ministry [of 
transportation], and the rest were sold to ministry staff. No shares were left for sale to the general public” 
(Hiebert 1996, p.71). While public participation has increased dramatically, the basic pattern of official 
insider privatization remains.   
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However, it would be misleading to attribute the turnaround solely to improved 
legislation and administrative guidance. Gainsborough (2003c) asks the question why 
equitization proceeded so slowly until 1998, arguing that a “key reason was an 
unwillingness on the part of political-business interests associated with state enterprises 
to do anything which would remove them from what they regarded as the „best space‟ for 
doing business, which until the late 1990s was seen as the state sector” (Gainsborough 
2003c, p.1). However, during the 1990s state control over enterprises did tighten and 
“fiscal pressures associated with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 saw a tightening of 
access to budget subsidies or cheap bank credit for state enterprises, with the result that 
subsidies were only available for a much smaller core of firms. This tightening appears to 
have been sustained even after the immediate effects of the crisis subsided” (ibid, p.9). 
Gainsborough argues that “it is no coincidence that the acceleration of equitization has 
coincided with the shift to more rapid private sector growth since 1999. Enterprise 
managers, their controlling institutions and labour forces all recognize that in the absence 
of budget subsidies and cheap bank credit and amid dwindling levels of protection, there 
are now fewer advantages to be had from remaining in the state sector” (ibid, p.12). 
Equitization sped up after 1998 in part due to “a changed calculation on the part of 
largely autonomous state business interests as to where the best place to do business was. 
By the end of the 1990s, many of the reasons for remaining in the state sector had 
disappeared while life in the private sector was no longer regarded with the trepidation it 
once was” (ibid, p.24). 
 
The environment continued to improve in the 2000s. In 2000 the first stock market 
opened in Ho Chi Minh City.
138
 Vietnam also signed the United States Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (USBTA) and the U.S. quickly became one of Vietnam‟s top trading partners. 
In 2003 a revised Land Law was promulgated, along with a revised Law on State 
Enterprises. In 2005 a new Enterprise Law and a new Investment Law were issued, 
unifying the legal framework for domestic private and foreign enterprises, and governing 
the operations of transformed state enterprises. These laws took effect in July 2006. In 
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 Equitized state firms are still numerically dominant on the Ho Chi Minh City and more recently opened 
Hanoi stock markets (World Bank 2008, p.86). 
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2006 the formal domestic private share of industrial output for the first time equaled that 
of the state sector (Mallon 2007). By 2007, riding a wave of deposit growth, private joint 
stock banks (JSBs) accounted for 60 percent of the inter-bank lending market (Robertson 
2009). In January 2007, Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
By 2006, the equitized share of state capital was only around 12 percent of total state 
capital invested in state enterprises (Cheshier et al 2006). This has since increased due to 
ongoing equitization of larger state companies and members of General Corporations, but 
the overall share remains low. Nevertheless, the 2000s saw the emergence of some ex-
post coherency to state enterprise reform, what Cheshier et al (2006) refer to as „keeping 
the big, releasing the small‟.139  
 
The basic thrust of this approach is to transform all state enterprises, including General 
Corporations, into firms operating under the Enterprise Law by 2010. Strategic sectors 
have been designated as part of a „commanding heights‟ strategy, in which the state will 
retain full (100 percent) or majority (over 50 percent) ownership in large state firms 
operating in these sectors. State firms not operating in these sectors are to be „released‟: 
equitized, transformed into limited liability companies or closed down. In 2005 the State 
Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) was established to take over responsibility for 
management of state capital in equitized state enterprises. However, it currently does not 
have a remit to assume control over transformed member companies of General 
Corporations, control of which remains with the GC. In addition to selecting strategic 
sectors, new corporate structures have been created for the General Corporations. In 2004 
the Parent-Child Corporation (công ty mẹ - công ty con) structure was established with 
Decree 153/ND-CP. And since 2005, several GCs 91 have begun transforming into 
diversified economic groups (tập đoàn).140 
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 The phrase is borrowed from the description of state enterprise reform in China. While the reform 
process is similar in Vietnam, it is not clear what relationship, if any, there is between the two programmes.   
140
 For further discussion of the evolution of strategic sectors and General Corporations, see Cheshier et al 
(2006). 
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However, significant criticism has been leveled against state enterprises, and the General 
Corporations in particular. As shown in Figure 3, the state sector accounts for around half 
of total investment, while its low contribution to employment and revenue growth and 
high debt-to-equity ratio leaves much to be desired.  
 
Figure 3: Performance Comparison: State, Private, Foreign 
 
Source: Harvard Vietnam Program (2008c), Figure 1, p.3 
 
Dapice (2003) and Harvard Vietnam Program (2008a) stress the extreme inefficiency of 
state investment, leading to Incremental Capital-Output Ratios (ICOR) above regional 








































































































State sector Private sector Foreign sector
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Table 3: Regional ICOR Comparison 
  





South Korea 1961-80 7.9 23.3 3.0 
Taiwan 1961-80 9.7 26.2 2.7 
Indonesia 1981-95 6.9 25.7 3.7 
Malaysia 1981-95 7.2 32.9 4.6 
Thailand 1981-95 8.1 33.3 4.1 
China 2001-06 9.7 38.8 4.0 
Vietnam 2001-06 7.6 33.5 4.4 
Source: Harvard Vietnam Program (2008a), Table 3, p.38 
 
Drawing attention to the inefficiency of state investment is necessary and important, 
particularly given the high levels of corruption in public infrastructure investment and the 
proclivity for white elephant projects like the Dung Quat oil refinery and the recently 
proposed multi-billion dollar high speed rail line between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. 




Given that “[i]n Vietnam, the public is never entirely public, and the private is never 
entirely private” (Đào Xuân Sâm, quoted in Fforde 2007, p.1), the ownership categories 
„state‟ and „private‟, while useful up to a point, need to be treated with caution. Equally 
as important, there are significant differences between state enterprises. Most of the 
literature on state enterprises in Vietnam portrays them as awash in state subsidies and 
inefficient due to soft budget constraints. Beresford (2008) argues against this, noting that 
almost all state firms have faced hard budget constraints from the very beginning, given 
the lack of state financial resources. However, both of these views fail to differentiate 
between types of state enterprises.
142
 Petrovietnam, the state conglomerate controlling 
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 For a critique of using ICORs to assess state sector performance in Vietnam, see World Bank (2008a) 
and Van Arkadie (2010). 
142
 This lack of differentiation is a nearly universal feature of the literature on Vietnam. Much of the 
problem stems from a misunderstanding of „soft budget constraints‟. As Kornai (1979) first pointed out, the 
presence of a soft budget constraint does not mean that financial resources are unlimited, and that 
investment hunger will enable all state companies to implement their plan and off-plan activities. Kornai‟s 
key insight is that the infinite investment demand of firms runs up against a finite pool of financial 
resources. Investment hunger and the expansion drive are constant but constrained by the availability of 
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upstream oil and gas production with annual revenues in the billions of U.S. dollars is 
simply not comparable to a small local state enterprise operating in the highly 
competitive footwear industry. Important differences also exist between General 
Corporations.
143
 For example, Petrovietnam with its mineral rent base is in a much better 
position than the Vietnam Textile and Garment Group (Vinatex), which operates in the 
thin margin garment sector facing intense competition from domestic private and foreign 
firms. As Nolan and Wang (1999) argue for China, it is necessary to get below the 





Another omission in the literature is lack of attention to large firms. In addition to 
Harvard Vietnam Program (2008a), Webster and Taussig (1999) examined 95 large 
private manufacturing firms in the late 1990s.
145
 Gainsborough (2002, 2003a) examined 
the top 100 firms by turnover in Ho Chi Minh City in 1995. Packard (2004) examined 
several General Corporations and their limitations in the early 2000s as part of a World 
Bank project on GC restructuring. However, these are exceptions and no systematic study 
of Vietnam‟s large firms has been conducted. In general, the literature also tends to 
remain within a state versus private framework, and since most large firms are state 
firms, the emphasis is on privatizing them while facilitating the growth of a private 
corporate sector (e.g. World Bank 2005). This dissertation will present research findings 
on Vietnam‟s Top 200 firms to address these limitations. 
 
In terms of resolving the Djilas contradiction in the 2000s, for London (2009) the market-
Leninism of the 1990s and 2000s is generating fundamental tensions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
finance. How these constraints are managed is a political issue, with results differing from place to place 
reflecting the balance of power among firms, planners and politicians. 
143
 Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) are one of the few to highlight differences in the monopoly powers of 
the General Corporations. 
144
 Gainsborough (2003a) is attentive to these differences, for example noting that state firms can have the 
same controlling institution but different controlling interests. Fforde (2009) also argues for the need to get 
below the „state enterprise‟ category and investigate the actual interests which influence particular state 
firms.  
145
 Taussig (2009) is based on revisiting these initial 95 firms. 
 144 
Economic and other policies are decided haphazardly; actors within different parts 
of the state apparatus routinely privilege self-maximization over soundness in 
decision making and principles of transparency and equity; and through soft loans 
and other means, state agencies continue to seek and secure large monopoly rents. 
Indeed, it appears that [the] Party remains intent on limiting the development of 
an autonomous bourgeoisie, and is succeeding rather effectively in nurturing the 
development of a corporate national bourgeoisie within and on the borders of the 
Party state. There is, of course, a logic to it all: the broad (however disorganized) 
distribution of resources, rents and opportunities across different parts of the state 
apparatus bolsters the political legitimacy of the state within the sphere of 
bureaucratic politics. It also creates new problems (London 2009, p.390). 
 
These problems are captured in what Fforde (2007) refers to as the second, as yet 
unresolved, „trap‟ resulting from the state led growth model. The trap is “that a 
globalizing market-oriented economy based upon commercialized SOEs would require 
effective government through changed „techniques of rule‟. Centrally, what could remain 
of Leninism in a VCP ruling over a market economy where capital and business would 
inevitably demand that their operations not be penetrated and controlled by Leninist 
structures?” (Fforde 2007, p.43). The temporary resolution of the Djilas contradiction 
after end of central planning led to Greenfield‟s (1994) „embourgeoisement of the state‟. 
However, “how would the VCP respond to a world with powerful commercial forces 
operating? And how could it, when it was so closely bound up with state capital?” 
(Fforde 2007, p.44-45). 
 
This enduring contradiction is revealed in changes to the Party statutes following the X
th
 
Party Congress in 2006, in which cadres were allowed to own private businesses but 
private entrepreneurs were not allowed into the Party. In contrast to China, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has still not resolved its central problem: defining what it 
means to be a communist, an issue that has bedeviled it through much of its history 




The pattern of accumulation that began after 1954 in the north as leveraging access to the 
state in order to overcome shortage and improve living standards became, after national 
reunification in 1975, a process of commercializing the state. The continued ability to 
arbitrage price differentials between plan and market by diverting inputs and assets from 
the state system, along with opportunities to engage in smuggling through travel abroad, 
increasingly became sources of capital accumulation. State firms and those connected to 
the state increasingly engaged in commercial activities outside the plan. The process 
accelerated through the 1980s and ultimately destroyed the basis for central planning, 
forcing the Vietnamese Communist Party to attempt resolution of the New Class 
contradiction. 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, temporary resolution of the Djilas contradiction followed a 
relatively straightforward application of the Stalinist definition of socialism as state 
ownership. The state sector would play the „leading role‟ in the economy and this led to a 
state enterprise focused development model. As in China, insider privatization, 
constrained autonomy, hollowing out and the rise of a new business elite turned state-
related accumulation into a process of capitalist class formation, Greenfield‟s (1994) 
„nascent bourgeoisie‟. Although based on leveraging access to the state, the growing 
influence of the market imperative, manifested as increased competition, resulted in 
remarkable economic dynamism. Nevertheless, the temporary solution failed to resolve 
the fundamental underlying contradiction.  
 
Much work has been done on these issues, but has tended to focus on processes occurring 
at lower levels in the state hierarchy or is based on aggregate comparisons between state 
and private. None have systematically investigated Vietnam‟s largest firms. The 
remainder of this dissertation will build on the work of Gainsborough (2003a) and Fforde 
(2007) by incorporating new research on Vietnam‟s largest firms in order to address these 
limitations and contribute to the assessment of how the ongoing attempt to resolve the 
Djilas contradiction is influencing the emergence of a capitalist class from within the 




This chapter explains the methodology used to identify and gather data on the largest 
firms in Vietnam. The first section provides the rationale for using the firm as the unit of 
analysis and the focus on large firms in Vietnam. Section Two describes how the largest 
firms in Vietnam were selected and discusses limitations of the data. Section Three 
describes the process of data collection. 
 
4.1 Why Large Firms? 
 
Mandel (1976), in his introduction to volume one of Marx‟s Capital, views the firm as 
the key unit of analysis of capitalism (Mandel 1976, p.58). Firms are where capital and 
labour meet. However, this orientation needs to be qualified and put in context: 
 
 The business world represents the outward-facing reality of capitalism and is an  
 inextricable part of whatever capitalism is … Yet there is another aspect to this  
 familiar world, equally essential to its existence but not itself tangible or concrete.  
 This is a kind of netherworld in whose grip the activities of business are caught.  
 That netherworld may be called the Invisible Hand, or the laws of motion of the  
 system, or the market mechanism; and its influence on the business world may be  
 seen as propelling it in the direction of growth, involving it in internal  
 contradictions, or guiding it toward a position of overall balance and stability. In  
 every case, however, the business world itself is seen as a mere vehicle by which  
 larger and more encompassing principles of order and movement are carried out  
 (Heilbroner 1985, p.16-17). 
 
The firm will be used as the unit of analysis because firms are the location, Heilbroner‟s 
„vehicles‟, of capitalism.146  
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 In the original debates on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the story centred on agrarian 
transformation as the location of changes in social property relations (Brenner 1985, Wood 2002). In the 
more recent debates about the transition from central planning to the market, the focus has been on firms. 
The argument is that command economies were already „developed‟ and therefore emphasis was placed on 
privatizing existing state enterprises. However, this is not always the case. Both China and Vietnam are 
 147 
 
This immediately raises the question of which firms. The general preference for private 
firms has already been critiqued in previous chapters. Another general preference in 
much of the academic literature and in policy debates is a focus on small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs). These firms are perceived to be more labour intensive, and thus 
the growth of SMEs results in growth of both employment and output. They are also, for 
ideological reasons, seen as more „genuine‟ representatives of domestic capitalism in 
contrast to foreign invested and state owned enterprises, and assumed to be the pool from 
which the national champions of tomorrow will emerge. The policy recommendation is to 
„level the playing field‟ so that the dynamic small private sector can grow and flourish.  
 
However, this is little evidence to support the assumption that small firms are 
systematically more labour intensive or capital efficient than large firms, or that their 
development is somehow more organic and therefore more vital to the development of 
national capitalism than state or foreign firms (Nolan 1996; Snodgrass and Biggs 1996; 
Taussig 2005). For example, Little, Mazumdar and Page (1987) find that firm size is not 
a reliable indicator of labour intensity and SMEs are often more capital intensive than 
larger firms. Type of industry is more important in explaining labour intensity and firm 
size. This makes a simple pro-SME perspective unviable. 
 
An alternative literature stresses the importance of big business as the driver of economic 
growth and development (Schumpeter 1942; Kitching 1982; Amsden 1989; Chandler 
1990; Teece 1993; Nolan 1996; Chandler, Amatori and Hikino 1997, Nolan and Wang 
1999). Large firms are better able to achieve economies of scale and scope that contribute 
to international competitiveness. They also invest in the acquisition and development of 
technologies and products and therefore pioneer entry into higher value-added activities. 
In addition, large firms‟ requirements for infrastructure, capital and skilled labour have 
significant and often positive spillover effects for the rest of the economy. Finally, large 
                                                                                                                                                 
somewhere in between, with a legacy of state companies and a substantial agricultural sector. A full 
account of the development of capitalism in Vietnam would require investigation of the ongoing agrarian 
transformation, along with changes in land tenure, developments in trade, and the legacies of colonialism 
and two wars of national liberation. This dissertation aims to tell only part of the story of the development 
of capitalism in Vietnam. 
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firms and business groups have played a leading role in the growth of both early 
developers and newly industrialized countries (NICs), notably Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand. With reference to the development of capitalism in Southeast Asia, 
McVey (1993) argues that the focus should be on big business since “it is at the level of 
major industries that we find most clearly displayed the nexus of business, politics, and 
the state, which … has been central to the Southeast Asian capitalist upsurge” (McVey 
1993, p.9). 
 
However, Doner (1991) stresses that “[s]tudies of Southeast Asian capital should avoid 
paying exclusive attention to large firms. There is considerable evidence, from studies of 
Japan, the East Asian NICs, and Southeast Asia, that small and medium-sized firms are 
an active and important component of recent economic growth” (Doner 1991, p.823). 
These opposing views, one emphasizing the importance of nimble SMEs and the other 
emphasizing the importance of large firms able to achieve economies of scale and scope, 
tend to be seen as mutually exclusive. One is either pro-SME or pro-large firm.  
 
The importance of a dynamic SME sector and a competitive big business sector is 
highlighted by Baumol, Litan and Schramm (2007). The dynamic SME sector is often a 
driver of the experimentation and innovation necessary to keep economies from 
ossifying. However, large firms are needed to scale up innovations, turn them into 
competitive products, and get them to market. For Baumol et al, the key process is one of 
„churn‟, in which a Schumpeterian infusion of new ideas, products and processes 
interacts with and rejuvenates big business, resulting in some new firms entering the 
ranks of the largest companies.  
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, most of the literature on firms in Vietnam focuses 
on the importance of private small and medium enterprises. Many of the processes 
identified as part of attempting to resolve the New Class contradiction – insider 
privatization, asset stripping, hollowing out – have been observed in smaller Vietnamese 
enterprises. However, very little work has been done on large firms. This dissertation 
attempts to correct this limitation through investigation of Vietnam‟s Top 200 companies. 
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4.2 Selecting the Top 200 
 
The sample frame used to determine Vietnam‟s largest firms was the annual General 
Statistics Office (GSO) Enterprise Survey.
147
 The firm list for each year is based on the 
results of the previous year‟s survey plus a list of new enterprises provided by the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) tax office.
148





The 2005 Enterprise Survey, covering the year 2004, was used to select firms for written 
questionnaires and interviews. The research project began in June 2006 and the 2005 
survey was the most recent at that time. However, in December 2006 a newer Enterprise 
Survey was released and this survey, covering the year 2005, was used to generate the 
largest firms list presented in Cheshier and Penrose (2007a) and used here. The result is 
that some firms which responded to questionnaires and participated in interviews are not 
in the 2006 largest firms list.
150
 Differences between the lists will be discussed below. 
 
Two lists of firms were generated. The first includes firms of all ownership types. The 
second excludes 100 percent foreign owned firms in order to focus on Vietnamese 
enterprises. The two hundred largest firms were identified. This figure, rather than one 
hundred, or fifty, was selected in order to include a wider variety of firms, particularly 
private firms and manufacturing companies. The two resulting lists will be referred to as 
the Top 200 All and the Top 200 Vietnamese (VN).
151
 Comparison between the two lists 
will be made in Chapter Five. 
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 This section borrows from Cheshier and Penrose (2007b). The research was conducted by the Country 
Economist Unit of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Hanoi, under the direction of 
Jonathan Pincus. Findings were published as Cheshier and Penrose (2007a). The research data are held by 
UNDP in Hanoi and are available upon request. The Department for International Development (DFID) of 
the United Kingdom supported the research financially through the DFID-UNDP Strategic Partnership 
Initiative. The author is solely responsible for errors of fact or omission. While the project was conducted 
by UNDP, the views expressed here are the author‟s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
United Nations or the countries it represents. 
148
 The MoF tax registry is the only other known sample frame for all firms in Vietnam. At the beginning of 
the project, both GSO and MoF were contacted to obtain their lists, but MoF proved unresponsive.  
149
 For firms with less than 10 employees, a 20 percent sample are given the full Enterprise Survey 
questionnaire and the remaining 80 percent receive a shorter version.  
150
 See Appendix Three. Firms not in the 2006 Top 200 are identified by notes 1 and 2. 
151
 These lists are presented in Appendices One and Two. 
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The total number of firms in the 2006 survey is 112,947, of which 2,852 are 100 percent 
foreign owned. Three duplicate entries were removed – Viettel, Saigon Newport and 
Dong Bac Coal Co.
152
 Duplicates were only removed from the Top 200 lists and the 
extent of duplication in the entire survey is unknown. 
 
Firms were ranked separately by number of employees, assets and turnover. Asset data 
were for end of year 2003. These individual ranks were then averaged to give an overall 
rank for each firm. The three categories were combined to try and capture a more 
complete picture of the economy. A ranking based only on number of employees, for 
example, is likely to over-emphasize labour intensive industries.  
 
The Top 200 VN list includes 69 of the top 100 firms ranked by number of employees. 
Twenty of the 31 firms in the top 100 by labour but not in the Top 200 VN are garments 
and footwear companies. While these firms have a large number of workers, they have 
lower asset values and often very low turnover. The Top 200 VN list includes 60 of the 
top 100 firms ranked by assets. Twenty of the 40 firms in the top 100 by assets but not in 
the Top 200 VN are financial companies with low rankings in labour and turnover. The 
Top 200 VN list includes 63 of the top 100 firms ranked by turnover. Twelve of the 37 
firms in the top 100 by turnover but not in the Top 200 VN are in petroleum related 
industries, most in petrol trading. These firms have very high turnover but very few 
employees. For example, the Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation (Petrolimex) 
headquarters is ranked second in terms of turnover and sixteenth in terms of assets but 
3,261
st
 in terms of labour. The combined rankings used to generate the Top 200 VN 
provide coverage of nearly two-thirds of the top 100 firms by labour, assets and turnover. 
 
A potential problem with this method concerns the reliability of reported figures. This 
applies in particular to the assets category. Valuation of land, equipment and intangible 
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 The original total number of firms in the 2006 survey is 112,950. However, GSO (2007) reports 113,352 
total firms in 2005. Three of these additional firms are duplicates that have been deleted here. The 
remaining 402 firms are private, with a combined 2,945 employees. It is not clear why this discrepancy 
exists. Figures presented here do not include these 402 firms. 
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assets is known to be problematic in Vietnam. This is even more applicable for firms in 
the process of equitization. The asset figures therefore need to be treated with caution. 
Similar objections can be made to the use of turnover and taxes paid figures, given 
known issues of multiple accounting books (one for the state and one for real), ghost 





Although these issues are very real, the danger is that these shortcomings, run to their full 
conclusion, prevent the use of any data. Vietnam is still a developing country and the data 
are messy. The GSO Enterprise Survey is one of the few tools available. That the figures 
are not precise is taken as given, and caution in interpretation is very much warranted. 
Nevertheless, a coherent picture can, and does, emerge. 
 
An encouraging sign is that the 2006 data show marked improvement over 2005. The 
level of non-response, or zero figures, for employees, assets and turnover has been 
reduced.
154
 Reporting on sector of activity is more specific, with more firms reporting to 
the four digit Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC) level.
155
 Sector of 
activity is defined as the activity contributing the largest share to enterprise output.
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This allows for more detailed differentiation between sub-activities within the same 
sector. Table 4 provides a summary of the major VSIC sector. 
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 Only the taxes paid category is used here. This category includes the major taxes. In the Enterprise 
Survey there are additional variables for contributions to the state recording „fees‟, „other fees‟ and „other 
additional‟. See GSO (2007), p.19-21 for definitions of the additional categories. 
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 For the 2005 list, a firm had to report figures for at least two of the three categories to be included. This 
was not an issue in the 2006 list. Improved reporting allowing for more precise rankings accounts for some 
of the differences in the largest firms lists between the 2005 and 2006 surveys. 
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 VSIC sectors and sub-sectors are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
revision 3. All VSIC codes are four digits, with zeroes as place holders. For example, the ISIC sector 14 is 
1400 in VSIC. Increased detail in the 2006 survey is through reporting to further levels of detail, for 
example 1421. 
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 An enterprise with multiple activities will have all activities attributed to the largest. For example, if a 
firm operates in manufacturing and trading, with manufacturing the largest, then the contribution of trading 
is counted as manufacturing. While not ideal, this is international practice. If the primary sector of activity 
(contributing the largest share to enterprise output) cannot be determined, then largest share of employment 
is used (Jammal, Doung Tri Thang and Pham Dinh Thuy 2006). 
 152 
Table 4: VSIC Sectors 
VSIC 
Sector Description 
A Agriculture, forestry and related service activities 
B Fishing 
C Mining and quarrying 
D Manufacturing 
E Electricity, gas and water supply 
F Construction 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 
H Hotels and restaurants 
I Transport, storage and communications 
J Finance, credit 
K Science and technology activities 
L Real estate, renting and business activities 
M Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
N Education and training 
O Health and social work 
P Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
Q Activities of party, social unions and associations 
T* Services for individuals and community 
U Private households with employed persons 
V Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
    * not clear why jumps from Q to T 
 
The ownership categories are also more precise, for example allowing for differentiation 
between types of state one member limited liability companies (central and local) and 
allowing for the possibility of multi-member limited liability companies with majority 
















 local SOE 
 central state LLC
2
 
 local state LLC 







 private LLC, LLC < 50% state capital 
 JSC no state capital 
 JSC < 50% state capital 
foreign 
 100% foreign 
 JV state and foreign
4
 
 JV non-state and foreign 
Note: 
  1 
SOE: state owned enterprise 
  2 
LLC: limited liability company 
  3 
JSC: joint stock company 
  4 
JV: joint venture 
 
A comment on ownership classification is required. The „foreign‟ category includes joint 
ventures (JVs), but does not include joint stock companies (JSCs) with foreign 
investment. Beyond firms classified explicitly as state owned enterprises, any firm with 





However, the classification of certain companies has already changed. For example, in 
January 2007 the Vietnam Dairy Products Co (Vinamilk) dropped below the 50 percent 
state capital threshold and is therefore now considered a private firm. This 
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 The 2005 Enterprise Law, which came into effect in July 2006, redefines majority control as 65 percent 
or higher. However, the same law also stipulates that any firm with more than 50 percent state capital is 
considered an SOE. It remains to be seen if, and how, the classifications will change in future Enterprise 
Surveys. 
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reclassification process will continue as more and more state firms equitize and state 
capital shares fall below majority. In addition, some firms in the 2006 Top 200 have 
ceased to exist as independent units all together, for example Bai Bang Paper Co which 




Unfortunately, the improvements in 2006 limit comparison with the 2005 data at a high 
level of aggregation. From the 2005 survey, 157 of the Top 200 companies in the 
Vietnamese firm list remain in the 2006 Top 200 VN. Tables 6 and7 summarize the 
changes in sector and ownership for the 43 firms that dropped out of the Top 200 VN 
from 2005 and the 43 firms added to the Top 200 VN in 2006. 
 
Table 6: Change in VSIC Sector of the 43 firms between 2005 and 2006 Top 200 VN 
VSIC sector 2005 (-) 2006 (+) net change 
Mining and quarrying 1 1 0 
Manufacturing 23 14 -9 
Construction 10 7 -3 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods 5 8 3 
Transport, storage and communications 3 4 1 
Finance, credit 1 7 6 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0 1 1 
Services for individuals and communities 0 1 1 
 
Table 7: Change in Ownership of the 43 firms 2005 and 2006 Top 200 VN 
Ownership 2005 (-) 2006 (+) net change 
state 36 31 -5 
private 4 11 7 
foreign 3 1 -2 
 
Table 6 shows a reduction in manufacturing and construction companies, with a rise in 
service related firms, in particular financial enterprises such as banks. Table 7 shows a 
reduction in state companies and an increase in private firms. This is partly a result of an 
increase in joint stock companies with no state capital and JSCs with less than 50 percent 
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 As part of this change, Vietnam Paper Corporation, formerly Vinapimex, became Vinapaco. 
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state capital. Five of the new private firms in 2006 are banks (with one more trading in 
gold and jewelry), which have displaced firms from the 2005 Top 200 VN. Several of 
these 2005 firms are now ranked just outside of the 2006 Top 200 VN.  
 
The unit of analysis in the Enterprise Survey is the independent accounting enterprise 
with its own legal status. This creates a problem counting General Corporations and 
therefore influences the definition of „large‟. If asked to name the largest firms in 
Vietnam, many would respond with the names of prominent GCs such as the Vietnam Oil 
and Gas Group (Petrovietnam), Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) and 
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group (Vinatex). However, General Corporations 
are not treated as single units, as corporations, in the Enterprise Survey. There are 
important exceptions to this, discussed below. Independent accounting member units 
report as separate firms, while the GC head office and dependent accounting units report 
together under the head office. Although this does not preclude the appearance of the 
head office in the Top 200, the figures do not include all the member companies of the 
corporation.  
 
The use of independent accounting enterprises as the unit of analysis can be defended for 
several reasons. First, this is how the Enterprise Survey is (for the most part, see below) 
organized. To maintain comparison with non-GC firms, the survey unit has been retained. 
In addition, adding up all the independent GC member companies and combining them 
with the GC head office to obtain corporation-wide figures assumes that the GCs operate 
as cohesive organizations. While true for some GCs, this assumption can be contested.  
 
Second, GCs have many members, big and small. Using the independent accounting 
enterprise as the unit of analysis allows for identification of the GC member companies 
that are largest elements of the corporation. Some GCs have many members in the Top 
200, while others only have one or two that account for the bulk of their parent 
company‟s size. Third, this method allows for identification of the geographic dispersion 
of independent member companies, particularly north and south, rather than simply 
treating the GC as one unit headquartered in Hanoi or, less frequently, Ho Chi Minh City.  
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However, a fundamental problem remains. Four GCs and four state owned commercial 
banks reported as corporations in the 2006 survey, providing figures which included their 
independent accounting member companies. These eight firms are: 
 
 Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) 
 Vietnam Post and Telecommunications (VNPT) 
 Vietnam Airlines 
 Vietnam Railways (VNR) 
 Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (Incombank) 
 Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank) 
 Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank) 
 Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) 
 
This discrepancy between unit of analysis prevents comparison among firms within the 
Enterprise Survey. There is first of all the issue of double counting. The figures of an 
independent accounting member company of one of these eight corporations are included 
in the survey as the independent enterprise and also as part of the figures for the parent 
corporation. Simple totals of number of employees, assets, turnover and tax paid based on 
the existing survey are therefore not valid. This calls into question GSO reports based on 
the Enterprise Survey which do not correct for this. Second, these eight corporations 
appear larger than they actually are according to the standard unit of analysis in the 
Enterprise Survey, which skews any attempt at ranking firms. It is also possible that other 
GCs, if they reported as corporations, would be larger than some of these eight.  
 
It was necessary to disaggregate the independent accounting member firms from these 
eight corporations to make the firms comparable. This was done by contacting the GCs 
directly and requesting figures for number of employees, assets, turnover and taxes paid 
for 2005 for the head office and dependent accounting units only. These figures have 
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been entered into the 2006 survey data. Vietnam Airlines refused to provide the requested 
figures so an ad hoc fix was undertaken. Independent member companies were located in 
the Enterprise Survey and their labour, assets, turnover and tax figures subtracted from 
the GC totals. Nine Vietnam Airlines members were identified, including firms in the 
Top 200. This method is imperfect and represents a stop-gap solution but does allow for a 
usable approximation of head office and dependent unit only figures. Ranks were then 
calculated based on these new figures, and new survey totals for employees, assets, 
turnover and taxes paid were computed. 
 
Table 8: Combined Results of GC Corrections 
Labour Assets Turnover Tax 
-70,361 -78,937,553 -49,821,512 1,073,327 
Note: Assets, Turnover and Tax figures are in million VND 
 
Table 8 indicates the changes that result from adjusting the GCs that reported as 
corporations. There are 70,361 less employees in the Enterprise Survey. The same applies 
for the other categories. The tax category increased because VNPT reported zero tax in 
the Enterprise Survey. 
 
To ensure that other GCs did not report in a similar way, a simple check was used. If any 
member company ranked higher than its parent company, then the GC did not report as a 
corporation. When GCs did rank higher, the figures for independent accounting member 
firms were subtracted from the parent company figures. If the results were negative, then 
the GC did not report as a corporation. These checks and corrections allow for 
comparison of firms in the Enterprise Survey.  
 
The magnitude of the problem of reporting as corporations depends on the GC. For 
example, in 2005 EVN only had a few independent member companies. Its remaining 
members were dependent accounting units and therefore correctly included in the EVN 
figures following the definition of the unit of analysis. The same applies for VNPT and 
the state banks. They are large in 2005 in part because they have a high proportion of 
dependent rather than independent accounting members. However, this situation is 
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changing as EVN and VNPT equitize member units, transforming dependent units into 
independent members and selling their (state) share. In future surveys, these changes will 
result in EVN and VNPT appearing smaller than at present.  
 
Related to complications ranking the General Corporations are problems with „horizontal 
conglomerates‟, particularly private business groups. It is well known that firms in 
Vietnam intentionally under-report their size in order to avoid unwanted attention from 
government officials (Gainsborough 2003a), what Webster and Taussig (1999) refer to as 
the „tall poppy syndrome‟. The independent accounting enterprise as the unit of analysis 
misses both state and private conglomerates, but the problem is greater for private groups 
which deliberately appear smaller than they actually are. These firms and groups 
obviously do not appear in the Top 200. While some attention has been given to this issue 
recently, for example in Taussig (2009), the size and extent of these private horizontal 




Within the Enterprise Survey, another area requiring manual correction relates to non-
response for taxes paid figures. Two GCs, one GC member company and four 100 
percent foreign firms reported zero taxes paid in 2006. These companies are: 
 
 Vietnam Post and Telecommunications 
 Vietnam Airlines 
 Ba Ria – Vung Tau Post and Telecommunications 
 Tainan Spinning Co Ltd 
 Pouchen Vietnam 
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 At present, most of the information about these private groups is based on rumour and speculation. For 
example, when discussing my dissertation topic with friends and other researchers, many people responded 
that they knew Vietnam‟s richest person or asked if a particular firm, which they claimed was the largest in 
Vietnam, had been included in the study. However, the richest person identified or the largest firm 
mentioned were rarely the same across the discussions. Although the Enterprise Survey does not capture 
everything, it does provide a means for attempting to be more systematic. Several „rich lists‟ have been 
published in the Vietnamese press, usually based on shareholdings of listed firms. See, for example, Thanh 
Nien News (2007, 2009a); Vietnamnet (2007a, 2007b); Vietnam News (2007). Since few firms in Vietnam 
are listed on the stock markets, and the markets themselves remain very volatile, this method was not used 
by the UNDP team to identify Vietnam‟s largest firms.   
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 Kingmaker Footwear Vietnam Ltd 
 Mabuchi Motor Vietnam Co Ltd 
 
For VNPT, the figure they provided in response to the „head office and dependent unit 
only‟ data request was used. Since Vietnam Airlines reported zero tax and did not return 
the questionnaire, correction was not possible and therefore no taxes are recorded. The 
remaining five firms were contacted directly. Ba Ria – Vung Tau Post and 
Telecommunications provided a figure. Tainan Spinning provided a „ballpark‟ figure, 
which has been included in the survey. The remaining three firms all indicated that they 
are still receiving tax incentives and paid little or no Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in 
2005. However, they did pay other taxes, such as land taxes and VAT, but declined to 
provide these figures. Therefore, the taxes paid figures under-report for 100 percent 
foreign firms and state firms. Nevertheless, given the large size of the total figures 
involved, these omissions and the inclusion of rough figures do not affect the overall 
rankings. 
 
Additional corrections and data cleaning were required. In the Enterprise Survey, 2,926 
firms did not report sector of operation. In the Top 200 All and Top 200 VN, five firms 
did not report. Classification by sector for these firms was based on primary activity.
160
 
These firms are: 
 
 Construction Company No. 319, assigned code 4520 in sector F construction 
 Phu Yen Materials Co, assigned code 5141 in sector G wholesale and retail trade 
 Company No. 28, assigned code 1810 in sector D manufacturing 
 Thanh An Corporation, assigned code 4520 in sector F construction 
 
All of these firms except Phu Yen Materials Company are under the Ministry of Defence. 
The sector non-responses in the Enterprise Survey result in over-statement of the share of 
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 GSO asks firms for a breakdown of activities, with primary activity forming the basis for sector 
classification. 
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Top 200 firms by sector for labour, assets, turnover and tax of the Enterprise Survey by 
sector.  
 
Location data by province also required manual correction. At the time of the research, 
there were 64 provinces and cities in Vietnam which were assigned province codes in the 
Enterprise Survey ranging from one to 96. However, three additional codes are also 
present in the survey: 97, 98 and 99. Code 97 is a transpose of 79, the code for Ho Chi 
Minh City. Code 98 remains a mystery. Nine firms reported province code 98 in the 
Enterprise Survey. These firms were researched individually to find their location and 
assigned the corresponding province code.
161
 The bulk of these firms are in Hanoi. Code 
99 is predominantly for those GCs that reported as GCs. Following the classification 
rules in the Enterprise Survey, discussed below, these were assigned to Hanoi since this is 
where their headquarters are located. However, this over-states the figures for Hanoi 
since these are national firms.  
 
The Enterprise Survey uses the enterprise rather than the establishment as the unit of 
analysis. Figures for a multi-establishment enterprise are valid at the national level but 
not at the provincial level if the enterprise has establishments in different provinces 
(Jammal et al 2006). Many of the largest firms are multi-establishment enterprises and it 
is not surprising that Hanoi and HCMC have much higher numbers of the largest firms 
than other provinces since this is where their headquarters tend to locate. Provincial 
counts are therefore misleading. Strictly speaking, this also applies to regional figures 
(north, centre, south), although the degree of misrepresentation is reduced since less firms 
have multiple establishments in multiple regions.  
 
There are several serious shortcomings with the Enterprise Survey data. Efforts were 
made to correct these where possible. Due to these limitations, interpretation of figures 
requires considerable caution. Precision is not possible but that does not render the 
figures meaningless. While problematic, the 2006 data are an improvement over 2005 
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 The Vietnam Business Directory maintained by the Ministry of Trade (2007) is an excellent searchable 
database of firms in Vietnam available online.  
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with more detailed sector classifications and ownership types and less non-response for 
labour, assets, turnover and tax. However, some of these data, in particular for ownership 
type, are already out of date. The findings therefore present a snapshot of the largest 
firms in 2005. 
 
4.3 Data Collection 
 
Following identification of the Top 200 Vietnamese firms, these firms were divided into 
two groups. The first group only received the written questionnaire, while the second 
group was also asked to participate in follow-up interviews. Firms were sent 
questionnaires beginning in August 2006 and interviews of selected firms were 




Prior to the UNDP largest firms research project, no systematic study of the largest firms 
in Vietnam had been undertaken.
163
 Given limited time and resources, a decision was 
taken to focus primarily on manufacturing firms. This became the primary criterion for 
selecting firms to interview. In addition, in order to better understand the dynamics of 
General Corporations, the headquarters of several GCs were contacted for questionnaire 
and interview, even though several of the head offices themselves were not listed in the 
Top 200. However, this focus on manufacturing firms and General Corporations resulted 
in neglect of the financial sector, particularly private joint stock banks in the Top 200, 
none of which were interviewed.  
 
Two separate questionnaires were generated, one for firms and one for General 
Corporation head offices.
164
 The Ministry of Planning of Investment, provincial People‟s 
Committees and provincial Departments of Planning and Investment assisted in 
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 These researchers were Scott Cheshier, Jago Penrose, Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga and one interpreter. Three 
additional interviews were conducted after May 2007 by Scott Cheshier. See Appendix Three for the 
Interview Schedule.   
163
 See the previous chapter for discussion of the few publications discussing large firms in Vietnam. In 
November 2007, one month after publication of Cheshier and Penrose (2007a), Vietnam Report (2007) 
released its Top 500 Companies in Vietnam list. At the time of the research project, the UNDP team was 
unaware of the Vietnam Report project. The Vietnam Report ranking is based on revenues, but it is not 
clear how the issue of General Corporations and double counting is dealt with.   
164
 The questionnaires are included in Appendices Four and Five. 
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contacting firms, arranging interviews and obtaining completed questionnaires. 
Interviews followed a semi-structured format. Interview questions were generated based 
on questionnaire responses and desk-based research on each firm prior to the interview. A 
few of the firms interviewed did not return questionnaires. 
 
Of firms in the 2006 Top 200 VN, 91 returned questionnaires, were interviewed, or both. 
In total, 104 questionnaires were returned and 93 interviews were conducted with firms, 
general corporation head offices and industry associations.
165
 In total, 127 firms 
responded, 37 of which are not in the 2006 Top 200 VN. Of these 127 responses, 34 
firms only returned questionnaires, 23 firms (including five business associations) were 
interviewed without returning questionnaires, and 70 firms returned questionnaires and 
were interviewed.  
 
I contributed to all stages of the project, including project formulation, cleaning and 
analysis of the Enterprise Surveys, questionnaire design, firm interviews, and report 
writing. I was responsible for the desk-based research performed prior to interviews for 
most General Corporations and their member companies, particularly those in the oil and 
gas, coal, rubber and chemicals sectors. I led the interview sessions for these firms. I 
participated in nearly all of the interviews, exceptions to this are indicated in Appendix 
Three. In addition, three interviews were conducted on my own. The results of the study 
were published as Cheshier and Penrose (2007a) and Cheshier and Penrose (2007b). 
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 See Appendix Three. The interview total includes interviews with five business associations, three 
additional interviews conducted by Scott Cheshier after May 2007, and two small firms included in the 
study on the recommendation of an United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) officer. 
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5 The Top 200 Vietnamese Firms 
 
In Chapter Two it was argued that a New Class existed in command economies in which 
a pattern of accumulation emerged based on leveraging access to the state. New Class 
power derived from a contradiction between national ownership of property but de facto 
control by state bureaucrats and managers. The end of central planning and the 
privatization of state property necessarily threatened the position of the New Class. 
Attempts to reproduce New Class power through transition occurred, following the basic 
pattern of state-related accumulation established under the command system. However, it 
was a pattern, and not all cadres succeed in reproducing themselves nor were all state 
firms dynamic or successful. In addition, those outside the New Class, such as private 
entrepreneurs, accumulated in ways similar to the New Class in transition. This pattern of 
state-related accumulation influences capitalist class formation. However, the process 
took a variety of forms and generated different outcomes in different countries. Chapter 
Two reviewed the variety of processes and outcomes in Eastern Europe and China. 
 
Chapter Three provided some examples of this process in Vietnam. Lê Đức Thọ‟s family 
ran several Party shops during the planning period that provided luxury goods to senior 
officials. Former General Party Secretary Lê Duẩn‟s son founded Techcombank in a 
perfect example of Goodman‟s (2000) inter-generational transfer of power and privilege 
discussed in Chapter Two. The Party itself went into business with An Phu Corporation.  
 
This chapter seeks to build upon these examples by discussing research conducted on the 
Top 200 Vietnamese firms. Two key features emerge. The first is the rising importance of 
the market imperative, with increasing competition forcing firms to adapt and improve. 
This is central to the development of capitalism in Vietnam. The second feature is the 
pervasiveness of state-related accumulation. However, state-related accumulation does 
not require intentionality on the part of the state. Indeed, the historical roots of this 
process in Vietnam are predicated precisely on a lack of control (Fforde 2005).  
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State-related accumulation also occurs irrespective of ownership type. Private firms 
leverage access to the state just as state firms seize new market opportunities to expand 
and accumulate. In many instances the boundary between state and private is blurred. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Three, political connections and access to the state 
remain insufficient conditions for success. Some firms, even with ample privileges, fail to 
exploit emerging opportunities. Others exploit them by shifting into more speculative 
activities like real estate and finance.  
 
Some firms engage in activities of questionable legality. Examples of corruption and 
illicit accumulation, such as HCMC Food or Tamexco discussed in Chapter Three, are 
not difficult to find, particularly in the Vietnamese press.
166
 The same applies for firms in 
the Top 200. Hanoi General Production and Import Export Company (Haprisomex), 
ranked 93
rd 
in the 2006 Top 200 VN, provides an example. Haprosimex is a state 
enterprise under the Hanoi People‟s Committee and has become one of the leading export 
firms in Hanoi. Established in 1960 as a union of Hanoi handicraft cooperatives, 
Haprosimex was officially founded as a company in 1991. In 1993 Haprosimex was 
reorganized under Decree 388 and established the Thanh Tri Garment Factory. In 1996 
Haprosimex established the Export Hat Factory and added Haprosimex Tours in 1998. It 
transformed into a Parent-Child corporation in 2006, with nine subsidiaries and one 
affiliate.
167
 Haprosimex has trade representatives in over twenty countries, specializing in 
export of garments, bamboo and rattan handicrafts, and agricultural products. It also 
imported consumer goods, cotton, iron, steel, and bulldozers and other construction 
equipment. 
 
However, a recent investigation into land use practices in Hanoi resulted in allegations of 
fraud. In 2009 Haprosimex was authorized to lease land in the central Hoan Kiem district 
of Hanoi from the Hanoi People‟s Committee. The lease is for a duration of 50 years and 
total rent to be paid to the People‟s Committee is to be approximately six billion VND. 
Haprosimex was to use this land as the location of its headquarters. Instead, Haprosimex 
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 For example, much of Gainsborough‟s excellent work on the political economy of corruption (e.g. 
Gainsborough 2003a) was based on a close reading of the Vietnamese press.   
167
 See Chapter Three for discussion of enterprise unions, Decree 388 and Parent-Child corporations. 
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leased the building on this land to NEM Fashion. The lease is for 34 years, with total 
compensation to Haprosimex of 24 billion VND. The 18 billion VND spread is 
equivalent to nearly USD one million. Haprosimex denies any wrong doing (Vietnamnet 
2010).  
 
Southern Food Corporation (Vinafood 2), ranked 36
th
 in the Top 200 VN, provides 
another example.
168
 In early October 2009 allegations emerged regarding possible fraud 
and illegal transfer pricing for personal gain. Mr. Trương Thanh Phong is the Chairman 
of Vinafood 2 and also the head of the Vietnam Food Association, responsible for setting 
minimum rice export prices.
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 In February 2009 the floor price for five percent broken 
rice delivered in July and August of 2009 was set at USD 460 per ton. This was reduced 
to USD 430 at the end of June. However, in a deal worth over USD two million, Mr. 
Phong signed a Vinafood 2 contract authorizing sale of 5,000 tons of rice to Saigon Food 
Pte Ltd for USD 406 per ton. Saigon Food exported this rice to an African buyer for an 
undisclosed price. Saigon Food is a subsidiary of Vinafood 2 based in Singapore, 
established in February 2009 with the approval of the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment. The Deputy General Director of Vinafood 2, Ms. Cao Thị Ngọc Hoa, is the 
Director of Saigon Food. This is very similar to the process of „pocket-swapping‟ 
described by Wank (1999b) in Chapter Two. Mr. Phong and Ms. Hoa claim nothing 
illegal occurred. One week later, on 15 October, it was announced that the State Bank of 
Vietnam will provide an interest free loan to Vinafood 2 to assist the corporation in 
purchasing 500,000 tons of rice for the national buffer stock. In 2008 Vinafood 2 posted 
revenues of over USD two billion from rice exports alone (Vietnamnet 2009d, 2009e; 
Vietnam News 2009c). 
 
A final example, resembling the processes described by Staniszkis (1991), comes from 
the Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group (Vinacomin). Fifteen Vinacomin 
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 Its counterpart, Northern Food Corporation (Vinafood 1), is ranked 133
rd
.   
169
 This is not unusual. The Chairman of Vinatex Group is also the head of the Vietnam Textile and 
Apparel Association. Geruco, the rubber group, was the founding member of the Vietnam Rubber 
Association and remains its leading member. The association offices are located in the Geruco compound 
in Ho Chi Minh City. The Chairman of the Vietnam Steel Association is a former Vice President of the 
Vietnam Steel Corporation (VSC). However, he has been quite vocal in bringing attention to the limitations 
of VSC and the development of the steel industry in Vietnam. 
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subsidiaries are in the Top 200 VN. In 2001, Mr. Đoàn Văn Kiển, General Director of 
Vinacoal (predecessor of Vinacomin), was censured by the Party for illegally trading in 
foreign currencies, violating government rules on borrowing foreign capital and repaying 
foreign debts, and for violations in construction projects which resulted in losses to the 
state budget. In 1998 Vinacoal suffered losses of USD 1.2 million from exporting coal 
too cheaply and in 1999 Vinacoal was USD 200 million in debt due to mismanagement. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Kiển was promoted to Chairman of Vinacomin when it was formed in 
2005 (Vietnamnet 2009b). 
 
In 2009 Mr. Kiển was censured again, with the Party Central Inspection Committee 
issuing a warning for nepotism and proposing to the Prime Minister that he be dismissed. 
Apparently Mr. Kiển signed and asked his subordinates to sign authorization for 
Vinacomin member Trade and Service Investment JSC to mine coal without a license. 
This is believed to have resulted in millions of tons of coal being mined and traded 
illegally. Mr. Kiển‟s younger brother, Mr. Đoàn Văn Thức, is Deputy Director of Trade 
and Service Investment JSC. Mr. Kiển was also faulted, again, with poor management, 
leading to uncontrolled mining in Quang Ninh province.
170
 Mr. Kiển resigned from his 
post and was replaced by Mr. Lê Dương Quang, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade 
(Thanh Nien News 2009a; Vietnamnet 2009b, 2009c). 
 
However, the processes operating in Vietnam are more complex and more interesting 
than simple theft and corruption. While Haprosimex demonstrates reinvestment and 
expansion alongside illegal profit generating methods, many of Vietnam‟s large firms 
have grown through state-related accumulation that is not necessarily nefarious. As in 
China, this occasionally involves exploiting legal ambiguities in Vietnam. And as in 
China, what emerges is enormous variety, even though the broad pattern of class 
formation through leveraging access to the state remains a common feature.  
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 This goes beyond smuggling and illegal mining. A foreign mining expert familiar with Vinacomin 
operations described Vinacomin‟s methods as „skimming‟. Normally, the easy to access and therefore most 
profitable coal at the top of a seam is used to finance extraction of the entire find. This maximizes output 
and makes the entire project financially viable. However, Vinacomin would normally just skim the easiest 
to access coal off the top and move on to the next mine. While very profitable, it made extraction of the 
remaining but deeper coal financially unviable. 
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The next section provides an overview of the Top 200 firms. Following this, discussion 
turns to the general corporations and economics groups which constitute a significant 
portion of the Top 200. In the third section selected cases will be presented to illustrate in 
more detail the strategies identified in the general overview of the Top 200 firms. The 
cases also demonstrate the variety of state-related accumulation processes operating in 
Vietnam, which will be linked to examples from Eastern Europe and China covered in 
Chapter Two. The final section summarizes the key findings. Unless otherwise stated, 
information provided throughout this chapter is from company questionnaires and 
interviews. 
 
5.1 Overview and Analysis 
 
Vietnam‟s largest firms can only be understood within the context in which they operate. 
This section provides that context. It begins with a comparison of the largest firms of all 
ownership types (state, private, foreign) with other companies in Vietnam. This is 
followed by a comparison of different sectors of operation, with particular attention paid 
to the manufacturing sector. Discussion then turns to the Top 200 Vietnamese firms, 
which will be the focus of the remainder of the chapter. This is followed by discussion of 
the origins and current strategies of Vietnam‟s largest firms. 
 
5.1.1 The Top 200 Firms 
 
In 2005, 112,947 firms were included in the Enterprise Survey.
171
 While accounting for a 
modest 15 percent of total labour, the Top 200 firms account for over forty percent of 
assets, over one-quarter of turnover and almost forty-five percent of taxes paid. For taxes 
and assets, a few very large firms account for the bulk of the Top 200‟s contribution to 
total taxes and assets recorded in the Enterprise Survey.
172
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 This section borrows from Cheshier and Penrose (2007a). Data presented in this section are from the 
2006 Enterprise Survey, covering the year 2005. 
172
 Although Vietnam‟s largest firms are big compared to other firms in Vietnam, in global terms many are 
more akin to small and medium sized enterprises. For example, the firm with the smallest number of 





Among all ownership types and across the full range of sectors, the Top 200 firms 
account for a sizeable share of total labour, assets, turnover and taxes paid. In some cases, 
the largest firms are the sector. Vinacomin accounts for 95 percent of coal production in 
Vietnam. Vietsovpetro, a joint venture under the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group 
(Petrovietnam), is ranked fifth in the Top 200 All. It operates the White Tiger (Bạch Hổ), 
Dragon (Rồng) and Big Bear (Đại Hùng) fields. It dominates crude oil production, with 
the low estimates of Vietsovpetro output at around two-thirds of total production in 
Vietnam, nearly all of which is from White Tiger (USCS 2004). It alone accounted for 
fifteen percent of total government tax revenues in 2005.
173
 It accounts for one-fifth of 
taxes paid as recorded in the entire Enterprise Survey. Vietsovpetro is also ranked first in 
                                                                                                                                                 
international definition of a small and medium sized enterprise is a company with three hundred workers or 
less. The fifteen smallest firms in terms of employment in the Top 200 each have less than one thousand 
employees, 146 firms have less than five thousand employees and only ninety-three have more than three 
thousand. Within the Top 200, the largest thirty firms account for nearly forty percent of employment, 
nearly two-thirds of assets, over forty-five percent of turnover and over two-thirds of taxes paid by the 200 
largest firms. 
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 The 2005 total tax revenues and grants figure is from IMF (2006), Table 14. 
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In terms of ownership type, the Top 200 All are predominately state and foreign firms. 
The Top 200 VN are mostly state firms. State firms in the Top 200 All account for nearly 
thirty percent of workers employed by state firms in the Enterprise Survey. Put another 
way, three percent of state firms account for almost 30 percent of employment, nearly 
two-thirds of assets, over forty percent of turnover and over forty percent of taxes paid by 
state firms in the Enterprise Survey. The situation is similar for foreign firms. The 
domestic private sector is not well represented in either Top 200 list, although the twenty-
two largest private firms account for nearly fifteen percent of total private sector assets, 
mostly held by private banks.  
 
Table 9: Top 200 All share of Enterprise Survey Ownership Types 
Enterprise Survey      
# Firms 
Top 200 
Share of Enterprise Survey 




Labour Assets Turnover Tax 
4,083 122 state 29.6 65.5 41.9 41.5 
105,167 22 private 1.9 13.7 4.8 4.6 
3,697 56 foreign 15.9 10.1 24.3 67.8 
 
In the manufacturing sector, the largest 110 manufacturing firms account for over fifteen 
percent of employment, almost one-quarter of assets, over one-quarter of turnover and 
nearly thirty percent of taxes paid by the 23,469 manufacturing firms included in the 
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 Established in 1981 as a joint venture with Zarubezhneft of Russia, it began producing oil in 1986. In 
addition to oil, in 1995 Vietsovpetro brought onshore associated natural gas from White Tiger, contributing 
to the development of the gas industry in Vietnam. However, the joint venture expires in 2011 and it is not 
clear that it will be renewed (Blagov 2006). Even if taken over by Petrovietnam, White Tiger output is 
declining. Estimates on the remaining life of White Tiger range from three to thirteen years. Other existing 
fields are much smaller. Some of the decline in output from White Tiger will be met by future domestic 
sources and also imported crude from the Middle East (Dragon Capital 2008). However, given its uncertain 
future, Vietsovpetro is losing staff and having difficulty replacing them, with Vietnamese and Russian 
workers and engineers leaving the company for more secure employment.  
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Enterprise Survey. Within the Top 200, they account for one-half of the employees and 
over one-third of turnover. Fifteen footwear firms account for over forty percent of 
employment. Over sixty percent of the Top 200 manufacturing workers are employed in 
forty-two footwear, textile, garment and seafood processing companies. Within the 
manufacturing sector, eight companies in tobacco products, beer and malt, motor vehicles 
and motorcycles account for sixty-five percent of the Top 200 manufacturing sector taxes 
paid. 
 




Top 200 Share of Enterprise Survey Sector, % 
Firms Sector* Description Labour Assets Turnover Tax 
1,013 6 A 
Agriculture, forestry and 
related service activities 
24.4 14.2 29.7 52.2 
1,173 15 C Mining and quarrying 41.1 59.7 62.9 96.3 
23,469 110 D Manufacturing 15.8 24.4 27.2 29.7 
208 2 E 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
50.1 84.4 85.5 58.3 
14,523 12 F Construction 4.9 8.4 9.5 9.8 
45,822 20 G 
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal 
and household goods 
6.6 9.3 13.3 17.1 
4,655 1 H Hotels and restaurants 3.6 4.6 9.0 11.7 
6,609 17 I 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
38.9 62.6 54.9 68.9 
1,096 16 J Finance, credit 75.6 78.6 63.5 21.6 
8,598 1 L 
Real estate, renting and 
business activities 
0.5 4.7 7.7 18.4 
* Sectors with no firms in the Top 200 are not included.  
 
Large foreign companies dominate manufacturing and are particularly important in terms 
of employment. Of the Top 200 manufacturing firms, foreign companies account for 
nearly one-half of the firms, almost two-thirds of employment, over half of assets, nearly 
sixty percent of turnover and forty-five percent of taxes paid. One wholly foreign owned 
footwear firm, Pouyen Vietnam, accounts for over thirteen percent of manufacturing 
workers in the Top 200. This company also accounts for one-fifth of all the foreign 
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manufacturing workers. Pouyen Vietnam employs the second highest number of workers 




Within the Top 200 All, foreign firms are the only firms operating in the following 
manufacturing sub-sectors: 
 Vegetable and animal oils 
 Prepared animal feeds 
 Other food products from starches 
 Soaps and detergents 
 Engines and turbines 
 Domestic appliances 
 Office machinery 
 Computing machinery 




























 Electric motor, generators and transformers 
 Insulated wire and cable 
 Other electrical equipment 
 Television and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony and telegraphy 
 Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording apparatus 





These foreign firms tend to be either of the import and distribute or import, assemble, 
export variety. Linkages with domestic suppliers are weak, although this varies by 
industry (VDF 2006). Large Vietnamese manufacturing firms are concentrated in seafood 
processing, textiles and garments, fertilizer, rubber products, cement and shipbuilding. 
 
5.1.2 The Top 200 Vietnamese Firms 
 
The Top 200 VN list was generated to focus on Vietnamese firms. The list is based on the 
Top 200 All but the forty-one 100 percent foreign firms are excluded. Joint ventures 
(JVs) remain. Of the 41 new firms, 34 are state firms, five are private and two are JVs. 
Four of the five private firms are in the manufacturing sector, two of which are fish 














VN (+) net change 
A Agriculture, forestry and related service activities - 4 4 
C Mining and quarrying - 2 2 
D Manufacturing 39 16 -23 
E Electricity, gas and water supply - 1 1 
F Construction - 6 6 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods 
1 5 4 
I Transport, storage and communications - 2 2 
J Finance, credit 1 1 0 
L Real estate, renting and business activities - 3 3 
T Services for individuals and community - 1 1 
 
Table 11 indicates the changes in sectors between the 100 percent foreign firms dropped 
from the Top 200 All and the new Vietnamese firms entering the list. The net negative 
impact on manufacturing is immediately apparent. Nearly all of the foreign firms are in 
the manufacturing sector. Only 16 of the incoming Vietnamese firms are in 
manufacturing, resulting in a shift of the Top 200 VN towards natural resource and 
service sectors.  
 
Within the Top 200 VN, nearly three-quarters of the companies are state firms, most of 












Table 12: Top 200 VN General Corporation Subsidiaries 
General Corporation Abbreviation # Firms 
Vietnam National Coal and Mineral Industries Group Vinacomin 15 
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group Vinatex 11 
Vietnam National Cement Corporation VNCC 9 
Vietnam Rubber Group Geruco 8 
Vietnam National Chemical Corporation Vinachem 8 
Vietnam National Shipping Lines Vinalines 5 
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group Vinashin 5 
Vietnam Insurance Group Bao Viet 4 
Vietnam Oil and Gas Group Petrovietnam 4 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group VNPT 4 
Hanoi Construction Corporation HACC 3 
Vietnam Airlines Vietnam Airlines 3 
Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation Petrolimex 3 
Vietnam Paper Corporation Vinapaco 3 
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation No. 5 Cienco 5 2 
Electricity of Vietnam EVN 2 
Hanoi Electronics Corporation Hanel 2 
Song Da Construction Corporation Song Da 2 
Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation VEAM 2 
Vietnam Industrial Construction Corporation Vinaincon 2 
Vietnam Railways VNR 2 
Vietnam Steel Corporation VSC 2 
Other GCs*   19 
Total   120 
* The „Other GCs‟ line is for GC head offices and member companies that only have one unit in the Top 
200 VN. The firm numbers include joint ventures, joint stock companies and limited liability companies in 
the Top 200 VN that retain GC affiliation.  
 
Table 13: Top 200 VN Independent Central SOE and State JSC Ministry Affiliation 
Ministry # Firms 
Defence 5 
Trade 4 
Transport and Communications 3 
Construction 2 
Agriculture and Rural Development 1 
Industry 1 
Post and Telecommunications 1 




Within the state enterprise category, there are two broad types. The first are „local‟ SOEs 
under the authority of provincial People‟s Committees (PPCs). The second are „central‟ 
SOEs under the authority of ministries. State enterprises which are not member 
companies of General Corporations are classified as „independent‟, and can be either 
„local‟ or „central‟. Table 13 shows the ministry affiliation of independent (non-GC) 




5.1.3 Origins of Vietnam’s Largest Firms 
 
Seventy of the Top 200 VN firms were established after 1995. Of the remaining firms, 27 
were established before 1975. A further 25 southern firms, although dating themselves 
from 1975 or soon after, are actually reconfigurations of pre-existing southern private 
firms or subsidiaries of multinational companies.  
 
Enterprises were established in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for one of three 
purposes: to supply the war effort, to build infrastructure or to produce goods for the local 
economy. They were small scale workshops, factories or shipyards usually built with 
Chinese or Soviet aid and turnkey technologies. Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company was 
established in 1965 to produce river craft for the navy. Sao Vang Rubber (SRC) was 
established in 1960 and produced tires for army vehicles. Thang Long Metal was 
established in 1969 to supply stoves and other products to the domestic market.
176
 In a 
similar manner, southern firms also supplied the army or produced for the southern 
economy.  
 
In 1975 the government embarked on the task of fusing the economies of the north and 
south. Southern firms were nationalized and transformed into state owned enterprises 
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 The four state owned commercial banks (SOCBs) in the Enterprise Survey are Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (Agribank), Bank for Investment and Development (BIDV), Bank for Foreign Trade 
(Vietcombank), and Industrial and Commercial Bank (Incombank). In 2008 „Incombank‟ became 
„Vietinbank‟. The four SOCBs are ranked first through fourth in terms of assets and account for one-fifth of 
total assets in the Enterprise Survey. The Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry have since been 
combined into the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
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 Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company is ranked 41
st
 in the Top 200 VN, Sao Vang Rubber is 175
th
, and 




following the northern model. Some firms continued in forms that were largely 
unchanged. Company No. 28 (Agtex) and Phong Phu Textiles produced uniforms for 
southern forces and continued to supply the armed forces after 1975. Nha Be Garments 
and Quang Ngai Sugar also passed into state ownership with few structural changes. 
Other firms were nationalized units of foreign companies. A Michelin tire factory became 
Southern Rubber Industry Company (Casumina) and a Nestle facility was combined with 
Dutch and Chinese companies to become Vietnam Dairy Products Company (Vinamilk). 
Other combinations of previously unrelated southern companies resulted in Southern 
Fertilizer Company (SFC) and a combination of ten private factories created Vietnam 




5.1.4 Strategies of Vietnam’s Largest Firms 
 
Managers of Vietnamese firms and business groups must decide how best to respond to 
policy changes that have resulted in increased competition and uncertainty but also 
greater autonomy and opportunity. The strategies they choose are based on their 
perceptions of potential profitability in different markets and their capacity to compete, 
reduce costs, increase scale and improve quality. The firms interviewed described three 
broad strategies: upgrading core business activities; expanding markets; and diversifying 
into new business areas, frequently real estate, tourism and investment in the country‟s 
emerging capital markets. These are not mutually exclusive and many firms are pursuing 
two or all three strategies simultaneously. 
 
Large firms are moving into related products, higher quality products and new business 
lines. They continue to develop brands, expand distribution channels and enter new 
markets. The main reason for this is increased competition. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, Vietnam has gained access to global markets, in exchange reducing protection for 
domestic industries. State owned enterprise reform has seen the barriers between state 
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 Company No. 28 is ranked 120
th
 in the Top 200 VN, Phong Phu Textiles is 49
th
, Nha Be Garments is 
52
nd
, Quang Ngai Sugar is 73
rd
, Southern Rubber Industry Company is 76
th
, Vietnam Dairy Products 
Company is 13
th
, Southern Fertilizer Company is 122
nd





firms break down with a corresponding increase in competition, even within strategic 
sectors. Foreign investment has poured into the country, focused on using Vietnam as an 
export base, selling products domestically, and natural resource exploitation. Increased 
competition has forced Vietnamese firms to adapt and respond.  
 
Competition from China has driven Vietnamese exporters to increase product quality. 
Several large Vietnamese garment companies cited the competitive strength of China, 
combined with the removal of Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) quotas under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), as the major motivation for moving into higher quality 
products. Garment Company No. 10 (Garco 10) said that because of China it is not 
possible to compete in „normal products‟, meaning high volume, low margin, easy to 
produce garments. In order to survive Garco 10 is moving into higher quality shirts and 
suits that require more advanced technologies, more investment and skilled staff. Other 
large Vietnamese garment companies made similar moves for similar reasons. During a 
tour of the Hyundai Vinashin shipyard a senior engineer cited competition with China as 





Vietnamese firms have also responded to other sources of competition in foreign markets. 
Viet Foods is now the number one supplier of difficult to produce sushi shrimp, 
accounting for nearly forty percent of all the sushi shrimp consumed in Japan.
179
 It plans 
to leverage its expertise into less demanding export markets to diversify and reduce its 
reliance on the Japanese market. Most large Vietnamese exporters mentioned expanding 
and diversifying export markets as a key goal.  
 
While some firms only export, most large Vietnamese manufacturing firms sell in both 
domestic and overseas markets. The relative importance of domestic sales and exports 
varies by industry. Companies producing paper, metal and electrical products, dairy, and 
fertilizers were originally established to cater to the domestic market. However, most 
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 Garments Company No. 10 is ranked 192
nd




 Viet Foods is ranked 185
th
. Viet Foods will be discussed in more detail below. 
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began exporting by the late 1990s and almost all now see export markets as the primary 
source of revenue growth. As a senior manager at Thang Long Metal said, đổi mới is 
about “product diversification to meet domestic demand and to export.” Several firms 
mentioned using exports as a source of revenues to replace sales lost in the domestic 
market as import competition increases.  
 
Expanding markets and moving into higher quality products are not the only strategies 
open to large Vietnamese firms. Not all firms are pursuing the quality niche strategy. 
Some are simply diversifying into similar products, for example from shrimp into catfish. 
Others are finding the push into higher value added products difficult, for example rubber 
plantations attempting to move into rubber manufactures. While some firms are actively 
pursuing the upgrading strategy, others indicated this was only a short term plan.  
 
The quality niche strategy itself is only the beginning. It is an excellent strategy for 
confronting the challenge of high volume, low margin China and indicates a level of 
dynamism and optimism about the future. However, the security of moving from shirts to 
men‟s suits is not high, and may only be temporary as many competitors are attempting 
to make the same move. One positive sign is that the firms engaging in and succeeding in 
implementing this strategy are embracing the challenge and seeking avenues to adapt and 
expand in the face of increasingly fierce competition. Many of the managers interviewed 
also believed that their long-term survival and prosperity depended on their ability to 
continue to diversify activities and improve the efficiency and quality of their production 
processes.  
 
However, many firms are moving into unrelated business areas, in particular real estate, 
tourism and finance. An extreme example is the Can Tho Agricultural and Animal 
Products Company (Cataco), ranked 85
th
 in the Top 200 VN. A local state enterprise 
established in 1978 as an agricultural products and animal husbandry company, it began 
diversifying in 1992 into seafood processing and export, real estate and construction, 
hotels, restaurants and tourism. Cataco currently earns most of its revenue from seafood 
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but is now shedding business units through equitization to raise capital for investment 
projects and will focus on hotels and restaurants. 
 
Most firms are not leaving their core businesses, even though many core business areas 
are not profitable. Some firms said that they felt obliged to continue to operate their core 
businesses to secure jobs. These firms are expanding and improving existing products 
while simultaneously entering more profitable business lines. Sometimes these strategies 
are intertwined. For example, one company has been forced to relocate out of a major 
urban area and is using the opportunity to build new production facilities and to develop 
an industrial zone for itself and foreign investors. 
 
Company No. 28 (Agtex) is a Ministry of Defence textile and garments firm moving into 
real estate, industrial zone development and petrol trading. The primary concern of senior 
management is to secure profits for itself and jobs for its employees. Profits from textiles 
and garments are expected to decrease, especially since Vietnam joined WTO, even to 
the point where they are “lower than if you deposit the money in the bank.” Operations in 
textiles and garments will provide jobs but no profits, and Agtex hopes to gain higher 
returns from its real estate, finance and petrol activities. 
 
In 2003 Phong Phu Textiles under the Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group 
(Vinatex) built several profitable resorts. Phong Phu‟s core business will be textiles but it 
is expanding in real estate and commercial centres. The plan is for sixty percent of 
revenues to come from textiles while real estate, tourism and other business activities 
provide most of its profits. These profits will be invested to expand further in textile 
production.  
 
These examples show the range of strategies pursued by Vietnam‟s largest firms as they 
respond and adapt to increased competition. Three general strategies emerged from the 
interviews: upgrading core business into more complex and higher value products; 
expanding markets; and diversifying business areas, often into real estate and finance. 
These strategies are frequently related and most firms are engaging in more than one, 
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with some firms pursuing all three strategies simultaneously. The next section will 
discuss these strategies in relation to Vietnam‟s general corporations and economic 
groups, whose member companies comprise sixty percent of the Top 200 Vietnamese 
firms. 
 
5.2 General Corporations and Economic Groups 
 
In a report presented to the Economic Committee of the National Assembly in late 2009 
it was stated that Vietnam‟s 90 remaining state corporations and economic groups 
account for 40 percent of GDP, 40 percent of industrial production, 50 percent of export 
turnover, 30 percent of total domestic revenue and employ nine percent of the national 
labour force. In 2008 they had revenues totaling USD 48 billion. However, the report 
criticized the state conglomerates for misuse of land and inefficient use of capital. Thirty-
four groups and corporations had invested in finance and credit, 18 in insurance and 34 in 
securities (Vietnam News 2009d). At the end of 2008, seven groups had overdue debt of 
USD 247 million, of which one group, the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group 
(Vinashin), accounted for 91.4 percent (Vietnamnet 2009f). 
 
The recent scandals involving Vinacomin and Vinafood 2 discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter, and the abundance of Audis in the parking lot of Electricity of Vietnam 
(EVN), are exceptional. It is rare to see in full view the hollowing out and asset stripping 
for personal gain conducted by Mr. Kiển and his brother at Vinacomin, even if widely 
regarded as prevalent behaviour. The visible state-related accumulation processes 
occurring in Vietnam‟s economic groups and General Corporations most resemble the 
organizational proliferation and consortium building of Ding (2000a) and Stark‟s (1996) 
recombinant property. As discussed in Chapter Two, recombinant property is a form of 
portfolio management as organizational hedging, in which firms respond to uncertainty 
and opportunity by diversifying assets and redefining and recombining resources. This 
results in complex cross-ownership structures involving banks, investment funds and 
other enterprises (Lavigne 1999). Discussion of recent state corporation diversification 
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into finance and real estate will illustrate this process. This trend is very pronounced 
amongst General Corporations.  
 
As part of the reform process, several core monopolies have been opened to „bounded 
competition‟ primarily from other General Corporations. The telecoms sector was 
dominated by the Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (VNPT), but has seen 
the entry of the Army‟s Viettel, FPT and more recently the entry of Electricity of 
Vietnam (EVN), through EVN Telecom, and other providers. The Vietnam National 
Chemical Corporation‟s (Vinachem) fertilizer base of operations has been penetrated by 
the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petrovietnam). Both Petrovietnam and Vinacomin are 
moving into power generation, previously a monopoly of EVN.  
 
As state enterprise reform expands to include General Corporations and economic 
groups, the proceeds from equitizing state capital in member companies provide 
corporations and economic groups with a new pool of investment funds. For example, 
EVN bumped up the timetable for equitizing its member companies to 2008, two years 
earlier than planned, to take advantage of favourable stock market conditions.
180
 Proceeds 
from equitization, along with domestic and international bond issues and domestic and 
foreign loans will be used to meet the massive investments needed in power 
infrastructure. These funds will also be used to invest in telecommunications 
infrastructure, banking, securities, insurance, real estate, ports and “other areas [we] think 
will generate profits.” This exemplifies the economic group as diversified business 








                                                 
180
 Following the collapse of the stock market, EVN put these plans on hold. 
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Figure 6: General Corporation Diversification 
 
 
Source: adapted from Cheshier, Robertson and Stoops (2008), p. 14 
 
General Corporation entry into finance and real estate are part of a longer historical 
diversification process.
181
 However, diversification has moved beyond the traditional 
process of entry into related activities. It now includes acquiring banks, establishing 
finance, insurance, leasing and securities companies, speculating in real estate and 
building golf courses, office buildings, five star hotels and tourist resorts. 
 
Control over financial institutions is at the core of this change. Finance companies are 
non-bank credit institutions licensed and supervised by the State Bank of Vietnam. In 
many respects similar to banks, they cannot provide payment settlement services. They 
are allowed to:  
 accept long term deposits (one year or longer);  
 borrow from domestic and foreign financial institutions;  
 issue bonds and commercial paper;  
 issue loans, including consumer loans; 
 provide loan guarantees;  
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 receive capital entrusted to them by the state or other organization (e.g. a GC); 
 invest in projects;  
 purchase shares in other companies;  
 trade in foreign exchange and gold; and,  
 perform underwriting, fund management and other financial services.182  
 
Nearly sixty percent of existing financing companies are controlled by General 
Corporations. According to the State Bank of Vietnam, these include:
183
 
 Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) Finance 
 Hanoi Housing Development and Investment Corporation (Handico) Finance 
 Song Da Construction Corporation Finance 
 Vietnam Cement Corporation (VNCC) Finance 
 Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group (Vinacomin) Finance 
 Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation (Vinaconex) and Viettel  
  Finance 
 Vietnam National Chemical Corporation (Vinachem) Finance184 
 Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (Petrovietnam) Finance 
 Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (VNPT) Finance 
 Vietnam Rubber Group (Geruco) Finance 
 Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) Finance 
 Vietnam Textile and Garment Group (Vinatex) Finance 
 
The full details of General Corporation involvement in finance are difficult to ascertain. 
They are also undergoing rapid change. For example, General Corporation and economic 
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 Vinachem became an economic group in December 2009. 
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group stakes in banks underwent dramatic shifts during the 2006-2008 boom-bust cycle, 
the results of which remain to seen.
185
 Nevertheless, it is possible to map some of the 
connections.  
 
Table 14: Selected State Corporations with Financial and Real Estate Subsidiaries 
Corporation Primary Sector Bank Finance Insurance Securities Land 
Petrovietnam Oil and Gas X X X X X 
Vinacomin Coal X X X 
 
X 
Vinatex Textiles, Garments X X 
 
X X 
Vinashin Shipbuilding X X 
 
X X 




VNPT Post, Telecoms X X X 
  








Geruco Rubber X 
   
X 




Source: adapted from Cheshier and Pincus (2010) 
 
Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation (Petrolimex) holds a stake in the Petroleum 
Group (PG) Bank and has an insurance company, Petrolimex Insurance (PJICO). EVN 
has a stake in An Binh Bank (ABBank) (Vietnamnet 2008a). Vinashin has a stake in 
Hanoi Building Bank (Habubank) and a finance leasing company under Vinashin 
Finance. Petrovietnam holds a stake in Global Petrol Bank (GP Bank) and has its own 
insurance subsidiary, Petrovietnam Insurance (PVI) (Vietnamnet 2008c). VNPT has a 
stake in Maritime Bank (MSB) and has plans to turn its Vietnam Postal Savings Services 
Company (VPSC) into a bank (Vietnamnet 2006, 2007c). Its member company, Vietnam 
Mobile Telecom Services Company (VMS, commonly known as Mobifone), is an 
investor in Tien Phong Bank along with FPT. Vietnam Ocean Shipping Company 
(Vosco), member company of Vietnam National Shipping Lines (Vinalines), has a stake 
in Maritime Bank.
186
 Vietnam Airlines is a shareholder in Techcombank. Vietnam 
Airlines member company Southern Airport Services Company (Sasco) is an investor in 
Lien Viet Bank along with Saigon Trading Corporation (Satra) (Vietnam Stock Market 
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 Thanks to Scott Robertson for highlighting this point. 
186
 For discussion of Vosco‟s importance to smuggling operations, see Beresford and Đặng Phong (2000). 
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News 2008). Satra is also a strategic investor in Habubank (Vietnamnet 2007a). Vinatex 
has a stake in Nam Viet Bank (Navibank) and holds equity in Maritime Bank (Morgan 
Stanley Gateway Securities 2008). Both Vinacomin and Geruco have stakes in Saigon 
Hanoi Bank (SHB), which is a strategic partner of the Vietnam Machinery Erection 
Corporation (Lilama) (Vietnam News Agency 2007). Vietnam Airlines recently 
established an insurance company in which Vinacomin and Lilama are also investors 
(Thanh Nien News 2008).  
 
Several General Corporations are also involved in securities companies, but as with 
banks this is extremely difficult to trace. Control can be exercised through a General 
Corporation invested bank which establishes a securities company, a GC independent 
investment in a securities firm or creation of a securities member company. Vinashin has 
a securities firm under Vinashin Finance. Vosco is an investor in Hai Phong Securities. 
Saigon Hanoi Bank, in which Vinacomin and Geruco are investors, has its own securities 
company. Vinatex holds a stake in Empower Securities and EVN has member company 
Ha Thanh Securities. 
 
For the General Corporations, a finance company provides the ability to self-finance. It 
also acts as a fungibility machine, with the finance company functioning as a black box 
for corporate funds and maturing debt obligations. Combine a finance company with a 
large stake in a bank, and the General Corporation ability to self-finance increases 
exponentially. Combine these with a securities company, and the General Corporation 
can underwrite, purchase, trade, manipulate and profit from the equitization of its 
member companies – all within the same corporation.  
 
EVN Finance provides an example of these interlocking connections. EVN itself holds 40 
percent of EVN Finance. ABBank, in which EVN holds a 28 percent stake, owns 8.4 
percent of EVN Finance. ABBank Securities and Ha Thanh Securities, EVN‟s own 
securities firm, also hold stakes in EVN Finance (VCCI 2008). The scope for intra-group 





















Petrovietnam has real estate companies under Petrovietnam Finance Corporation (PVFC) 
and Petrovietnam Power Corporation (PV Power), and is involved in construction of 
office buildings, hotels, resorts, and golf courses. Vinatex also has a real estate company 
and at least one of its member companies, Phong Phu, has invested in resort complexes. 
Geruco is involved in construction of industrial zones, Vinacomin in commercial 
property development, and Vinashin in industrial zone development and hotel 
construction. The finance-real estate nexus is illustrated by the Vinashin Hotel project in 
Nam Dinh. The hotel is being built by Vinashin member company Hoang Anh 





The activities of the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) over the last 
several years illustrate the diversification drive that results from relaxation of financial 
constraints. At the end of 2005 the Vietnamese government issued its first sovereign bond 
managed by Credit Suisse First Boston, obtaining USD 750 million. This was on-lent to 
Vinashin in 2006 to facilitate upgrading and expansion of the shipbuilding industry. In 






ABBank Ha Thanh Securities 
ABBank Securities 
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2007 Vinashin established 154 new member companies. Excluding weekends, there are 
260 working days in the year. Vinashin therefore created a new subsidiary on average 
every 1.69 days (Thời báo Kinh tế Sàigòn Online 2008). These include shipyards, 





Acquisition of self-financing capabilities facilitates transmogrification of General 
Corporations into investment groups, turning interest away from sector development. 
This is exemplified by the Vietnam Rubber Group (Geruco). Nine rubber plantations are 
in the Top 200 VN, eight of which are Geruco members.  
 
Table 15: Geruco member companies in Top 200 VN 
Company Rank 
Dau Tieng Rubber Corp. 27 
Dong Nai Rubber Co. 30 
Binh Long Rubber Co 57 
Phuoc Hoa Rubber Co 66 
Phu Rieng Rubber Co 67 
Loc Ninh Rubber Co. 160 
Dong Phu Rubber Co. 164 
Ba Ria Rubber Co. 171 
 
Many of these members are following Geruco into plantation development in Laos and 
Cambodia due to lack of available land in Vietnam. They have also been tasked by the 
government with moving into higher value added rubber products. This is proving 
difficult. Foreign firms are establishing rubber manufacturing facilities. Three Vietnam 
National Chemical Corporation (Vinachem) member companies already operate in this 
area. These plantations sell rubber to the foreign and Vinachem rubber manufacturers but 
do not receive any upgrading support from them.  
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 See Vinashin website for details (www.vinashin.com.vn/members.aspx). In the English version only 
companies related to shipbuilding are listed, while in the Vietnamese version the scope of diversification 
becomes more apparent. A full list of Vinashin members is included in KPMG Limited (2009). More 
recently, Deutsche Bank provided a USD two billion loan to Vinashin (Pincus and Vũ Thành Tự Anh 
2008). For further discussion and critique of Vinashin, see Huỳnh Thế Du (2006). 
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One plantation tried to work with an Italian firm to develop elastic for the textile and 
garment industry. However, the partnership did not work due to incompatible objectives. 
The plantation wanted long term cooperation and assistance in exporting, but the Italians 
were only looking to sell equipment and machinery.  
 
The response to difficulties in breaking into rubber manufactures mirrors that taken by 
other large firms in Vietnam. A few plantations are investing in the Geruco rubber based 
sports equipment company. Several plantations are moving into wood products 
manufacturing and a few into unrelated businesses like seafood. Almost all of them are 
engaging in real estate and industrial zone development.  
 
At the same time, Geruco is using profits from rubber sales to invest in a variety of 
projects and companies. Geruco invests in five main categories: hydroelectric power 
stations, roads, industrial zones and residential areas, cement and infrastructure. Geruco 
prioritizes these categories because demand for electricity is increasing, roads require 
large amounts of capital and only large firms such as Geruco can afford to invest, IZs and 
residential areas can be built on existing Geruco land, cement also requires large capital 
investments so Geruco is well placed and infrastructure investments develop Geruco IZs 
and residential areas. Participation in investment projects depends on the type of 
investment with some projects run by Geruco and others as only a minority contributor. 
Geruco is also an investor in the Vietnam Steel Corporation and Essar Steel of Singapore 
hot rolled steel joint venture in Ba Ria – Vung Tau and will invest with the Vietnam 
National Chemical Corporation (Vinachem) and its member company Danang Rubber 
(DRC) with a foreign partner in radial tire production.  
 
Geruco is becoming more of an investment house than a vehicle for developing the 
rubber sector in Vietnam. Many General Corporations and economic groups are 
following a similar pattern. As discussed for non-GC members in previous sections, few 
of the corporations and economic groups are abandoning their core businesses. However, 
the recent moves into finance and real estate are a perfect example of Stark‟s (1996) 
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recombinant property and have important implications for industrialization and 
development in Vietnam.  
 
5.2.1 Diversification, Discipline and Industrial Development 
 
The dynamism of Vietnam‟s largest 200 firms bodes well for Vietnam‟s economic 
prospects. However, many of these firms are moving into speculative activities, 
particularly real estate and finance. This is most pronounced amongst Vietnam‟s state 
corporations, which represent sixty percent of the firms in the Top 200. Diversification 
into these activities at the expense of upgrading and expanding core business calls into 
question the use of General Corporations as vehicles for industrialization and national 
development. 
 
Government proponents of the General Corporations in Vietnam point to the Korean 
chaebol, Japanese keiretsu and Chinese business groups as positive examples of the 
potential role of domestic, diversified conglomerates in the process of economic 
development.
189
 They argue that only large business groups can achieve the economies of 
scale necessary to acquire new technologies and to compete with multinational firms. 
Like Vietnam‟s General Corporations, Korea‟s chaebol benefited from massive 
subsidized credit flows, the so-called „policy loans‟, which were used to finance long 
term, risky investments in shipbuilding, steel, electronics, automobiles and other 
sectors.
190
 The chaebol also accumulated capital on the basis of import monopolies. In 
short, the chaebol were „political capitalists‟ much like Vietnam‟s General Corporations.  
 
The chaebol, dependent as they were on state largesse in the form of subsidized capital, 
exhibited many of the maladies of soft budget constraints described by Kornai (1979).
191
 
Extremely high gearing ratios left the Korean conglomerates vulnerable to even small 
shifts in cash flow and gave the state considerable power to direct investment decisions. 
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group model in Southeast Asia, see Studwell (2007). 
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 See discussion of Kornai (1979) in Chapter Three. 
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The response of the chaebol to this form of vulnerability was to become too big to fail. 
Fungibility played an important role in this process. Although the state disapproved of 
expansion mania and rampant diversification, “once credit is allocated, it is difficult to 
track down the actual use of the funds since various bookkeeping devices can hide it” 
(Woo 1991, 13).  
 
However, there are also important differences between the chaebol during their state-
sponsored growth, contemporary Chinese state holding companies and Vietnamese 
General Corporations. Chief among these is the relationship between the conglomerates 
and the banks. In both Korea and contemporary China, conglomerates were not given 
permission to open banks, an important factor in shifting the balance of power towards 
the state and away from business groups. In this, Vietnam‟s General Corporations bear 
more similarities to Chile‟s grupos and Indonesia‟s ill-fated konglomerat of the late 
Suharto period. Ownership of banks and other financial firms, combined with lax 
financial supervision and enforcement, opens the door to insider lending, underwriting, 
insuring and leasing, which provides groups with easy access to capital but at the same 
time undermines regulation of financial markets and greatly increases systemic risk.  
 
Another key difference between the Korean and Vietnamese cases is the insistence of the 
Korean state on minimum performance standards and the capacity and willingness of 
successive governments to back up these standards with tough sanctions. Control of the 
banking system was an important weapon in the government‟s control arsenal. As Woo 
notes, “The [Korean] state was munificent, but also a harsh disciplinarian. It supplied the 
cold bath that the market could not. Export credits were wonderful gifts to the chaebol 
but to get, one had to be deserving: otherwise, licenses were immediately revoked” (Woo 
1991, 165). Vietnam‟s General Corporations are not yet subject to the sorts of 
performance standards that forced the chaebol to continuously upgrade and compete on 
international markets to maintain their advantageous position. Weak state control, de 
facto – and increasingly de jure – autonomy, and disregard for central directives remain 
key features of the political economy of the General Corporations.  
 
 191 
For example, as part of the state effort to tackle inflation in 2008, the Prime Minister 
called on the General Corporations to focus on their core businesses, to reduce 
unnecessary investment projects and to limit GC investments to only one bank. 
Subsequent reductions in General Corporation investments were heralded in the press as 
evidence of GC compliance (Vietnam News 2008a, Vietnamnet 2008b). However, the 
relevant policy change was not government directives and a newfound willingness of the 
GCs to comply; rather, the sharp rise in high interest rates on loans stemming from the 
government‟s tight money policy in the second half of 2008 designed to bring down the 
rate of inflation. Corporation member companies found access to working capital difficult 
or too expensive, and some General Corporations diverted investment expenditures to 
cover member company operating requirements. Reduced access to favourable loan 
conditions explains most of the decrease in investment. This also applies to corporation 
plans to acquire stakes in additional banks (Vietnam Business Finance 2008). 
 
In April 2008, the Prime Minister ordered the General Corporations to invest at least 
seventy percent of their capital in their core business areas. The chairman of 
Petrovietnam responded that this policy amounted to „shock therapy‟ and went on to state 
that “even when state conglomerates and enterprises investment in non-core businesses 
accounts for up to 40 or 50 percent of total investment and if these investments are 
profitable then the government should not ask them to disinvest from these businesses as 
this would cause the enterprise to collapse” (quoted in Pincus and Vũ Thành Tự Anh 
2008). This was hardly the response expected from a state representative in one of the 
country‟s largest state corporations. The balance of power in Vietnam still lies with the 
General Corporations, while the government, short of tightening credit for the entire 
economy, appears unable to impose its will on its own conglomerates. 
 
One of the most pressing concerns of government is the limited progress made by 
General Corporation in increasing productivity and profitability in their respective core 
sectors. While the General Corporations and economic groups account for 50 percent of 
Vietnam‟s exports, most of this is in natural resources like crude oil, coal and rubber or 
low value added light manufacturing products like garments. Production of textiles, steel, 
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electricity, chemicals, and other sectors have failed to keep pace with demand, leaving 
the country heavily dependent on imports and facing chronic trade deficits.  
 
According to Vietnam‟s General Statistics Office, Vietnam imports the most goods by 
value from China.
192
 Table 19 presents the top ten imports from China to Vietnam, based 
on averaging import values between 2006 and 2008. In nine of the ten commodities a 
General Corporation exists with a mandate to develop that sector.  
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Domestic competition is increasing in some of these sectors, for example Petrovietnam‟s 
move into fertilizer production. In addition, Petrovietnam‟s first oil refinery, Dung Quat, 
came online in 2009. And given excess global production capacity, for example in steel, 
it is not necessarily desirable for Vietnam to continue attempting classic import 
substitution policies in every sector.
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 Nevertheless, in some sectors, production in terms 
of quality, complexity and efficiency is little changed from twenty years ago and 
equipment is often even older, in some cases dating from the 1960s. This calls into 
question the reason for existence of several General Corporations. 
 
Nevertheless, some General Corporations have done better than others, and most GCs 
have at least a few dynamic and competitive member companies. For example, Mobifone 
and Vietnam Telecom Services Company (Vinaphone), both under VNPT, are significant 
players in the telecoms market. Nha Be Garments Company (Nhabeco), Viet Tien 
Garments Company (Vtec), and Garments Company No. 10 (Garco 10), all under 
Vinatex, are moving into higher quality garments products, expanding exports, and 
developing brands. Tan Mai Paper, nominally under the Vietnam Paper Corporation, is 
moving into specialty couche paper production for calendars and brochures and 
expanding exports while also engaging in mergers and acquisition to increase scale. 
Danang Rubber Company (DRC) under the Vietnam National Chemical Corporation 
(now economic group) has moved into production of large specialty mining tires, which it 
sells to Vinacomin and is beginning to export. It is the only producer of such tires in 
ASEAN.
194
 Nevertheless, the conglomerates as a whole continue to rely for profits on 
natural resource and monopoly rents. Diversification has centred on lucrative ventures in 
residential and commercial properties, industrial estates, resorts, finance and distribution, 
and has for the most part avoided moving up the value chain.  
 
Diversification helps the groups to finance their social policy obligations and achieve 
profit and tax targets. However, scope for risky intra-group lending and speculative 
investment increases with the presence of an intra-group finance company, bank and 
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securities trading company. The attraction of investment in the group‟s core sector wanes 
as the General Corporations transform themselves into investment houses seeking out the 
highest returns available. The increasing financial autonomy of General Corporations 
gives them the power to resist state pressure to invest in slow-gestating industrial and 
export projects that are unprofitable, at least in the short term. A disjuncture has therefore 
emerged between the rhetoric of state-led industrialization and the practice of the state 
sector‟s largest business groups in Vietnam. 
 
Chapter Two reviewed the literature on the development of capitalism in Southeast Asia 
and the warning represented by Yoshihara‟s (1988) view of „technologyless growth‟ in 
the region. This was a growth trajectory dependent on importing foreign technology 
while domestic business groups speculated in real estate and finance rather than develop 
their own technological capabilities. Failure to discipline such groups and direct their 
activities into productive reinvestment in Indonesia led to a derailing of its capitalist 
transformation. Harvard Vietnam Program (2008a) is correct in stating that ownership of 
Vietnam‟s General Corporations and economic groups, whether kept within the state or 
turned private, is a political issue. The ability to impose discipline is the key issue, not 
ownership type. However, to date the state‟s track record in Vietnam is poor.  
 
5.3 Selected Cases 
 
This section reviews twelve firms, emphasizing the variety of state-related accumulation 
processes operating in Vietnam. The history, strategies and growth of these firms will be 
linked to the processes discussed in Chapter Two. Examples of military and Chinese 
Vietnamese firms will also be presented. Yang‟s (2002) double entrepreneurship from the 
China literature is a feature of several cases, in which identification of profitable market 
opportunities is combined with skillful navigation of ambiguous rules and an uncertain 
institutional environment. A particular variation of Yang‟s double entrepreneurship will 
be explored through discussion of three firms contesting the definition of state capital.  
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Insider privatization, described by Staniszkis (1991) and Frydman et al (1998), is also 
relevant. Even though frequently referred to as kleptocracy, the process in Eastern Europe 
was often perfectly legal (Staniszkis 1991, Frydman et al 1998, Lavigne 1999). The same 
is true in Vietnam, even though the Vietnam literature, as in see in Chapter Three, tends 
to emphasize the more disreputable side of these activities.  
 
A third prominent process relates to the first-mover advantages of constrained autonomy 
described by Nolan and Yeung (2001) in the China literature. Some firms were quicker to 
recognize emerging opportunities than others. Seizing these opportunities through 
expansion of sales and distribution networks, upgrading production and establishing 
brands led to capture of significant market position in an increasingly competitive 
environment. This often resulted in a growth trajectory described by Nolan (1996), in 
which constrained but autonomous state enterprises develop interlocking interests with 
other state firms, domestic private firms and foreign companies. The boundary between 
state and private blurs in these firms, making it difficult to distinguish them from 
Dickson‟s (2003) red capitalists.  
 
There is some overlap between the various processes, for example the diversification and 
inter-firm linkages of recombinant property and constrained autonomy. Nevertheless, the 
story of each firm offers unique insights into the mechanisms of state-related 
accumulation as a process of class formation. And while not all firms discussed are 
success stories, the broad pattern of leveraging access to the state remains the central 
feature.  
 
The first two cases are both private seafood companies. The first case, discussed briefly 
in the previous section, is Viet Foods Ltd. 
 
Viet Foods Ltd 
 
Viet Foods Ltd, ranked 185
th
 in the Top 200VN, represents the most straightforward and 
least contentious form of state-related accumulation. The company was founded by Mr. 
Nguyễn Hữu Thanh, a former seafood professor at the University of Agriculture. In 1986 
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he began work with a local state seafood processing company and learned the business, 
along with developing close contacts with several Japanese buyers. After much hassle 
and negotiation, in 1997 he obtained loans from Vietcombank and BIDV to establish his 
own private limited liability company with the intention of supplying specialty seafood 
products to the Japanese market. Construction was completed in 1999 and the firm began 
operating in 2000, using nearly 100 percent imported equipment. Turnover in the first 
year of operation was USD five million. Obtaining further Vietcombank loans and using 
retained earnings, Viet Foods added cold storage facilities and additional production lines 
to meet growing demand. By 2006 the firm had turnover of USD 63 million, supplied 
nearly 40 percent of all the sushi shrimp consumed in Japan, and employed 3,300 
workers.  
 
Viet Foods is the standard transition success story. The entrepreneurial founder identified 
a market opportunity and seized it. Leveraging buyer connections obtained from working 
at a state owned company, similar to the process of „pulling over connections‟ described 
by Wank (1999b), constitutes the primary relation to the state. However, without those 
connections it is doubtful whether Viet Foods would be as successful as it has been.  
 
Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Company 
 
Minh Phu Seafood, ranked 155
th
, represents a more complex version of the Viet Foods 
story. Mr. Lê Văn Quang began business as a seafood broker in 1988, purchasing inputs 
from farmers and renting processing facilities for production and export from local state 
firm Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corp. (Camimex) under the Ca 
Mau People‟s Committee.195 In 1992 he established what would become Minh Phu 
Seafood Corporation after waiting over one year for approval of his private business 
license. He also began applying for approval to build his own processing facilities, but 
would not receive permission for seven years. Nevertheless, having his own business 
allowed him to sign his own contracts and select the state export company with the 
lowest fees rather than relying on only one state firm as intermediary.  
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 Camimex is ranked 126
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 in the Top 200 VN. 
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In 1995 the government decided to forbid renting of SOE processing facilities by private 
firms. Without his own factory, Mr. Quang was forced to establish a formal joint stock 
company, Minh Hai Utuco, in partnership with Camimex. This allowed Minh Phu 
continued access to Camimex production facilities. Minh Phu held a 40 percent stake and 
Mr. Quang was Vice Director of Sales at Minh Hai. However, since Minh Hai was a state 
enterprise with majority shares held by Camimex, relations were difficult and Mr. Quang 
had little influence.  
 
Approval for Minh Phu‟s own factory was granted in 1997 and construction was 
completed in early 1999. No longer dependent on the partnership with Camimex, Mr. 
Quang sold his stake in Minh Hai in 2001. At the end of 2002 Minh Phu transformed into 
a two member limited liability company, and in 2006 became a joint stock company and 
listed on the stock market.  
 
Minh Phu Seafood plans to develop the „complete process‟ in seafood, including input 
stock development, harvesting, processing and exporting. This will facilitate quality 
control, ensure stable supply, reduce production costs and increase price competitiveness. 
In 2004 it established M Seafood in the U.S. to distribute its products and manage cash 
flow. While pursuing vertical integration, Minh Phu also plans to expand into real estate, 
ports, banking, investment funds and equity investments. 
 
In January of 2007, Mr. Quang‟s wife, Ms. Chu Thị Bình, was listed as the richest 
woman in Vietnam based on her shares held in Minh Phu. Their daughter, Ms. Lê Thị 
Dịu Minh, was ranked sixth (Vietnamnet 2007a). In March of 2007, Mr. Quang, referred 
to as the „King of Seafood‟, was listed as the ninth richest person in Vietnam (previously 
he was fourth) and his wife was tenth, based on the value of their shares in Minh Phu 
(Vietnamnet 2007b). 
 
Minh Phu Seafood represents a curious form of state-related accumulation. Although 
renting state enterprise processing facilities could be construed as a form of insider 
privatization, Mr. Quang did not begin business inside a state firm. Furthermore, this was 
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not strictly illegal until several years after Minh Phu was established. Mr. Quang was 
forced to interact with the state due to unfavourable rules and attitudes towards private 
sector activity. It was necessary in order to conduct business, rather than being a source 
of advantage and privilege. Nevertheless, as with Viet Foods, the early growth of Minh 
Phu did depend on accessing the state, and the skills, contacts and knowledge of the 
business served Minh Phu very well once the business climate improved. In this sense, 
Mr. Quang and the rise of Minh Phu Seafood is closer to Yang‟s (2002) double 
entrepreneurship from the China literature rather than the more nefarious accumulation 




The Viet Foods and Minh Phu Seafood cases demonstrate the broad definition of „state-
related accumulation‟ employed here. It is not always based in illegality or corruption, 
does not always involve cadres or bureaucrats leveraging privilege from inside the state, 
and is not always necessarily advantageous. However, for accumulation to occur, 
particularly in the initial stages, some linkage to the state was necessary.  
 
The next three cases involve conflicts over definitions of own capital (vốn tự có) and 
state capital (vốn nhà nước) in state enterprises, with implications for ownership and 
control of these firms. As discussed in Chapter Three, the definition of own capital has a 
long and convoluted history, culminating in official abolition of the category in the 2003 
State Enterprise Law.
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 Nevertheless, it remains a source of tension and conflict, the 
outcome of which appears to vary from firm to firm. 
 
Dak Lak Rubber Company (Dakruco) 
 
The first case is Dak Lak Rubber Company (Dakruco), a rubber producer and exporter 
ranked 170
th
 in the Top 200 VN. Dakruco is a local state enterprise under the authority of 
the Dak Lak People‟s Committee and is one of the few rubber companies in the Top 200 
not under Geruco, the national rubber group. The entity that would become Dakruco was 
established in 1975 by taking control of rubber and coffee plantations in Dak Lak 
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province in the Central Highlands of the former southern regime. In 1981 the rubber and 
coffee plantations were separated into two different enterprise unions and in 1993 
Dakruco was created from the rubber union under the reorganization of state enterprises 
associated with Decree 388.
198
 Dakruco used the opportunity provided by Decree 388 to 
streamline its workforce, reorganize its management structure and invest in expanding 
and upgrading its processing facilities. The result was steadily increasing output, 
productivity, revenues and profits. In 2004 Dakruco obtained a business license to 
operate in Laos and began investing in rubber plantations in Laos in 2005. In 2006 
Dakruco began a similar operation in Cambodia.
199
 In 2005 Dakruco was approved to 
transform into a Parent-Child Corporation under Decree 153.
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 As part of this process, it 
is equitizing its subsidiary units, including its Rubber Wood Processing Company. It has 
plans to develop a rubber finance company, establish an eco-tourism business, and has 
already begun investing in development of high rise office buildings. Dakruco currently 




The contentious element of the Dakruco story concerns the estimation of the amount of 
state capital in the company. Mr. Huỳnh Văn Khiết, director of Dakruco, maintains that 
state capital only amounts to ten percent of total capital in the company.
202
 In 1988 acting 
Prime Minister Võ Văn Kiệt authorized a loan from East Germany to Dakruco valued at 
USD 10 million, to be delivered in the form of steel, urea (fertilizer) and other materials. 
However, following the reunification of Germany in 1990 it was not clear who Dakruco 
should pay back. The decision was taken to consider this loan as own capital since it did 
not come directly from the Vietnamese state. Furthermore, after 1993 Dakruco did not 
receive any additional state budget support. The company required significant investment 
funds to turn itself around, but was denied state funding and Dakruco was forced to 
borrow from banks. These loans were considered own capital. As part of the 1993 
                                                 
198
 See Chapter Three for discussion of Decree 388. 
199
 Geruco is also moving into Laos and Cambodia, but the Geruco move into Laos occurred after Dakruco. 
200
 See Chapter Three for discussion of Decree 153. 
201
 http://www.dakruco.com/english/index_eng.asp.  
202
 In addition to being director of Dakruco, Mr. Khiết is also president of the Laotian and Cambodian 
subsidiaries, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Rubber Association and Chairman of the Dak Lak People‟s 
Rubber Credit Fund. He also holds a PhD. 
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reorganization and the infusion of bank loans, Dakruco was revalued and state capital 
determined to be ten percent of total.  
 
The benefit of the Parent-Child corporate structure is that proceeds from equitization of 
subsidiaries go to the parent firm, in this case Dakruco. It is only when the parent 
company itself equitizes that the issue of own versus state capital will become important. 
If the Dak Lak People‟s Committee agrees that Dakruco only has ten percent state 
capital, then 90 percent of Dakruco will be held by Mr. Khiết, the other senior managers, 
and employees of the company. Since share allocation is determined by seniority, Mr. 
Khiết stands to inherit the firm. It remains to be seen if this will in fact occur, particularly 
since the category „own capital‟ no longer officially exists. 
 
Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co (Protrade) 
 
The second case involves Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co (Protrade), a 
local state enterprise under the authority of the Binh Duong People‟s Committee and 
ranked 124
th
 in the Top 200 VN. Mr. Nguyễn Văn Minh, chairman and CEO of Protrade, 
began working in 1976 for a trading subsidiary of the local state Vifaco Animal 
Husbandry Company. In 1982 he borrowed a small sum (four million VND) from the 
welfare fund of his firm to establish a rubber processing company, the predecessor of 
Protrade. He repaid the loan in four years. With an eye for profitable ventures, he 
established an ice water factory in 1985, a garments export company in 1989, and a 
carton paper and packaging company in 1991. In 1992 Mr. Minh entered into a joint 
venture with a Singaporean firm to establish a golf course in Binh Duong. His firm 
contributed over USD 3.5 million, part of which involved conversion of land, and holds a 
25 percent stake in the venture. In 1993 he established a rubber wood processing factory. 
Also in 1993, Mr. Minh obtained the license to transform his business operations into 
Protrade. In 1995 Protrade contributed nearly USD 15 million to a joint venture creating 
Dutch Lady Vietnam, in which Protrade holds 30 percent. Dutch Lady is ranked 112
th
 in 
the Top 200 VN and has almost 40 percent of the domestic market in dairy products. Mr. 
Minh is the chairman of Dutch Lady. He was introduced to the Dutch company behind 
Dutch Lady in 1993 by his friend, the director of Vifaco.  
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In 2000, Protrade acquired a majority 51 percent stake in Thuan An General Import 
Export Company. Mr. Minh is now the chairman. In 2002 Mr. Minh purchased Ben 
Thanh Rubber Company and merged it into Protrade. In 2005 he did the same with his 
old employer, acquiring Vifaco and incorporating it into Protrade. In 2006 Protrade 
established the Hanh Phuc International Women and Children Hospital to serve high end 
Vietnamese and foreign clients. Protrade is the largest investor in the joint stock 
company, in which Thomson Medical of Singapore is also an investor. Mr. Minh is the 
chairman of the hospital and his daughter is a corporate director. Also in 2006, Protrade 
received permission to transform into a Parent-Child Corporation. In addition, Protrade is 
an investor in the Geruco member Dau Tieng Rubber Company project in Laos.
203
 The 
firm also obtained a license for a second golf course in 2006, and is looking for investors 
for a third golf course. Mr. Minh is also exploring the possibility of establishing a 
racetrack with an Australian investor.  
 
The evolution of Protrade‟s investments follow the emerging profitable opportunities in 
Vietnam. It is no accident that Protrade began in natural resource based and labour-
intensive manufacturing and progressively moved into services. Mr. Minh described three 
criteria for deciding upon investments. First, the business activity had to be characterized 
by little or no competitive pressure, in particular he would not enter activities in which 
foreign firms were operating. Second, the investment had to be within the financial 
resources of the company. Considering the size and scope of Protrade‟s investments, joint 
venture contributions, and acquisitions, this does not seem to have been much of a 
problem. Third, he had to be able to invest sufficient capital to achieve scale and ensure 
quality.  
 
However, Mr. Minh was the victim of timing. When he went into business in 1982 he 
could only establish a state enterprise. This created a conflict over ownership of Protrade 
that continues to this day. In response to Question 1.3 of the questionnaire, Protrade self 
identified as a state enterprise in which the state held 100 percent. In response to 
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Question 8.11, Protrade reported that state capital in the company was 57 percent of total 
capital.
204
 When asked to clarify, the following explanation was given. Mr. Minh stated 
that Protrade is a state enterprise because the original loan used to establish the business 
in 1982 was borrowed from an SOE and is considered state capital. Furthermore, Mr. 
Minh is technically a state official appointed to manage Protrade. Even though he repaid 
the initial loan and subsequently did not receive any further state budget support, he 
could not declare his firm a private company. He also expressed a responsibility to the 
state and to his employees. Furthermore, since all after tax profits are now considered 
state capital, Protrade is an SOE even though all of its development occurred through use 
of „own‟ funds, primarily retained earnings and loans. However, when asked about state 
approval of business decisions, Mr. Minh stated since Protrade‟s expansion was due to 
own capital, the state – in the form of the Binh Duong People‟s Committee – was not 
involved.  
 
These issues came to a head in 2004, when Protrade equitized one of its subsidiaries. 
Officially, the proceeds from this equitization should have gone to the Binh Duong 
People‟s Committee. However, Mr. Minh successfully petitioned the People‟s Committee 
to keep the proceeds within Protrade on the grounds that no state capital was involved. 
Now that Protrade is a Parent-Child Corporation, this is no longer a problem and all the 
proceeds from equitizing subsidiaries will go to Protrade as the parent company. 
However, uncertainty remains when Protrade itself transforms. Mr. Minh plans to again 
petition the Binh Duong People‟s Committee to keep the proceeds on the grounds that it 
was his own money and effort that built the business. As with Dakruco, it remains to be 
seen if he will be successful. The overwhelming impression from the interview was that 
Mr. Minh did not consider this an insurmountable problem. 
 
Like Minh Phu Seafood, Dakruco and Protrade are also examples of class formation 
through Yang‟s (2002) double entrepreneurship. However, state-related accumulation 
figures more prominently. Dakruco essentially received USD 10 million of materials for 
free. The role of land contributions in Protrade joint ventures explains part of its ability to 
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contribute such large sums to these endeavors, and permission to keep the proceeds from 
equitization indicates a close relationship to the People‟s Committee. In addition, both 
Dakruco and Protrade are successfully using the Parent-Child corporate form to 
temporarily shield revenues from the state, even though both will have to face the issue 
when the time comes to transform the parent company. Nevertheless, the impression from 
both interviews was of an entrepreneur committed to his company and his workers built 
up on their own without state support, even though both firms are officially classified, for 
now, as state enterprises.  
 
Danang Sea Products Import Export Corporation (Seaprodex Danang) 
 
Dakruco and Protrade stand in stark contrast to the Danang Sea Products Import Export 
Corporation (Seaprodex Danang), ranked 99
th
 in the Top 200 VN and a member of the 
GC Vietnam National Sea Products Corporation (Seaprodex). Established as an „imex‟ in 
1983, Seaprodex Danang acquired its first processing factory in 1985.
205
 In 1988 it was 
grouped under the central state organization that would become Seaprodex Corporation. 
It was also part of a pilot programme experimenting with self balancing and profit 
maximization in state enterprises. The firm was selected to participate in the programme 
after the then company director petitioned Mr. Võ Văn Kiệt for inclusion. Although the 
enterprise was established with a small amount of state capital, it was then directed to 
increase its capital on its own through retained earnings and bank borrowing. In addition, 
it was granted decision making authority over its foreign exchange earnings, one of only 
a few state enterprises at that time that did not need to remit foreign exchange to the state. 
Although this mechanism was later applied to most firms in Vietnam, at the time 
Seaprodex Danang had more operational independence than most other state enterprises. 
This was controversial and the firm was subjected to multiple inspections and audits by 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice.  
 
In early 1991 the government issued a decision regarding determination of state capital in 
state enterprises. Since Seaprodex Danang was involved in the complicated pilot 
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 See Chapter Three for discussion of the „imexes‟. In 1993 Seaprodex exported just over six percent of 
Vietnamese marine products and state import-export companies exported approximately seventy percent of 
total seafood exports (Fforde 1994). 
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programme, the level of state capital in the firm was not set until 1992. The government 
determined that all profits made under the pilot programme belonged to the state. 
However, the then director of the firm refused to sign the document, since he had built 
the company up on his own without state support. He lost this battle and ultimately had to 
accept classification of Seaprodex Danang capital as state capital. 
 
There is an interesting issue of timing here. It is one thing for Dakruco and Protrade to 
contest own versus state capital in the 2000s and quite another for Seaprodex Danang to 
attempt this in the early 1990s at a much earlier stage of reform. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the early 1990s was a period of recentralization from the perspective of firms, 
complicating the Seaprodex Danang attempt to claim its capital as its own. Another 
importance difference between these firms is the authority level of their state controlling 
institution. Dakruco and Protrade are both local state enterprises under provincial 
People‟s Committees while Seaprodex Danang is a central state enterprise under 
ministerial and General Corporation supervision. This central affiliation continues to 
hamper Seaprodex Danang. Technically, since Seaprodex Danang is not in a strategic 
sector, Seaprodex Corporation should sell its state majority share as Seaprodex Danang 
transforms to operate under the Enterprise Law. However, Seaprodex Danang accounts 
for one quarter of total revenues of the parent corporation and Seaprodex Corporation 
does not want to relinquish control. It is not yet clear how this issue will be resolved. 
Nevertheless, Seaprodex Danang demonstrates that not all firms are winning the contest 
over ownership and control surrounding the definitions of own versus state capital. 
 
The next case involves a former independent central level state enterprise (i.e. not a 
member of a General Corporation). It is similar to Dakruco and Protrade in terms of a 
long serving founding member dominating the company, but does not involve a conflict 
over own versus state capital. Instead, the firm illustrates a process of formalizing de 
facto ownership and control through legal insider privatization similar to that described 
by Staniszkis (1991) and Frydman et al (1998) in Eastern Europe. The firm is the 
Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology (FPT), ranked 12
th
 in the Top 200 
VN. 
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Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology (FPT) 
 
FPT was established in 1988 as the Food Processing Technology state enterprise under 
the Ministry of Science and Technology.
206
 The firm was founded by Mr. Trương Gia 
Bình and a group of friends who had studied mathematics, physics and information 
technology in Russia. Mr. Bình married (and later divorced) the daughter of General Võ 
Nguyên Giáp. The group wanted to “connect Vietnam and Russia to help Vietnam 
develop and start making money.”  
 
The true origins of FPT are subject to dispute. The sanitized version provided in the 
interview attributes FPT‟s move into software development as the result of an upstairs 
neighbour fortuitously in need of information technology (IT) services. However, two 
reliable sources, both of whom claim to know Mr. Bình personally, remarked that FPT 
began by smuggling computers.
207
 Either way, in 1990 the company was renamed the 
Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology, which included a software 
development division, and began officially distributing Olivetti computers.  
 
In 1994 FPT became the official distributor of IBM products in Vietnam. In 1997 it 
established FPT Telecom.
208
 In 1998 FPT became the first internet service provider in 
Vietnam and began to officially distribute Oracle products. In 2000 the firm became the 
distributor for Samsung mobile phones in Vietnam and in 2001 it established the 
VNExpress online news service.  
 
The year 2002 was pivotal for FPT‟s development. Not only did FPT become the official 
partner of HP in Vietnam, it also equitized into a joint stock company. The proceeds from 
the equitization were remitted to the state and state capital was initially held at a majority 
51 percent. Mr. Bình held ten percent of the company. However, in the interview it was 
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 There are discrepancies between the company history provided in Section Two of the firm questionnaire 
and the history of the firm listed on its website (http://www.fpt.com.vn/en/) and in its 2008 annual report 
(FPT Corporation 2008). When differences arise, preference is given to the website and annual report 
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the accumulation process.   
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 FPT Telecom was equitized in 2005 and was transformed into a corporation under FPT in 2008. 
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emphasized that the senior management had “been running the company like a private 
company” since its inception, that there was no state involvement in management 
decisions, and the role of the supervising ministry was simply to facilitate FPT‟s 
operations. Furthermore, after FPT‟s equitization the firm‟s growth exploded. During the 
interview it was remarked that this was not a coincidence.  
 
In 2003 FPT Software was formally established along with several other subsidiaries. In 
2004 FPT Software equitized, and FPT became a Gold Partner of Cisco Systems and 
began distribution of Nokia mobile phones. In 2005 FPT became a Gold Partner of 
Microsoft and established FPT Software Japan Ltd. In 2006 the firm entered into a 
strategic partnership with Microsoft, FPT University was established, Texas Pacific 
Group and Intel Capital invested in the firm and FPT listed on the HCMC stock market. 
Following the infusion of funds, nine subsidiaries were established in 2007: 
 
 FPT Capital 
 FPT Securities 
 FPT Land 
 FPT Retail 
 FPT Information Services 
 FPT Hoa Lac High-Tech Park 
 FPT Media and Entertainment 
 FPT Promotion  
 FPT Online Services 
 
FPT also established Asia Pacific FPT Software in Singapore the same year. In 2008 FPT 
was renamed FPT Corporation. 
 
In 2008 FPT also became a founding member of Tien Phong Bank along with 
Mobiphone, a mobile services provider and member of the state owned Vietnam Post and 
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Telecommunications Group (VNPT). In the same year FPT Software expanded to 
Malaysia, France, the U.S. and Australia and engaged in software outsourcing for IBM, 
HP, Sanyo, Hitachi, and Panasonic.  
 
In its 2008 annual report, FPT stated that it surpassed the USD one billion revenue mark, 
had over 8,600 employees, 12 major subsidiaries and 40 additional member companies, 
and was the largest private company in Vietnam. This statement is correct since the state 
share in the company, now managed by the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), 
dropped to just over seven percent. Mr. Bình remains the largest shareholder in FPT, with 
just over eight percent of shares in the company (FPT Corporation 2008).  
 
The high market capitalization of FPT has made Mr. Bình and the other senior managers 
of FPT very rich. In the March 2007 richest people in Vietnam list reported by 
Vietnamnet (2007b), the top four richest persons were all senior FPT personnel, and five 
FPT senior managers were in the top ten. Mr. Bình, FPT Chairman, was ranked first.
209
 
Mr. Lê Quang Tiến, Mr. Bùi Quang Ngọc and Mr. Hoàng Minh Châu, all FPT Vice 
Chairmen, were ranked second through fourth. Mr. Đỗ Cao Bảo, a member of the FPT 




FPT represents one of the clearer examples of class formation through state-related 
accumulation. Early high level connections and questionable business activities gave FPT 
its start. It is also one of the clearer examples of the dynamism that can result from de 
facto autonomy, of running a nominally state firm like a private company. Prior to 
equitization, FPT was already a leading company in Vietnam. Formalizing ownership and 
control through legal insider privatization resulted in further explosive growth since the 
founders now had a de jure direct stake in the success of the company. It also made the 
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 He has since been challenged for the top spot by Mr. Đoàn Nguyên Đức of Hoàng Anh Gia Lai 
(HAGL). Mr. Đức is the first person in Vietnam to have his own private jet (Thanh Nien News 2009b). 
Unfortunately, HAGL was not in the 2006 Top 200 VN and was not included in the research project. In the 
2009 richest list, Mr. Bình is listed eighth. Due to wild fluctuations in the stock market, the rankings 
change. The specific rankings themselves are less relevant than the presence of these individuals on them. 
To ensure consistency with the timing of the firm interviews, the 2007 list has been used throughout.   
210
 In addition, two senior female FPT managers were included in the January 2007 top 20 richest women 
list (Vietnamnet 2007a). 
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founders very wealthy. FPT has now become the leading IT firm and the largest private 
firm in Vietnam. It has expanded internationally and is partnered with some of the top IT 
firms in the world. While some foreign observers question its ability to move into higher 
value added services, the growth of FPT is nevertheless phenomenal.  
 
Vietnam Dairy Products Company (Vinamilk) 
 
Vietnam Dairy Products Company (Vinamilk), ranked just below FPT at 13
th
 in the Top 
200 VN, offers a contrasting story. Ms. Mai Kiều Liên, Chairwoman and General 
Director, has been in charge since 1992 and worked at the company since 1976, but 
neither she nor any of the other senior Vietnamese personnel appear on any of the rich 
lists, even though Vinamilk equitized in 2003 and listed on the HCMC stock exchange in 
2006. Ms. Liên graduated from the Moscow University of Meat and Milk Processing in 
1976 and received further training in economic management in 1984 from the University 
of Economics in Leningrad. She also holds a certificate of Government Management 
from the National Political Institute in Vietnam (Vinamilk Corporation 2008). 
Furthermore, she was a member of the Communist Party Central Committee between 
1996 and 2001.
211
 Vinamilk represents the variety of state-related accumulation processes 
operating in Vietnam. 
 
Vinamilk was established as the Southern Coffee and Milk Company in 1976 following 
nationalization of four factories: Thong Nhat Dairy, formerly belonging to a Chinese 
corporation; Truong Tho Dairy, formerly belonging to Friesland; Dielac, under 
construction and formerly owned by Nestle; and Bien Hoa Coffee.
212
 It operated under 
the General Department of Food. In 1978 there was a re-combination of ministries to 
create the Ministry of Food Industry. Vinamilk was transferred to this ministry and 
changed its name to the United Enterprises of Milk, Coffee and Candies Company No. 1. 
Due to this government restructuring, all food product companies were assigned to the 
Ministry of Food Industry. Two existing but previously independent factories were 
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 http://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mai_Ki%E1%BB%81u_Li%C3%AAn.  
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 Friesland is the Dutch company that returned to Vietnam and joint ventured with Protrade to create 
Dutch Lady, Vinamilk‟s main competitor in the domestic market. 
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In 1988 Vinamilk was the first company to introduce powdered milk into the Vietnamese 
market. It also began to build its brand name and distribute nationwide once internal 
barriers to trade were removed.
214
 In 1989 the Ministry of Food Industry was separated 
into the Ministry of Food (MoFD) and the Ministry of Industry (MoI). The Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA) was also created. Vinamilk and dairy products fell under Industry. 
Food fell under MoFD and coffee under MoA. So Lubico Candy was returned to HCMC 
and Bich Chi Nutrient Powder was returned to Dong Thap, both under MoFD. Bien Hoa 
Coffee was returned to Dong Nai, under MoA.
215
 In 1991 Vinamilk launched launched 
Ultra High Temperature (UHT) processed milk and yogurt in Vietnam. 
 
In 1992, the Milk, Coffee and Candy Company No. 1 changed its name to Vietnam Dairy 
Products (Vinamilk), under the Ministry of Light Industry in yet another ministry move. 
In 1994 Vinamilk built a dairy factory in Hanoi to better serve the northern market. In 
1996 Vinamilk created the Binh Dinh Dairy Joint Venture with Dong Lanh Quy Nhon 
JSC to better serve the central region and in 2000 Vinamilk opened the Can Tho Dairy 
Factory to better serve the Mekong Delta.  
 
In 2004 Vinamilk acquired Saigon Milk JSC. In 2005 the company bought out Dong 
Lanh Quy Nhon to become the sole owner of Binh Dinh Dairy. In the same year 
Vinamilk opened a dairy factory in Nghe An and entered into a joint venture with 
SABMiller. In 2006 Vinamilk acquired Tuyen Quang Dairy Farm and opened An Khang, 
a health clinic in HCMC. In 2007 the firm acquired a controlling (55 percent) interest in 
Lam Son Milk Company Ltd and its JV with SABMiller launched Zorok beer.
216
 Since 
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 For a brief time Vinamilk itself was under MoA. There was a plan to link dairy farms and milk 
production but this did not happen. The argument was that “milk had something to do with cows, and this 
[cows] means agriculture.” 
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 SABMiller bought out Vinamilk in 2009. 
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2003 foreign investors have acquired stakes in Vinamilk, including Fraser and Neave 
Dairy of Singapore, Deutsche Bank, Dragon Capital and Arisaig. As with many 
companies in Vietnam, Vinamilk now also has a real estate subsidiary, International Real 
Estate Company Ltd, which has its own real estate subsidiary, Victory Real Estate 
(Vinamilk Corporation 2008). Vinamilk currently has nearly 40 percent of the dairy 
market in Vietnam and one of the top brand names in the country.  
 
In its 2008 annual report, Vinamilk described itself as one of largest private firms in 
Vietnam. As with FPT, this is correct since the state share in Vinamilk, managed by 
SCIC, dropped to a minority 47.6 percent.
217
 What is interesting about Vinamilk is not its 
ownership type – whether classified as state or private – but rather that its expansion 
began so early, over a decade before it equitized. Vinamilk identified and seized market 
opportunities in ways similar to Shougang Steel and Sanjiu Pharmaceuticals in China as 
part of what Nolan and Yeung (2001) described as the first-mover advantages of 
constrained autonomy. Vinamilk‟s expansion is also an example of the growth pattern 
described by Nolan (1996) in China, in which constrained but autonomous state 
enterprises develop linkages with other firms to the degree that it becomes difficult to 
distinguish them from Dickson‟s (2003) red capitalists.  
 
When asked about the repeated changes of its supervising ministry, Vinamilk simply 
stated that it “made no difference.” Vinamilk also resisted becoming a General 
Corporation in order to focus its financial strength on its core business. Vinamilk felt that 
the company structure, rather than the state corporation model, was better suited to 
expanding its dairy business. This self-determination contrasts with Seaprodex Danang 
and was perhaps a function of Ms. Liên‟s standing in the Party.218 Interestingly, Vinamilk 
now believes the private corporation model to be useful, having transformed into 
Vinamilk Corporation in 2008 while also expanding into real estate. Vinamilk 
demonstrates the variety in Vietnam‟s state-related accumulation processes and 
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 Ms. Liên is listed as one of the representatives of SCIC, and therefore state capital, on the Vinamilk 
board (Vinamilk Corporation 2008). 
 211 
highlights the importance of looking at firms rather than only individuals as part of class 
formation. 
 
The next three cases involve Chinese Vietnamese firms, but with very different histories 
and relations to the state. As with most of the firms presented in this section, these firms 
highlight both class formation processes described in Chapter Two and elements of the 
reform process in Vietnam discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
Cho Lon Investment and Import Export Corporation (Cholimex) 
 
The first case is the Cho Lon Investment and Import Export Corporation (Cholimex), 
ranked just outside the top 200 at 216
th
 in the 2006 Top 200 VN.
219
 Cholimex was 
established in 1981 as a proto-joint stock company involving state officials from Ho Chi 
Minh City‟s District Five, known as Chợ Lớn and the historic centre of the Chinese in 
Vietnam, and the city‟s Chinese Vietnamese. As discussed in Chapter Three, after 1975 
the HCMC People‟s Committee realized that much of the existing production capacity in 
the city remained viable but lacked raw materials, inputs and spare parts. The new 
economic policies were not reinvigorating the city‟s economy. In addition, many of the 
pre-1975 entrepreneurs were in re-education camps or, by 1981, had fled the country as 
part of the boat people exodus. Lacking the skills, equipment and capital to jumpstart 
production itself, the HCMC PPC turned to remaining Chinese Vietnamese to get the 
economy moving again. Cholimex was created as part of this process. 
 
Cholimex was managed by three representatives from the District Five People‟s 
Committee and three local Chinese Vietnamese entrepreneurs. The District Five officials 
acted as a bridge between the HCMC PPC and local Chinese Vietnamese. The state 
contributed land, administrative approval and protection to engage in business. Local 
Chinese Vietnamese contributed their overseas business connections and own capital. 
Their investments were valued in gold, in return for which they received shares in 
Cholimex. 
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Wehrfritz (2006) and briefly in Rama (2008). 
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The experiment was immediately a success. Accessing pre-1975 overseas Chinese 
networks in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, Cholimex imported raw materials and 
inputs, including yarn for textiles, flour for food processing and spare parts. These were 
supplied to Cholimex factories and other factories in HCMC. Cholimex then exported the 
output of many of these factories. Imports were also exchanged with farmers for 
agricultural and aquacultural products and herbal medicines for export. Since Cholimex 
was not allowed to handle foreign exchange, most of these transactions were trade in 
kind. However, Cholimex did sell some goods directly to local consumers.  
 
Although the freedom granted to the company provided a spur to the local economy it 
also undermined the planning and price system. In 1982 Hanoi clamped down on non-
plan activity and in 1983 the company surrendered its right to trade to a newly 
established state trading enterprise, Imexco.
220
 At the same time, Cholimex was 
„nationalized‟. The state took control of the firm, buying back the shares contributed by 
local Chinese Vietnamese. However, the management staff, predominately Chinese 
Vietnamese, did not change.  
 
Cholimex remained subordinate to Imexco until 1989. Although selling to the same 
markets and even to the same buyers, all exports had to go through Imexco.
221
 This 
hampered business activities but forced Cholimex to focus on expanding and upgrading 
its production facilities. In 1983 it upgraded two of its original workshops, the Export 
Marine Products and Foods Processing Enterprise and the Agricultural Export Processing 
Factory. It also had factories producing medicines and doing electronics assembly and in 
1986 it established a garments factory. 
 
Following the resumption of direct foreign trade in 1989, Cholimex was renamed the 
District Five Investment Import Export Company. At the same time, the Export Marine 
Products and Foods Processing Enterprise, which would eventually become Cholimex 
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 Cholimex also managed to sneak its „brand‟ onto product labels, using „Q5‟ to indicate Cholimex 
products exported by Imexco in order to maintain relationships with overseas buyers. 
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Food JSC, began to produce chilli sauce and other condiments, becoming one of the top 
brands in Vietnam. In 1993 the company was renamed under Decree 388, becoming the 
Cho Lon Investment Import Export Company and continued to diversify. In 1995 it 
established the Cholimex Business Centre, specializing in leasing office space and 
providing business services to the influx of foreign investors. In 1997 it opened the Vinh 
Loc Industrial Zone to lease land and office space to foreign and domestic firms. In 2000 
it equitized its medical factory, creating Cho Lon Pharmaceutical JSC, in which 
Cholimex retains 24 percent. It also established a construction and real estate company. 
In 2003 Cholimex opened the Can Gio Aquaculture Trading Centre and in 2006 it 
became a Parent-Child corporation focused on investing in real estate and industry. It 
now has over twelve subsidiaries and has plans to open a securities trading company in 
the near future.  
 
Cholimex is a bit of an oddity. It began as an innovative public-private partnership but 
regressed into a fairly standard local state enterprise, real estate subsidiary and all. In this 
respect, Cholimex is similar to Seaprodex Danang. What began arguably as a „red hat‟ 
firm – in which a quasi-private firm operated with protective cover from the state – 
became a simple „red‟ enterprise.222 However, the firm also demonstrates some of the 
dynamism of constrained autonomy shown by Vinamilk, for example in the popular 
products of Cholimex Food. What remains unique about Cholimex is the „buyout‟ of the 
original Chinese Vietnamese investors, upon whom the company was built. In its early 
years over half the employees at Cholimex were Chinese Vietnamese but now this figure 
stands at only 20 percent. And while the original management stayed through the 
„nationalization‟ and Imexco phases of the company‟s history, there are no longer any 
Chinese Vietnamese amongst Cholimex‟s senior management. The current Vietnamese 
senior managers have been in their positions for over ten years. Cholimex highlights the 
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 214 
Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Ltd (Biti’s) 
 
The second case is Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Ltd (Biti‟s), ranked 158th in 
the Top 200 VN. Biti‟s has been held up as an example of the dynamism of the emerging 
private sector in Vietnam (e.g. Trần Khánh 1993, Hiebert 1996). As will be seen, it is 
indeed a great success story and was one of the most ambitious and motivated firms 
interviewed. However, the story is more complex than simple private sector dynamism. 
 
In 1982 two Chinese born in Vietnam, Mr. Vưu Khải Thành and his wife, established two 
small rubber sandal production workshops, Binh Tien and Van Thanh. Together they 
employed twenty workers. Mr. Thành had previously worked in his cousin‟s footwear 
firm and decided to strike out on his own. At that time, many materials were unavailable 
in Vietnam and only rubber was sourced domestically. Mr. Thành had to smuggle or 
purchase smuggled chemicals and other inputs. Products were of low quality. 
 
The workshops supplied footwear to the military and exported via government contracts. 
For example, Vietnam had received a Soviet loan to build a hydroelectric plant. Vietnam 
repaid this loan in consumer goods, with Biti‟s assigned to produce footwear and export 
to the Soviet Union as part of the loan repayment scheme. Biti‟s was compensated from 
the state budget. It also exported by selling to the organization that would eventually 
become Vinatex, which exported on behalf of Biti‟s. In 1986 the two workshops were 
merged into the Binh Tien Rubber Cooperative, now producing higher quality slippers 
sold both in Vietnam and exported to Eastern Europe. In only four years, Biti‟s went 
from twenty to 1,000 employees. Also in 1986, the Biti‟s brand was launched. 
 
In 1989, the year central planning was formally abolished, Biti‟s became the first private 
company in Vietnam to be given an import and export license. The firm had lobbied hard 
for three years to attain approval, and was eventually selected to participate in a pilot 
programme allowing private companies to engage directly in foreign trade. Biti‟s was 
selected for the programme because it had experience producing for export and was also 
involved in charitable work and other social activities. 
 
 215 
Prior to 1989, Biti‟s exported predominately to the Soviet Union. After 1989, it expanded 
to France, Germany and Spain. At roughly the same time as Vinamilk, Biti‟s also began 
to see the opportunities emerging in the growing domestic market. However, it was easier 
to export since this only required production and packaging. Biti‟s recognized that in 
order to succeed in the domestic market, it would need a sales and distribution system. 
 
In 1990 Biti‟s upgraded its production facilities with Taiwanese technology, producing 
sandals and slippers. With this upgrade, Biti‟s could now produce higher quality footwear 
to compete with Thai imports. It established a branch office first in Ho Chi Minh City, 
and then in Hanoi and other provinces and cities, all done under the Biti‟s brand. It took 
five years to capture market share from Thai imports. 
 
In 1991 Biti‟s became the first private Vietnamese company to establish a joint venture 
with a foreign firm, contributing land and capital to take a 45 percent stake in the 
Taiwanese invested Sun Kuan JV producing indoor slippers.
223
 In 1992 Biti‟s 
transformed into a limited liability company, Binh Tien Imex Corp Ltd, with 2,300 
employees.
224
 In 1993, Biti‟s recorded USD 15 million in sales of shoes and sandals and 
was the largest producer and exporter of footwear in Vietnam (Hiebert 1996). In 1994, 
following the thaw in relations between Vietnam and the U.S., Biti‟s became the first 
Vietnamese firm to open an office in the United States (Hiebert 1996, Templer 1998). In 
1995, to meet growing demand, Biti‟s established Binh Tien Dong Nai Imex Corp Ltd 
(Dona Biti‟s), producing sport shoes and leather footwear using Korean technology. 
Biti‟s itself expanded into production of ladies fashion footwear. Biti‟s products had been 
sold in China since the middle 1990s, and in 2000 Biti‟s opened four representative 
offices in China.  
 
In 2002 Biti‟s began diversifying into real estate development, hotels, tourism and office 
space rental with the establishment of the Central Highlands Trade Centre. It also began 
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construction of the Lao Cai International Border Gate Trade Centre on the Chinese 
border, which was completed in 2006. These are multi-function complexes that include a 
trade centre, office space and hotels. In 2003 Biti‟s established a training centre in Dong 
Nai to improve the skills and design capacity of its workforce, and in 2004 it established 
an investment and construction joint venture with a Chinese partner. The Northern Trade 
Centre in Ha Dong, now part of Hanoi, was established in 2005 and in 2006 the Danang 
Business Centre was opened. Also in 2006, Biti‟s launched the Vosto brand using Italian 
technology to produce more expensive, higher quality footwear. The remainder of the 
Vietnamese market was covered by the Western Branch, established in 2008, and the 
Southern Branch, established in Nha Trang in 2009. 
 
The Biti‟s trademark has now existed for over 25 years and is consistently voted one of 
the top brands in Vietnam. Biti‟s now employs over 9,000 workers and has 4,500 sales 
agents and shops selling its products in Vietnam. In addition, Biti‟s exports to over 40 
countries, with its brand registered in over 30 countries. It has 25 distributors and over 
300 sales agents in China and now has offices in Laos and Cambodia. In addition to 
upgrading its footwear products and expanding its real estate, tourism and trade ventures, 
Biti‟s plans to diversify into other consumer goods such as wallets, purses, hats and 
garments. Mr. Thành and his wife have come a long way from two small rubber sandal 
workshops, in the process creating one of the most dynamic firms in Vietnam. 
 
The early history of Biti‟s, as a supplier to the military and participant in Soviet loan 
repayment programmes, is not included in existing accounts of the firm‟s origins. The 
focus has instead been on its path breaking moves into direct import and export and 
foreign joint venture (e.g. Hiebert 1996, Beresford and Đặng Phong 2000). Mr. Thành 
and the company are rightly applauded for their excellent management of the firm and its 
rapid expansion and growth. However, it is simply inconceivable that the first license for 
a private company to engage directly in foreign trade or enter a foreign joint venture were 
not politicized, particularly in the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the end of 
central planning. The stream of high level visitors to Biti‟s – including General Võ 
Nguyên Giáp, current Party General Secretary and former chairman of the National 
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Assembly Mr. Nông Đức Mạnh, former Prime Minister Mr. Phan Văn Khải, a Chinese 
Vice Prime Minister who was also the former Party Secretary of Shanghai, and a Prime 
Minister of Laos – testify to this. There is nothing illegal here, and the skill and 
entrepreneurialism of Mr. Thành are not in question. Nevertheless, Biti‟s remains a prime 
example of Dickson‟s (2003) red capitalists.225 
 
Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Company (Ut Xi) 
 
Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Company (Ut Xi), ranked 83
rd
 in the Top 200 VN, is a 
rare example from the Top 200 of growth with almost no relation to the state. In 1998 
Ms. Nguyễn Thị Xi established a private seafood firm, having been a relatively poor 
seafood broker for over forty years. In 2002 she, along with five others, founded Ut Xi as 
a limited liability company in order to export. Ut Xi acquired a factory from a nearby 
state enterprise and built two more processing facilities, financed by family money and a 
loan from Agribank. The factories became operational in 2003 and Ut Xi‟s revenues 
exploded. In 2006 Ut Xi transformed into a joint stock company with Ms. Xi as 
Chairwoman holding 45 percent of the shares. 
 
Of the other founders, three are sons of Ms. Xi and one is her daughter-in-law. The final 
founding member is Mr. Tiêu Cẩm Châu, a Chinese Vietnamese who was a classmate of 
Ms. Xi‟s son. All had prior experience in the seafood business, Mr. Châu having worked 
in seafood since 1981. It is not clear if this included work at a state firm. Ut Xi was able 
to access export markets by leveraging Mr. Châu‟s business connections. 
 
Ut Xi‟s growth from founding to one of the largest firms in Vietnam in only four years is 
remarkable. Leveraging business connections is a familiar pattern, and in seafood is 
similar to Viet Foods, but the connections of Mr. Châu are more likely to be from 
Chinese networks rather than the state. Other than purchase of an SOE factory, no 
relation to the state was indicated in the interview.  
 
                                                 
225
 Templer (1998) notes that “Vietnam‟s largest private company, Bitis, is owned by a family of Viet Hoa 
[Vietnamese Chinese] who have used family ties, business acumen and an appreciation of the value of 
close government connections to get rich” (Templer 1998, p.303) but does not provide any details. 
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Timing is once again important. Ut Xi emerged and flourished in the early 2000s, after 
implementation of the 1999 Enterprise Law and considerable relaxation of barriers to 
private firms. Unlike Minh Phu Seafood, Ut Xi was able to grow without being forced 
into relationships with the state. Whether or not Ut Xi represents a new growth dynamic 
remains an open question. However, within the Top 200, Ut Xi represents the exception 
that proves the rule. 
 
The next two cases involve military companies. Within the Top 200 VN there are five 
firms under the Ministry of Defence: 
 
Table 17: Military Companies in the Top 200 VN 
Company Rank Sector 
Military Telecom Corporation (Viettel) 9 Telecommunications 
Saigon Newport 45 Transport 
Construction Company No. 319 63 Construction 
Company No. 28 (Agtex) 120 Garments 
Thanh An Corporation 149 Construction 
 
Company No. 28 (Agtex) was briefly discussed in previous sections. The first military 
enterprise under discussion here is the Military Telecom Corporation, more commonly 
known as Viettel.  
 
Military Telecom Corporation (Viettel) 
 
The forerunner of Viettel, Sigelco, was established in 1989 as an electronics information 
and equipment company under the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Sigelco provided services 
to the military via the military‟s own dedicated telecommunications network.226 It also 
engaged in commercial operations, remitting profits to MoD as part of the effort to 
reduce state budget expenditures on the military. Sigelco‟s commercial operations mainly 
involved constructing towers, microwave systems and equipment for the state monopoly 
under the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MoPT), the organization that would 
                                                 
226
 This network has its own prefix, 069. It is not used for commercial purposes. 
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eventually become the Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group (VNPT). Sigelco 
also engaged in small scale import and export. 
 
Between 1989 and 1994, the company built a broadband microwave backbone system 
across the country. In 1993 Sigelco became Viettel. In 1995 the government ended the 
monopoly status of VNPT and called for more operators in the telecommunications 
sector. The same year, Viettel was granted a license to provide fixed local and long 
distance leased lines and mobile and internet services based on its experience supporting 
the telecommunications operations of the military and VNPT. However, Viettel did not 
launch its own commercial service until 2000. In 1995 the telecommunications market 
remained small. Furthermore, Viettel did not want to launch piecemeal coverage, 
preferring to wait until it could roll-out nationwide service. In 1999 Viettel completed its 
own national fibre optic backbone system and in 2000 launched the first Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) long distance service in Vietnam.
227
 This was expanded to 
include VoIP international services in 2001. 
 
In 2002 Viettel became an internet service provider and in 2003 it offered fixed line 
telephone service. In 2004 Viettel Mobile was launched, now one of the top mobile 
service providers in Vietnam. In 2006 Viettel expanded into Laos and Cambodia. In 2007 
it recorded over USD one billion in revenue, with twelve million subscribers. In 2008 
Viettel partnered with the Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation 
(Vinaconex), ranked 139
th
 in the Top 200 VN, to establish a finance company.  
 
During the initial public offering (IPO) of its member company Viettel Post in 2009, 
Viettel sold a 25 percent stake (Wall Street Securities 2009). Viettel also acquired an 18.9 
percent stake Vinaconex (Vietnam News 2009a).
228
 In addition, in 2009 Viettel began 
construction of a USD 50 million high-tech hub in Hoa Lac High-Tech Zone. The 25-
floor office building will support the Viettel joint venture with Chunghwa of Taiwan and 
house an international standard data centre (Vietnam News 2009b). At the end of 2009 
                                                 
227
 This system is separate from the military telecommunications network. While Viettel does provide back-
up to the military network, it is no longer involved in running the MoD network. 
228
 This reduced the SCIC stake in Vinaconex from 63.36 percent to 51.35 percent (Vietnam News 2009a). 
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Viettel became an economic group, with plans to expand into media content, banking 
services and foreign and domestic real estate (FPT Securities 2009).
229
 Viettel also holds 
a 10 percent stake in Military Bank (Military Bank 2008). 
 
By 2009, Viettel had over 300 showrooms and 20,000 retail agents in Vietnam, along 
with 25 million subscribers and over 6,800 employees. Its mobile phone subsidiary, 
Viettel Telecom, is ranked 83
rd
 out of the 100 largest telecom companies in the world and 
has been ranked one of the four leading telecom companies in a developing country. In 
terms of subscribers, Viettel has been ranked 41
st
 out of the 650 largest telecoms 
companies worldwide (Vietnam News 2009b).  
 
In early 2007, as part of an effort to reduce the role of the military and police in business, 
the Party re-affirmed that military and police companies not related to national security 
need to be equitized and transferred to civilian control (BBC News 2007). When asked 
about the impact of this on Viettel‟s operations during the interview in 2007, Viettel 
responded that it did not think it would affect Viettel.
230
 Given Viettel‟s expansion since 
2007, it clearly hasn‟t. Viettel is a prime example of Nolan and Yeung‟s (2001) 
constrained autonomy. Although the plan was not fixed in Vietnam as in China, and 
Vietnam did not „grow out of the plan‟ in the same way (Naughton 1994, 1996), 
reduction of entry barriers allowing increased competition are an important element of 
the Viettel success story. Leveraging its early experience with the military and VNPT, 
Viettel captured second-mover advantages and went on to link with domestic and foreign 





                                                 
229
 It is unknown how this will effect management of state capital in Viettel. During the interview in 2007, 
Viettel stressed that state capital was managed by MoD. However, since Viettel was a state enterprise under 
a ministry, in theory this management function should have eventually been passed over to SCIC under the 
Ministry of Finance. Now that Viettel is an economic group, it is unclear what role, if any, SCIC will play. 
230
 The Ministry of Public Security, in partnership with a Russian telecom company, received a license to 
establish a mobile phone company in Vietnam in late 2007. The company, Gtel, was launched in 2008 and 
was the seventh mobile provider in Vietnam. 
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Dong Bac Coal Corporation 
 
The second military case is Dong Bac Coal Corporation, ranked 44
th
 in the Top 200 VN. 
It is not listed in Table 18 because it is a member company of the Vietnam Coal and 
Mineral Industries Group (Vinacomin). Dong Bac was established in 1994 to oversee 
military coal mines and coal processing factories under the authority of the Ministry of 
Defence. However, in 1994 the government also created Vinacoal, the GC 91 forerunner 
of the economic group Vinacomin, to centralize management of Vietnam‟s coal 
resources. Dong Bac was made a member of Vinacoal, and remains to this day the largest 
subsidiary of Vinacomin. Dong Bac (literally, north east) is located in Quang Ninh 
province on the Chinese border, site of the majority of Vietnam‟s coal reserves. Given the 
national security and economic development dimensions to its operations, it retained its 
link to the army even though placed under Vinacoal. Its first priority is commercial 




In 2001 Dong Bac established the General Construction and Trading Company, a 
subsidiary producing coal stoves, trading in materials and fuels used by Dong Bac, and 
responsible for construction of infrastructure in support of Dong Bac investments. In 
2005 it established the Tay Nguyen Mineral Exploitation subsidiary in Dak Nong 
province to spearhead Vinacomin‟s move into bauxite mining in the Central Highlands. 
This move was supported by the Ministry of Defence. Dong Bac is also an investor in 




                                                 
231
 It does not have any direct links, beyond purchase of supplies, with Industrial Explosives Material 
Company, the Vinacomin subsidiary ranked 114
th
 in the Top 200 VN. 
232
 Vinacomin‟s bauxite projects have become very controversial. In early 2009 an open letter to the Prime 
Minister was issued under the signature of 97 year old General Võ Nguyên Giáp warning of the potentially 
destructive environmental consequences of bauxite mining and urging the Prime Minister to reconsider the 
projects. Given General Giáp‟s extreme age, it is almost certain that other interests are behind the issuance 
of the letter. However, the entire matter remains very unclear. There are two primary bauxite and aluminum 
sites, one in Nhan Co in Dak Nong province and the other in Tan Rai in Lam Dong province, both in the 
Central Highlands. The U.S. mining firm Alcoa signed a memorandum of understanding with Vinacomin in 
2006 to explore the possibility of investing in the Nhan Co project. Vinacomin had been in discussion with 
Aluminum Corporation of China (Chalco) as early as 2005 regarding Chinese participation in bauxite 
mining and aluminum production. It was eventually agreed that the engineering arm of Chalco, China 
Aluminum International Engineering Company (Chalieco), would build the facilities at Tan Rai. Following 
General Giáp‟s letter, several journalists investigated the issue and criticized the government on online 
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In 2006 Dong Bac transformed into a Parent-Child corporation. Its senior management is 
nominated by the Ministry of Defence and approved by Vinacomin. A division of labour 
has been agreed upon, with the army supervising Dong Bac‟s defence responsibilities and 
Vinacomin supervising Dong Bac‟s business activities and responsible for management 
of its state capital. Vinacomin exercises strict control of Dong Bac‟s coal business. Dong 
Bac can only sell coal to Vinacomin and cannot export coal directly. All coal transactions 
go through Vinacomin. For non-coal business activities, Dong Bac has a higher degree of 
autonomy. It is also engaged in petrol trading, including construction of storage facilities 
at Cua Ong port. In addition, Dong Bac has a small stake in Military Bank. In its 2006 
corporation charter Dong Bac is also approved to operate in manufacturing of vehicles 
and ships, but has not yet invested in these operations. In 2007 Dong Bac partnered with 
a Laotian firm to exploit natural resources (copper, gold, lead, zinc) in Laos.  
 
As with Viettel, Dong Bac did not feel that the 2007 government decision to reduce 
military management in firms would have much effect. Unlike Viettel, Dong Bac did not 
give the overwhelming impression of dynamism and growth. A stake in a bank and 
movement into Laos or Cambodia are fairly common maneuvers for Vietnam‟s large 
firms. However, Dong Bac and its supervision by both Vinacomin and the Ministry of 
Defence highlights the complexity of authority relations within Vietnam‟s General 
Corporations.  
 
The twelve firms reviewed demonstrate the variety of state-related accumulation 
processes operating in Vietnam, similar in many respects to various processes observed 
in Eastern Europe and China. These firms also demonstrate the dynamism that has 
                                                                                                                                                 
blogs for selling Vietnam‟s natural resources to China, destroying the environment and failing to provide 
jobs for Vietnamese workers since Chalieco was importing its own Chinese labour. No mention was made 
of U.S. involvement via Alcoa. This sparked an anti-Chinese nationalist outrage. Several bloggers were 
eventually arrested. The Politburo and the Prime Minister issued a series of statements, declaring their 
intention to ensure the environmental safety and economic feasibility of the projects, and the desire to 
undertake the projects without foreign assistance. While a ban was issued on foreign investment in bauxite 
projects, placing Alcoa participation in jeopardy, the Chalieco engineering contract to build facilities on 
behalf of Vinacomin went forward. Later in 2009, foreign work visas were limited to three month duration, 
possibly in an attempt to curtail use of imported Chinese labour. It remains to be seen how the issue will be 
resolved (Vietnam News 2005, 2008b; Reuters 2009; Vietnamnet 2009a). 
 223 
resulted from increased competition. Although not all firms discussed were success 
stories, the broad pattern of leveraging access to the state remains a common feature.  
 
5.4 The Role of the Communist Party in Vietnam 
 
Even after nearly thirty years of reform, it is still relatively early in Vietnam‟s capitalist 
transformation. Vietnam is only just now emerging into the ranks of „middle-income 
countries‟, and while its record to date has been impressive, much remains to be done. 
One-off gains from granting property rights to farmers and removing restrictions on 
production and trade will not sustain growth indefinitely. The „easy‟ reforms, and 
therefore the „easy‟ growth, will need to be followed by deeper structural change. This is 
politically difficult. As Hutchcroft (1998) observes, it “is far easier, for example, to 
liberalize imports than to promote high-value exports; less troublesome to dismantle a 
system of preferential fiscal incentives than to create a revenue system able to sustain the 
long-term infrastructural needs of development; and [sic] much simpler to give out new 
bank licenses than to assure the „prudential regulation‟ of the financial system” 
(Hutchcroft 1998, p.3). However, these „deeper reforms‟ are not just about institution 
building. They are fundamentally about resolving the Djilas contradiction and coming to 
terms politically with the emergence of capitalism in Vietnam.  
 
Inability to discipline capital can lead to Latin American style outcomes, typified in 
Southeast Asia by the Philippines and post-Suharto Indonesia (Yoshihara 1988, 
Hutchcroft 1998, Studwell 2007). However, it remains unclear why some nations develop 
the political will to impose discipline and orient accumulation towards long term growth 
and structural change. Greenfeld (2001) argues that part of the answer depends on the rise 
of nationalism and the type of nationalism that emerges. Woo (1991) on South Korea; 
Samuels (1994) on Japan; and Doner, Ritchie and Slater (2005) more generally argue that 
part of the answer depends on the perception of vulnerability, a systemic threat which 
generates an imperative to succeed, a develop or die mentality.  
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Steinfeld‟s (2009, 2010) work on China supports both positions. The lesson China seems 
to have drawn from the Asian Financial Crisis was that state-led development would not 
deliver, highlighting China‟s vulnerability in terms of pursuing an inadequate growth 
strategy. This occurred in the context of a redefinition of the role of the Chinese 
Communist Party, in which China‟s „quest for modernity‟ was increasingly defined in 
nationalist rather than socialist terms. This influenced the shift to the Three Represents 
and inclusion of private entrepreneurs into the ranks of the Party. Whether intentional or 
not, China has in practice, even if perhaps still not in rhetoric, resolved the New Class 




In Vietnam, this has not yet occurred. The Party has historically responded quickly and 
pragmatically in times of crisis. However, at present it does not appear that a sufficient 
sense of vulnerability exists to initiate resolution of the New Class contradiction. The 
status quo remains the state-led development model of the 1990s and 2000s. This can be 
seen in the fact that the debates about the role of the Party remain largely unchanged. For 
example, in August 1995, then Prime Minister Võ Văn Kiệt sent a secret memo to his 





 Mr. Kiệt argued that „national interest‟ was more important than 
„socialism‟, and explicitly argued against a Stalinist definition of socialism as state 
ownership, instead advancing a definition of the role of the Party based on facilitating 
national development and ensuring social welfare. In this formulation, „socialist 
orientation‟ is separated from ownership of the means of production and the role of the 
Party is to develop the nation and improve the lives of its citizens (Vasavakul 1997, 
Riedel and Turley 1999). Almost fifteen years later, in 2009, the rector of a prominent 
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 This is not meant to suggest that China‟s problems are now over. China continues to face serious 
political, economic, social and environmental issues. Its continued transformation is not guaranteed. 
However, resolving the New Class contradiction does mean that the tensions of the old system can be 
overcome rather than simply delayed, even if resolving one contradiction simply opens up new ones. 
234
 This memo was subsequently leaked and is discussed in Vasavakul (1997) and Riedel and Turley 
(1999). The intention here is not to hold up Võ Văn Kiệt as a „reformer‟, but simply to highlight the terms 
of the debate within the Party. 
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university in Vietnam presented a document for discussion in the run-up to the XI
th
 Party 




Whether intended or not, capitalism has been unleashed in Vietnam. State-related 
accumulation has generated incredible economic dynamism, but also resulted in the 
„embourgeoisement of the state‟ (Greenfield 1994). What then is the role of the Party? 
What does it mean to be a communist in Vietnam? The Party has not yet decided how to 
relate to itself, and in particular how to relate to the emergence of an increasingly 
autonomous capitalist class from within the state. This is not necessarily about ideology 
or commitment to socialism, it is about legitimating principles. Without a rationale, a 
definition of its role beyond ownership, by what standards are activities judged? How are 
policy options generated and chosen between? So-called consensus based politics is 
insufficient, since without a sense of vulnerability and imperative for change it simply 
leads to lowest common denominator outcomes. Failure to resolve the New Class 
contradiction, demonstrated by the inability to define the role of the Party, results in 
continuation of the status quo state-led development model. However, as indicated by the 
Philippines and post-Suharto Indonesia, there is a very real danger that this will simply 
degenerate into money politics and rent-distribution rather than continued economic 
growth. The recent wave of massive and overlapping investment licenses granted at the 
provincial level, resulting in, for example, plans for a port in every coastal province, 
indicates that this process is already underway (Harvard Vietnam Program 2008a).
236
 In 
addition, this prevents effective disciplining, as demonstrated by the difficulties with 
Vietnam‟s state corporations, and makes achieving the policy coordination necessary for 
the next generation of needed reforms extremely difficult.  
 
                                                 
235
 In order to protect the identity of this individual, details regarding the context in which this information 
was obtained have been omitted. See Quinn-Judge (2005) for discussion of the Anti-Party Affair in the late 
1960s in which many of the same issues were debated.   
236
 The rising formal power of provincial interests is an important part of the story in Vietnam. However, 
since this dissertation is not directly about the history of the Party or the evolution of the state, this will not 
be discussed in detail. For discussion of these issues, see Đặng Phong and Beresford (1998); Abuza (2002); 
Vasavakul (1997); Riedel and Turley (1999); Gainsborough (2007a); and Abrami, Malesky and Zheng 
(2007, 2008). 
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These issues also extend to relations between the Party and the people. As „state-led 
development‟ is increasingly perceived as a euphemism for corruption and personal 
enrichment, failure to resolve the New Class contradiction and redefine the role of the 
Party erodes legitimacy. The Communist Party in Vietnam needs to resolve the New 
Class contradiction by defining its purpose. Failure to do so could result in the derailing 




This chapter presented the findings of research conducted on the Top 200 Vietnamese 
firms. One of the key findings is the increasing importance of competition – the market 
imperative – in all sectors for firms of all ownership types. This is one hallmark of the 
development of capitalism in Vietnam. In response, Vietnam‟s largest firms have adopted 
three general strategies: upgrading core business into more complex and higher value 
products, expanding markets and diversifying business areas, often into real estate and 
finance. These strategies are frequently related and most firms are engaging in more than 
one, with some firms pursuing all three strategies simultaneously. Diversification into 
finance and real estate is a fairly common practice, but is particularly pronounced 
amongst Vietnam‟s General Corporations and economic groups.  
 
Twelve case studies were presented which illustrate these strategies, along with a 
considerable degree of dynamism. The firms reviewed also highlight the centrality of 
state-related accumulation to the process of class formation in Vietnam. This pattern of 
accumulation comes in a variety of forms identifiable from the Eastern Europe and China 
literature, such as double entrepreneurship, contesting ownership, insider privatization, 
constrained autonomy turned red capitalism, and recombinant property. It is not 
necessarily corrupt and can even be quite mundane. Nevertheless, this broad pattern of 






The primary argument of this dissertation is that the capitalist class in Vietnam is 
emerging from within the state. Chapter One argued that viewing growth and 
development as the extension of markets is insufficient for understanding the 
transformation occurring in Vietnam. The chapter sought to reorient the theoretical 
approach used to analyze this change, arguing for the importance of using a Marxist 
definition of capitalism which stresses the emergence of a new social division of labour 
based on the emerging class relation between capital and labour. This provides a 
framework capable of capturing the unique features of capital as an „ism‟ and serves as a 
guide to empirical investigation. However, there is a tendency towards the doctrinaire in 
Marxism. The approach adopted here is similar to what Pelley (2002) refers to as a 
„Marxish framework‟. While a theoretical model of capitalism is useful, it needs to be 
applied with flexibility in practice. Given unique historical and political circumstances, 
Vietnam will have its own variety of capitalism. Attempting to identify which type or 
model of capitalism is operating in Vietnam misses the point since there is no one correct 
form. The more important question is: what is the nature of Vietnamese capitalism?  
 
Chapter Two introduced Djilas (1957) and the concept of communist bureaucracies as a 
New Class. This was used as a lens to explore the formation of a capitalist class. For 
Djilas, the New Class is based on a contradiction between national property and control 
over its use. This contradiction is predicated on a disjunction between a legal definition 
of property as collective and de facto ownership and control by state bureaucrats and 
managers. It cannot be resolved without jeopardizing the position of the New Class. The 
foundation of New Class power therefore erodes during transition as property is 
privatized and the plan is dismantled. Reproduction of New Class power during transition 
becomes an issue of fundamental importance, and how the Djilas contradiction is 
resolved influences the formation of a capitalist class.  
 
Attempts to reproduce New Class power do not occur in a vacuum. Under a command 
economy, the New Class accumulates based on leveraging access to the state. In Eastern 
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Europe and China, resolution of the New Class contradiction during transition followed a 
pattern of state-related accumulation that has its roots in the planning period. However, 
different countries experienced different outcomes, with state continuity a key element in 
orienting this process towards economic growth. Chapter Two identified specific 
methods used to resolve the Djilas contradiction in Eastern Europe and China, which 
provided guidance for identifying similar processes of capitalist class formation in 
Vietnam. Discussion also included the development of capitalism in Southeast Asia and 
its relevance to the emergence of capitalism in Vietnam.  
 
Chapter Three served the dual purpose of literature review and discussion of events 
between 1954 and 2006 in Vietnam. It was argued that, as in Eastern Europe and China, a 
pattern of accumulation based on leveraging access to the state emerged under planning. 
In the initial period between 1954 and 1974 in the north this functioned primarily to 
overcome shortages and improve living standards. However, after national reunification 
in 1975, it expanded into a process of commercializing the state. The continued ability to 
arbitrage price differentials between plan and market by diverting inputs and assets from 
the state system, along with opportunities to engage in smuggling through travel abroad, 
increasingly became sources of capital accumulation. State firms and those connected to 
the state increasingly engaged in commercial activities outside the plan. The process 
accelerated through the 1980s and ultimately destroyed the basis for central planning, 
forcing the Vietnamese Communist Party to attempt resolution of the New Class 
contradiction. 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, temporary resolution of the Djilas contradiction followed a 
relatively straightforward application of the Stalinist definition of socialism as state 
ownership. The state sector would play the „leading role‟ in the economy and this led to a 
state enterprise focused development model. As in China, state-related accumulation 
included both state and private entrepreneurs and shaped the process of capitalist class 
formation. Although based on leveraging access to the state, the growing influence of the 




Much work has been done on these issues in Vietnam, but has tended to focus on 
processes occurring at lower levels in the state hierarchy or is based on aggregate 
comparisons between state and private. None have systematically investigated Vietnam‟s 
largest firms. This dissertation presented research on the Top 200 Vietnamese firms to 
assess how the ongoing attempt to resolve the Djilas contradiction is influencing the 
emergence of a capitalist class from within the state. 
 
Chapter Four reviewed methodology. The firm was used as the unit of analysis because it 
is in firms that capital and labour meet. Firms are the „vehicles‟ of capitalism. The focus 
was on large firms because large firms are better able to achieve the economies of scale 
and scope that contribute to international competitiveness. They also invest in the 
acquisition and development of technologies and products and therefore pioneer entry 
into higher value-added activities. In addition, large firms‟ requirements for 
infrastructure, capital and skilled labour have significant and often positive spillover 
effects for the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, competitive large and small firms are 
important to a dynamic economy. However, most of the work done in Vietnam tends to 
focus on small and medium sized enterprises. This dissertation presented research 
findings on Vietnam‟s largest firms in order to address this limitation. The remainder of 
the chapter explained the methodology used for selecting the Top 200 firms. 
 
Chapter Five presented the research results. Two key features emerged. The first was the 
rising importance of the market imperative, with increasing competition forcing firms to 
adapt and improve. In response, Vietnam‟s largest firms adopted three general strategies: 
upgrading core business into more complex and higher value products; expanding 
markets; and diversifying business areas, often into real estate and finance. These 
strategies are frequently related and most firms engage in more than one, with some firms 
pursuing all three strategies simultaneously. Diversification into finance and real estate is 
a fairly common practice, but is particularly pronounced amongst Vietnam‟s General 
Corporations and economic groups.  
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The second feature is the pervasiveness of state-related accumulation. However, state-
related accumulation does not require intentionality on the part of the state. Indeed, the 
historical roots of this process in Vietnam are predicated precisely on a lack of control. 
State-related accumulation also occurs irrespective of ownership type. Private firms 
leverage access to the state just as state firms seize new market opportunities to expand 
and accumulate. In many instances the boundary between state and private is blurred. 
However, political connections and access to the state remain insufficient conditions for 
success. Some firms, even with ample privileges, fail to exploit emerging opportunities.  
 
Twelve case studies of individual firms were presented which illustrated the three general 
adaptive strategies, along with a considerable degree of dynamism. The firms reviewed 
also highlighted the centrality of state-related accumulation to the process of class 
formation in Vietnam. This pattern of accumulation comes in a variety of forms 
identifiable from the Eastern Europe and China literature. However, it is not necessarily 
corrupt and can even be quite mundane. Nevertheless, this broad pattern of accumulation 
demonstrates that the capitalist class in Vietnam is emerging from within the state.  
 
6.1 Further Research 
 
This dissertation is intended to be the beginning of a larger story about the development 
of capitalism in Vietnam. However, this dissertation has focused on only one element of 
this process – how the capitalist class is emerging from within the state. The full story of 
the development of capitalism in Vietnam requires, first and foremost, analysis of the 
formation of wage labour. In addition, examination of the economic structure and 
bureaucracy from at least the 19
th
 century Nguyễn dynasty, tracing its evolution through 
the period of French colonialism and into two major wars, needs to be incorporated into 
the analysis. The rise of nationalism and the history of the Communist Party, along with 
changes in land tenure, the role of trade and foreign investment, and changes in the global 
economy also need to be included. Finally, large private business groups, which for 
methodological reasons do not appear in the Top 200, need to be investigated. As Ut Xi 
Aquatic Products demonstrates, it is possible that the growth dynamic based on state-
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related accumulation is changing. Whether or not this is true, and whether or not this only 
applies in some sectors but not others, needs to be examined. These topics remain 
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Table 18: Company Websites 
 
Company Acronym Website 
Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Ltd Bitis http://www.bitis.com.vn/ 
Cho Lon Investment and Import Export Corporation Cholimex http://cholimex.com.vn/ 
Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology FPT http://www.fpt.com.vn/en/ 
Dak Lak Rubber Company Dakruco http://www.dakruco.com/english/index_eng.asp 
Electricity of Vietnam EVN http://www.evn.com.vn/ 
Military Bank MB http://www.militarybank.com.vn/ 
Military Telecom Corporation Viettel http://www.viettel.com.vn/ 
Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Company Minh Phu http://www.minhphu.com/trangchu_e.php 
Petrovietnam Finance Corporation PVFC http://www.pvfc.com.vn/ 
Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank Techcombank https://www.techcombank.com.vn/ 
Vietnam Airlines Vietnam Airlines http://www.vietnamairlines.com.vn/ 
Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group Vinacomin http://www.vinacomin.vn/ 
Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation  Vinaconex http://www.vinaconex.com.vn/ 
Vietnam Dairy Company Vinamilk http://vinamilk.com.vn/ 
Vietnam National Chemical Corporation Vinachem http://www.vinachem.com.vn/ 
Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation Petrolimex http://www.petrolimex.com.vn/ 
Vietnam National Shipping Lines Vinalines http://www.vinalines.com.vn/ 
Vietnam Ocean Shipping Company Vosco http://www.vosco.com.vn/ 
Vietnam Oil and Gas Group Petrovietnam http://www.pvn.vn/ 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group VNPT http://www.vnpt.com.vn/ 
Vietnam Rubber Group Geruco http://www.vnrubbergroup.com/ 
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group Vinashin http://www.vinashin.com.vn/ 





Appendix 1: The Top 200 Firms, All 
Rank English Name 
1 Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
2 Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation 
3 Electricity of Vietnam 
4 Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam 
5 Vietsovpetro JV Enterprise 
6 Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 
7 Pouyen Vietnam Co Ltd 
8 Vietnam Insurance Corporation 
9 HCMC Post and Telecommunications 
10 Military Telecom Corporation 
11 Vietnam Railway Corporation 
12 Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Co 
13 Canon Vietnam Co Ltd 
14 The Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology 
15 Vietnam Dairy Products Co. 
16 Southern Steel Corporation 
17 Vietnam Mobile Telecom Services Company 
18 Tae Kwang Vina Industrial Co Ltd 
19 Vietnam Paper Corporation 
20 Fujitsu Vietnam Computer Products Co Ltd 
21 CP Vietnam Livestock Co Ltd 
22 Pouchen Vietnam 
23 Saigon Tobacco Co. 
24 Bao Viet Life Insurance 
25 Honda Vietnam Co Ltd 
26 Chang Shin Co Ltd 
27 Hyundai Vinashin Shipyard Co Ltd 
28 Bao Viet Insurance 
29 Nidec Tosok Vietnam Co Ltd 
30 Petroleum Technical Services Company  
31 Furukawa Automotive Parts Co Ltd 
32 Vietnam Construction Investment Import and Export Holding Corporation 
33 Hwa Seung Vina Co Ltd 
34 Vedan Vietnam 
35 Yazaki EDS Vietnam Co Ltd 
36 Saigon Tourist Holding Company 
37 Dau Tieng Rubber Corp. 
38 Viet Tien Garment Co. 
39 Saigon Thuong Tin Bank 
40 Dong Nai Rubber Co. 
 288 
41 Vietnam Airlines 
42 Hanoi Public Service and Transportation Co. 
43 Tainan Spinning Co Ltd 
44 Asia Commercial Bank 
45 Yamaha Motor Vietnam Co Ltd 
46 Saigon Beer Alcohol and Beverage Corporation 
47 Hoang Thach Cement Co 
48 Mabuchi Motor Vietnam Co Ltd 
49 Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.5 
50 Nissei Electric Vietnam Co Ltd 
51 Hualong Corporation Vietnam 
52 Petrolimex B12 
53 Vietnam Southern Food Corporation 
54 HCMC Water Supply Co 
55 Bim Son Cement Co 
56 Khanh Viet Corporation 
57 Prudential Vietnam 
58 Metro Cash and Carry Vietnam 
59 Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company 
60 Saigon Newport Co 
61 Hanoi Textile and Garment Co 
62 Dong Bac Coal Co. 
63 Orion-Hanel Picture Tube Co Ltd 
64 Cua Ong Coal Selecting Co. 
65 Lam Thao Fertilizers and Chemicals Co 
66 Petrolimex Region 2 
67 Phong Phu Textile Co. 
68 Chi Hung Joint Venture Co. 
69 Thanh Le Commercial Import Export Co 
70 Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam 
71 Nha Be Garment Co. 
72 Dona Pacific Vietnam Co Ltd 
73 Vietnam Manufacturing and Export Processing Co Ltd 
74 Nam Viet Co Ltd 
75 Binh Long Rubber Co 
76 Kim Anh Co Ltd 
77 Development Investment Construction Corp. 
78 Formosa Vietnam Co Ltd 
79 Construction Company No. 1 
80 Sumitomo Bakelite Vietnam Co Ltd 
81 Vietnam Ocean Shipping Co 
82 Petrovietnam Gas Company 
83 Southern Airport Authority 
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84 Construction Company No. 319 
85 Bai Bang Paper Co 
86 Noi Dia Coal Co Ltd 
87 Phuoc Hoa Rubber Co 
88 Lever Vietnam JVC 
89 Dona Victor Moulds MFG Co 
90 Phu Rieng Rubber Co 
91 Ha Long Shipyard 
92 Bach Dang Shipyard 
93 Thanh Cong Textile Co. 
94 Samyang Vietnam Co Ltd 
95 Petrolimex Region 1 
96 Intimex Import Export Co 
97 Quang Ngai Sugar Corp. 
98 Vietnam Acecook Co Ltd 
99 Vietnam Sea Transport and Chartering Co 
100 Southern Rubber Industry Co 
101 Saigon Passenger Railway Transportation Co.  
102 Kinh Do JSC 
103 Saigon Co.opMart 
104 Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.1 
105 Tan Mai Paper Co. 
106 Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Co. Ltd. 
107 Bao Minh Co 
108 Cai Lan Oil and Fats Industries Co Ltd 
109 Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products Company 
110 Uni President Vietnam Co Ltd 
111 Ha Bac Nitrogen Fertilizers and Chemical Co 
112 Northern Airports Authority 
113 Dona Orion Vietnam Co Ltd 
114 Binh Duong Trading Investment and Development Corporation 
115 Cao Son Coal Co. 
116 Uong Bi Coal Co. 
117 Ha Tu Coal Co. 
118 Saigon Port 
119 Hanoi General Production and Import-Export Company 
120 Vietnam Glass and Ceramics for Construction Corp. 
121 Ha Tien Cement Co No.1 
122 Thai Binh Co Ltd. 
123 Machino Auto Parts Co Ltd 
124 Phu Yen Material Company 
125 Vietnam Air Petrol Co 
126 Seaprodex Danang Co  
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127 Scancom Vietnam Co Ltd 
128 Vissan Import Export Corporation 
129 Saigon Agriculture Corporation 
130 Can Tho Sea Product Processing Export Enterprise 
131 Hai Phong Port 
132 Yazaki Haiphong Vietnam Co Ltd 
133 Saigon Post and Telecommunication JSC 
134 Vang Danh Coal Co. 
135 Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Co. 
136 Nui Beo Coal Co. 
137 Chutex International Co Ltd 
138 Phy My Hung Joint Venture Co. 
139 Sumi-Hanel Electronics Co. 
140 Construction Company No. 4 
141 Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank 
142 Theodore Alexander Co Ltd 
143 Dutch Lady Vietnam 
144 Industrial Explosive Material Company 
145 Freetrend Industrial Vietnam Co Ltd 
146 Holcim Vietnam Ltd. 
147 Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank 
148 Company No. 28 
149 Green River Wood and Lumber Vietnam Co Ltd 
150 Eastern Asia Commercial Bank 
151 Coc 6 Coal Co. 
152 Triumph International Vietnam Co Ltd 
153 Always Co Ltd 
154 Ha Tien Cement Co No.2 
155 Ha Long Coal Co. 
156 But Son Cement Co 
157 Nam Dinh Textile Co 
158 Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co. 
159 Proconco Producing Animal Feeds JVC 
160 Southern Fertilizers Co 
161 Hanoi Trade Corporation 
162 Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corp. 
163 Pangrim Neotex Co Ltd 
164 An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export Co. 
165 Hoang Gia Cat Tuong Co. Ltd  
166 Northern Foodstuff Co 
167 Mao Khe Coal Co. 
168 Hoang Mai Cement Co 
169 Kingmaker Footwear Vietnam Co Ltd 
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170 Saigon Transportation Mechanical Corporation  
171 Minh Quy Aquatic Products Processing Co Ltd.  
172 Tin Nghia Import Export Co 
173 Vietnam Apatite Company 
174 Thang Loi Textile and Garment Co 
175 Vietnam Northern Food Corporation 
176 Toyota Vietnam 
177 Vietnam International Bank 
178 Dong Nai Agricultural Products and Food Processing Import Export Co 
179 Thanh An Corporation 
180 Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation 
181 Phuong Nam Joint Stock Commercial Bank 
182 Deo Nai Coal Co. 
183 Ninh Thuan Agricultural Products Export Co. 
184 Viet Thang Textile Co. 
185 Phu Nhuan Jewelry Joint Stock Company 
186 Water Electrical Mechanical Installation and Construction Joint Stock Co 
187 Vietnam Industrial Construction Corporation 
188 Electrical Mechanical Appliances and Technology Development Company Co 
189 Aquatic food trading Company 
190 Sanyo Vietnam Home Appliances ASEAN 
191 Lam Son Sugar Joint Stock Corporation 
192 Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Co. Ltd.  
193 LG Electronics Vietnam Co Ltd 
194 Ajinomoto Vietnam Co Ltd 
195 Petec Trading and Investment Corporation 
196 Cai Doi Vam Import Export Company 
197 Danang Rubber Co 
198 Grobest Industrial Vietnam Co Ltd 
199 Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Co. 













Appendix 2: The Top 200 Firms, Vietnamese 
Ran
k English Name Abbreviation 
1 Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development AGRIBANK 
2 Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation VNPT 
3 Electricity of Vietnam EVN 
4 Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam BIDV 
5 Vietsovpetro JV Enterprise VIETSOVPETRO 
6 Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam VIETCOMBANK 
7 Vietnam Insurance Corporation BAOVIET 
8 HCMC Post and Telecommunications  
9 Military Telecom Corporation VIETTEL 
10 Vietnam Railway Corporation VNR 
11 Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Co TISCO 
12 The Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology FPT 
13 Vietnam Dairy Products Co. VINAMILK 
14 Southern Steel Corporation SSC 
15 Vietnam Mobile Telecom Services Company VMS 
16 Vietnam Paper Corporation VINAPIMEX 
17 Saigon Tobacco Co. VINATABA SAIGON 
18 Bao Viet Life Insurance BAO VIET LIFE 
19 Honda Vietnam Co Ltd HONDA VIETNAM 
20 Hyundai Vinashin Shipyard Co Ltd HVS 
21 Bao Viet Insurance  
22 Petroleum Technical Services Company  PTSC 
23 




24 Saigon Tourist Holding Company SAIGON TOURIST 
25 Viet Tien Garment Co. VTEC 
26 Saigon Thuong Tin Bank SACOMBANK 
27 Dau Tieng Rubber Corp.  
28 Vietnam Airlines VIETNAM AIRLINES 
29 Hanoi Public Service and Transportation Co. TRANSERCO 
30 Dong Nai Rubber Co. DONARUCO 
31 Asia Commercial Bank ACB 
32 Saigon Beer Alcohol and Beverage Corporation SABECO 
33 Yamaha Motor Vietnam Co Ltd YAMAHA VIETNAM 
34 Hoang Thach Cement Co  
35 Petrolimex B12 PETROLIMEX B12 
36 Vietnam Southern Food Corporation VINAFOOD 2 
37 Khanh Viet Corporation  
38 Bim Son Cement Co BCC 
39 Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.5 CIENCO 5 
40 HCMC Water Supply Co  
41 Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company  
42 Hanoi Textile and Garment Co HANOSIMEX 
43 Orion-Hanel Picture Tube Co Ltd OHPT 
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44 Dong Bac Coal Co. NECO 
45 Saigon Newport Co SNP 
46 Cua Ong Coal Selecting Co.  
47 Lam Thao Fertilizers and Chemicals Co LAFCHEMCO 
48 Petrolimex Region 2 PETROLIMEX SAIGON 
49 Phong Phu Textile Co. PHONGPHU TEXCO 
50 Thanh Le Commercial Import Export Co THALEXIM 
51 Chi Hung Joint Venture Co.  
52 Nha Be Garment Co. NHABECO 
53 Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam INCOMBANK 
54 Development Investment Construction Corp. DIC 
55 Nam Viet Co Ltd NAVICO 
56 Kim Anh Co Ltd  
57 Binh Long Rubber Co  
58 Petrovietnam Gas Company PVGAS 
59 Vietnam Ocean Shipping Co VOSCO 
60 Construction Company No. 1  
61 Southern Airport Authority SAA 
62 Bai Bang Paper Co BAPACO 
63 Construction Company No. 319  
64 Lever Vietnam JVC UNILEVER VIETNAM 
65 Noi Dia Coal Co Ltd  
66 Phuoc Hoa Rubber Co  
67 Phu Rieng Rubber Co  
68 Ha Long Shipyard  
69 Bach Dang Shipyard  
70 Petrolimex Region 1 PETROLIMEX HANOI 
71 Intimex Import Export Co INTIMEX 
72 Thanh Cong Textile Co. T.CTEX 
73 Quang Ngai Sugar Corp.  
74 Vietnam Sea Transport and Chartering Co VITRANSCHART 
75 Saigon Co.opMart  
76 Southern Rubber Industry Co CASUMINA 
77 Saigon Passenger Railway Transportation Co.   
78 Kinh Do JSC KIDOCO 
79 Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.1 CIENCO 1 
80 Tan Mai Paper Co.  
81 Cai Lan Oil and Fats Industries Co Ltd CALOFIC 
82 Bao Minh Co BAO MINH 
83 Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Co. Ltd.  
84 Ha Bac Nitrogen Fertilizers and Chemical Co HANICHEMCO 
85 Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products Company CATACO 
86 Northern Airports Authority NAA 
87 Cao Son Coal Co.  
88 Binh Duong Trading Investment and Development Corporation BECAMEX IDC 
89 Saigon Port CSG 
90 Ha Tu Coal Co.  
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91 Vietnam Glass and Ceramics for Construction Corp. VIGLACERA 
92 Uong Bi Coal Co.  
93 Hanoi General Production and Import-Export Company HAPROSIMEX 
94 Ha Tien Cement Co No.1  
95 Machino Auto Parts Co Ltd MAP 
96 Vietnam Air Petrol Co VINAPCO 
97 Phu Yen Material Company PYGEMACO 
98 Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Co. PVFCCo 
99 Seaprodex Danang Co  SEAPRODEX DANANG 
100 Vissan Import Export Corporation VISSAN 
101 Phy My Hung Joint Venture Co.  
102 Thai Binh Co Ltd.  
103 Can Tho Sea Product Processing Export Enterprise  
104 Saigon Post and Telecommunication JSC SPT 
105 Saigon Agriculture Corporation  
106 Hai Phong Port  
107 Vang Danh Coal Co.  
108 Nui Beo Coal Co.  
109 Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank TECHCOMBANK 
110 Holcim Vietnam Ltd.  
111 Sumi-Hanel Electronics Co.  
112 Dutch Lady Vietnam  
113 Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank VIETNAM EXIMBANK 
114 Industrial Explosive Material Company VIMICCO 
115 Construction Company No. 4  
116 Eastern Asia Commercial Bank  
117 Proconco Producing Animal Feeds JVC PROCONCO 
118 Coc 6 Coal Co.  
119 But Son Cement Co  
120 Company No. 28 AGTEX 
121 Ha Tien Cement Co No.2  
122 Southern Fertilizers Co SFC 
123 Ha Long Coal Co.  
124 Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co. PROTRADE 
125 Nam Dinh Textile Co NATEXCO 
126 Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corp. CAMIMEX 
127 Hanoi Trade Corporation HAPRO 
128 Hoang Mai Cement Co  
129 Saigon Transportation Mechanical Corporation  SAMCO 
130 Northern Foodstuff Co FONEXIM 
131 An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export Co. AFIEXCO 
132 Toyota Vietnam TOYOTA VIETNAM 
133 Vietnam Northern Food Corporation VINAFOOD 1 
134 Minh Quy Aquatic Products Processing Co Ltd.   
135 Mao Khe Coal Co.  
136 Tin Nghia Import Export Co TIMEX CO 
137 Vietnam International Bank VIBank 
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138 Hoang Gia Cat Tuong Co. Ltd   
139 Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation VINACONEX 
140 Vietnam Apatite Company VINAAPCO 
141 Phuong Nam Joint Stock Commercial Bank  
142 Thang Loi Textile and Garment Co VITEXIM 
143 Phu Nhuan Jewelry Joint Stock Company  
144 Ninh Thuan Agricultural Products Export Co.  
145 
Dong Nai Agricultural Products and Food Processing Import Export 
Co 
DONAFOODS 
146 Deo Nai Coal Co.  
147 Petec Trading and Investment Corporation PETEC 
148 Vietnam Industrial Construction Corporation VINAINCON 
149 Thanh An Corporation  
150 
Electrical Mechanical Appliances and Technology Development 
Company Co 
GELIMEX 
151 Viet Thang Textile Co. VICOTEX 
152 Aquatic Food Trading Company APT CO 
153 
Water Electrical Mechanical Installation and Construction Joint 
Stock Co 
COWAELMIC 
154 Lam Son Sugar JSC LASUCO 
155 Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Co.  
156 Cai Doi Vam Import Export Company CADOVIMEX 
157 Hanoi Beer Alcohol and Beverage Corporation HABECO 
158 Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Co. Ltd.  BITIS 
159 Danang Rubber Co DRC 
160 Loc Ninh Rubber Co.  
161 Southern Airport Services Co SASCO 
162 Hanoi Clean Water Company  
163 Saigon Petro Co SAIGON PETRO 
164 Dong Phu Rubber Co.  
165 Thang Long Metal Ltd.  
166 HCMC Urban Environment Co  
167 Chinfon Haiphong Cement Co. CHC 
168 1-5 Automobile Mechanics Co.  
169 Pha Rung Shipyard  
170 Dak Lak Rubber Co. DAKRUCO 
171 Ba Ria Rubber Co. BRC 
172 Saigon Culture Company  
173 Vietnam Automobile Component Manufacturing Company VAP 
174 Power Construction Engineering Company No. 1 PCC1 
175 Sao Vang Rubber Co SRC 
176 Power Engineering Consulting Company No. 1  
177 Ba Ria - Vung Tau Post and Telecommunications  
178 Vietnam Food Production Company VIFON 
179 Duong Huy Coal Co.  
180 Dong Thap Import Export Trading Co DOCIMEXCO 
181 Vietnam National Tea Corporation VINATEA 
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182 Hai Phong Cement Co  
183 Vietnam Electric Wire and Cable Corporation CADIVI 
184 Production Service Import Export Co.   
185 Viet Foods Co Ltd VIET FOODS 
186 Seafood Import Export JSC  
187 Nha Trang Textile Co. NHATEXCO 
188 Housing and Urban Development Corporation HUD 
189 Song Da Co. No. 9  
190 Vietnam National Shipping Lines VINALINES 
191 Song Da Co. No. 10  
192 Garment Company No. 10 GARCO 10 
193 Construction and Investment Development Co INVESCO 
194 Vietnam National Textile and Garment Corporation VINATEX 
195 Ben Thanh Tobacco Co  
196 Civil Engineering Construction Co. No.568  
197 Hon Gai Coal Selecting Co.  
198 Communication and Transportation Construction Company  
199 Hoa Phat Steel JSC  


































I. Questionnaire and Interview 
Honda Vietnam Co Ltd X 5-Dec-06 
Toyota Vietnam X 5-Dec-06 
Lam Thao Fertilizers and Chemicals Co X 6-Dec-06 
Hanoi General Production and Import Export Company X 7-Dec-06 
Machino Auto Parts Co Ltd X 7-Dec-06 
Vietnam Chemical Corporation
2
 X 15-Dec-06 
Lam Son Sugar Co
7
 X 3-Jan-07 
Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group
2
 X 4-Jan-07 
Vietnam National Tea Corporation X 4-Jan-07 
Vietnam Apatite Company
3
 X 5-Jan-07 
Vietnam Automobile Component Manufacturing Co
7
 X 7-Jan-07 
Vietnam Paper Corporation
3
 X 8-Jan-07 
Rang Dong Light Source and Vacuum Flask Co
1
 X 8-Jan-07 
The Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology X 9-Jan-07 
Vietnam National Shipping Lines X 9-Jan-07 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group X 10-Jan-07 
Vietnam Oil and Gas Group
2,9
 X 11-Jan-07 
Vietnam Glass and Ceramics for Construction Corporation X 11-Jan-07 
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group
2
 X 12-Jan-07 
Van Dien Fused Magnesium Phosphate Co
1
 X 12-Jan-07 
Thang Long Metal Ltd X 15-Jan-07 
Vietnam Sea Transport and Chartering Co X 16-Jan-07 
Viet Tien Garment Corporation X 18-Jan-07 
Binh Dien Fertilizer Co
1
 X 22-Jan-07 
Vietnam Electric Wire and Cable Corporation X 22-Jan-07 
Coastal Fisheries Development Co
1
 X 24-Jan-07 
Southern Rubber Industry Co X 24-Jan-07 
Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Co X 25-Jan-07 
Dong Nai Rubber Co X 26-Jan-07 
Tan Mai Paper Co X 26-Jan-07 
Chi Hung Joint Venture Co X 29-Jan-07 
Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co X 30-Jan-07 
Nha Trang Seafood Co
1
 X 1-Feb-07 
Ninh Thuan Agricultural Export Co
7
 X  1-Feb-07 
Dak Lak Rubber Co
3
 X 2-Feb-07 
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Hyundai Vinashin Shipyard Co Ltd X 2-Feb-07 
Cho Lon Investment and Import Export Corporation
1,10
 X 3-Feb-07 
Fuvi Mechanical Technology Co
1
 X 5-Feb-07 
Southern Fertilizers Co
4
 X 6-Feb-07 
Nha Be Garment Co X 6-Feb-07 
Vietnam Rubber Group
2
 X 7-Feb-07 
Ba Ria Rubber Co
4
 X 8-Feb-07 
Petrovietnam Gas Company
4
 X 9-Feb-07 
Phong Phu Textile Corporation
5,9
 X 23-Feb-07 
Sao Ta Food Co
1
 X 5-Mar-07 
Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Co Ltd X 5-Mar-07 
Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Co X 6-Mar-07 
Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products Company X 7-Mar-07 
Viet Foods Co Ltd X 7-Mar-07 
Quang Ngai Sugar Corporation X 8-Mar-07 
Danang Rubber Co
9
 X 9-Mar-07 
Seaprodex Danang Co  X 9-Mar-07 
Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company X 12-Mar-07 
Vietnam Ocean Shipping Co X 12-Mar-07 
Bach Dang Shipyard X 13-Mar-07 
Ha Long Shipyard X 14-Mar-07 
Dong Bac Coal Corporation X 14-Mar-07 
Industrial Explosive Material Company X 21-Mar-07 
Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation
2
 X 23-Mar-07 
Sao Vang Rubber Co X 26-Mar-07 
Electricity of Vietnam
3
 X 27-Mar-07 
Petroleum Technical Services Company  X 28-Mar-07 
Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Co X 30-Mar-07 
1-5 Automobile Mechanics Co X 31-Mar-07 
Garment Company No.10 X 31-Mar-07 
Company No.28 X 2-Apr-07 
Mercedes Benz Vietnam Ltd
1
 X 4-Apr-07 
An Phu Corporation
1
 X 5-Apr-07 
Southern Basic Chemicals Co
1
 X 9-Apr-07 
Vietsovpetro
9
 X 17-May-07 
 
II. Interview Only 
Vietnam Cement Association
1
   26-Oct-06 
Vietnam Steel Association
1
   26-Oct-06 
Vietnam Fertilizer Association
1
   27-Oct-06 
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Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association
1,8
   10-Dec-06 
Vietnam Textile and Garment Group   9-Jan-07 
Vietnam Rubber Association
1
   17-Jan-07 
Binh Long Rubber Co
7
   30-Jan-07 
Dau Tieng Rubber Corporation
3
   30-Jan-07 
Hoang Gia Cat Tuong Co Ltd    31-Jan-07 
Cat Thai Plastic Co
1,4
   5-Feb-07 
Cai Doi Vam Import Export Company   6-Mar-07 
Cai Lan Oil and Fats Industries Co Ltd   13-Mar-07 
Lilama Corporation
2
   16-Mar-07 
Military Telecom Corporation   22-Mar-07 
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation
7
   27-Mar-07 
March 8 Textile Co
1
   29-Mar-07 
Hanoi Textile and Garment Co   29-Mar-07 
Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Co Ltd   2-Apr-07 
Vietnam Dairy Products Co   10-Apr-07 
Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation
2
   16-May-07 
Vinashin Finance Co
1,6
   5-Aug-08 





International Consumer Products Corporation
1,6
   1-Sep-09 
III. Questionnaire Only 
An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export Co. X   
Anvifish Co Ltd
1
 X   
Bridge Construction Company No.12
1
 X   
Cao Son Coal Co X   
Chinfon Haiphong Cement Co X   
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation No.1 X   
Coc 6 Coal Co X   
Construction and Investment Company No.18
1
 X   
Construction and Production Material Co
1
 X   
General Production Investment Service Import Export Co
1
 X   
Ha Long Coal Co X   
Ha Tu Coal Co X   
Hanoi Clean Water Company X   
Hanoi Post and Telecommunications
1
 X   
Hoang Thach Cement Co X   
Hon Gai Coal Co
1
 X   
Hon Gai Coal Selecting Co X   
Mao Khe Coal Co X   
Northern Airports Authority X   
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Northern Foodstuff Co X   
Nui Beo Coal Co X   
Petrolimex B12 X   
Petrolimex Region 1 X   
Power Construction Engineering Company No.1 X   
Proconco Producing Animal Feeds Co X   
Saigon Newport Co X   
Song Da Company No.10 X   
Thua Thien Hue Construction Corporation
1
 X   
Uong Bi Coal Co X   
Vang Danh Coal Co X   
Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation X   
Vietnam Construction Investment Import and Export Holding Corp. X   
Vietnam Food Production Company X   
Vietnam Railway Corporation X   
 
Note: unless otherwise indicated, interviews were conducted in person by Scott Cheshier,  
 Jago Penrose and Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga 
 
1 
not in the Top 200 
2 
General Corporation Head Office that is not in the Top 200 
3 interview conducted by Scott Cheshier and Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga 
4 
interview conducted by Scott Cheshier and Jago Penrose
 
5 
interview conducted by Jago Penrose and Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga  
6 
interview conducted by Scott Cheshier
 
7 
interview conducted by Jago Penrose
 
8 interview conducted by Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga 
9 
additional information obtained via phone interview by Nguyễn Thị Thanh Nga 
10 














Note: This questionnaire is intended for several types of firms and not all questions may 
be applicable. 
Please list values in Vietnam dong 
 
Company Name (English): _________________________________________________ 
Company Name (Vietnamese): ______________________________________________ 
Website address: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 1: General Information 
 
1. When was the firm founded (Year)? _______________________________________ 
2. Current Legal Operating Structure: ________________________________________ 
3. Division of Ownership: 
Owner Percent 
1.)   
2.)   
3.)   
4.)   
5.)   
 
4. If an SOE please indicate whether: a public utility _____, or a business SOE ______ 
Also please indicate supervising agency ________________________________ 
5. If a member company of a corporation please provide the name of parent company: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Is the firm classified as operating in a state sector (either 100% or 50% or more state 





7. Please list the firm‟s major activities and record the total values for 2003, 2004 and 
2005: 
Activity 2003 2004 2005 
Primary activity: _____________________       
Secondary activity: ___________________       
Other: _____________________________       
* Rank the firm‟s activities by total value added. If this is not possible rank according to  
 the value of operations. If both are impossible rank according to net turnover.  
 
8. If the firm‟s Primary Activity* is product-diversified please complete the following in 
percent for the products which contributed most by value to the Primary Activity in 
2005 (if not product-diversified, please complete for Primary Activity as Product 1): 
  
  














_________                 
Product 2: 
_________                 
Product 3: 
_________                 
Product 4: 
_________                 
Product 5: 
_________                 
* Subsidiary, affiliate, joint venture, parent company, partner firm, etc. 
 
9. Indicate which of the following are major suppliers of raw materials for your primary 
product or service and provide percentage of total inputs (Please tick box): 
Supplier 
Major Supplier 
Percent total inputs 
Yes No 
SOEs       
Domestic private       
Joint-ventures       
FIEs       
Imported directly by firm       
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10. Indicate which of the following are major suppliers of intermediate inputs for your 
primary product or service and provide percentage of total inputs (Please tick box): 
Supplier 
Major Supplier 
Percent total inputs 
Yes No 
SOEs       
Domestic private       
Joint-ventures       
FIEs       
Imported directly by firm       
 
11. Please complete the following table: 
 
Domestic Market Share 
(percent) 
Share of Vietnam Exports 
(percent) 
Primary Activity   
   of which:   
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5   
Secondary Activity   
 
12. Indicate which of the following are your major competitors for your primary activity 





SOEs       
Domestic private       
Joint-ventures       
FIEs       
Imports       
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13. Please indicate the numbers of staff in the following categories: 
Category Male Female Total 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with science based university 
degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with non-science based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
Total    
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Section 2: History of Firm 
 
Year Event* Reason 
      
      
      
      
      
   
 
*Please include: Major investments by value (production facilities, capital assets); Change in 
Senior Management; Organizational expansion (acquisition, subsidiary, joint-venture, domestic 
branch office, overseas office); Expansion into new markets; Changes in ownership; New or 
improved product or service; Financial changes: change in source of credit. 
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Section 3: Strategy and Planning 
 
1. Is your strategy set out in a business plan which is available as a document? 
Yes ___, No ___ 
2. Is the business plan: 
a. Available to the public? ____ 
b. Available to investors only? ____ 
c. For internal use only? ____ 
3. How does the business plan reflect the industry development plan?  
Mostly___ Partially____ Not at all_____ No Industry Plan _____ 
4. If a member company, how does your business plan relate to the corporation business 
plan if one exists?  
Mostly ___ Partially ____ Not at all ____ No GC plan _____ 
5. What are the key performance indicators in your strategy/ business plan? __________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Please indicate if any of the following are planned or anticipated in the next five years 
and indicate the reason: 
 Planned Reason 















      
Create 
affiliates 
      
JV with 
FIE 
      
JV with 
VN firm 
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Section 4: Capital Equipment 
 
1. When was the majority of your capital equipment made (Please tick box)? 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Primary Activity       
Secondary Activity      
 
2. If capital equipment has been replaced in the last five years please indicate how 
















equipment to produce 
same product or 
service              
Supplemented 
existing equipment to 
undertake same 
product or service             
Replaced existing 
equipment to produce 
new product or 
service             
Produce new product 
or service alongside 
existing product or 











3. If capital equipment will be replaced in the next five years please indicate how 


























product or service             
Produce new 
product or service 
alongside existing 
product or services             
 
4. Are there incentives to buy capital equipment domestically? Yes ___, No ___ 
5. Please assess the quality of your main product or service in relation to (Please tick 
box): 
  Inferior Equal Superior Don't Know 
Vietnamese 
competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     







6. Please assess the price of your main product or service in relation to: (Please tick 
box) 
  Lower Equal Higher Don't Know 
Vietnamese competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
 
7. Indicate which of the following was/ will be associated with purchase of equipment: 
a. Reduction/ Increase* of unskilled staff. 
b. Reduction/ Increase* of staff with science degree. 
c. Reduction/ Increase* in skilled staff.  
d. No Change _____ 
*Please delete as appropriate 
8. Rate the degree to which each of the following factors affect the acquisition of capital 
equipment (1 – Very Important, 5 – Not Important): 
Factors 
Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Difficulties finding suitable equipment/ technology           
Difficulties licensing suitable technology from foreign firms           
Lack of capital           
Staff lack skills required to absorb technology into existing business 
and production processes            
Obstacles to laying off workers           
Acquiring necessary government approval           
 
 310 
Section 5: Innovation (improvements to existing processes, or actions undertaken to  
  incorporate new equipment or processes) 
 
1. Please indicate whether the firm has improved or will improve production processes 
and/ or business processes in the last five years/ next five years in response to the 
following factors (Please tick box): 
  Last 5 Years Next 5 Years 
 N/A* No Yes N/A* No Yes 
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese private 
firms             
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese SOEs             
Competitive pressure from FIEs             
Competitive pressure from imports       
To match quality of competitors in export 
markets             
Quality regulations in new export markets              
To meet quality requirements of foreign 
partner             
New government regulation             
Government sectoral strategy and development 
policies             















2. Please indicate importance of the following when improving production processes, 
business processes and product (1-Very Important, 5-Not Important): 
Method 
Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Internal R&D department      
Suggestions from workers and managers      
Cooperation with domestic R&D institutions      
Reverse engineering      
Buy technology from domestic sources      
Buy technology from foreign sources      
Joint venture with domestic enterprises      
Joint venture with foreign enterprises      
Hiring domestic consultants      
Hiring foreign consultants      
Domestic training      
Training/ study tour abroad      
Google      
 
3. Please indicate significance of the following obstacles to desired process 
improvements (1 - Very Significant, 5 – Not Significant):  
Method 
Significance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of capital       
Lack of skilled technical staff      
Lack of access to technology      
Lack of technical knowledge.      






4. Please rank the following activities in order of priority (1 – Most Important, 8 – Least 
Important) in the last five years and the next five years: 
Activities 









Product improvement       
Improvement of production process       
New production facilities      
New product models       
Upgrade existing production 
facilities      
Increase market share in existing 
markets     
Enter new foreign market      





Section 6: Labour 
 
1. Please indicate the length of time staff have been with the firm, and if staff joined the firm within the last three years please 
indicate from where they were recruited:  
Category 
Length of time with firm 
(Percent of each category) 
If recruited within last 3 years recruited from  
















Board of Management         
Board of Directors         
Line Managers         
Workers (non-management) 
with science based 
university degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
        
Workers (non-management) 
with non-science based 
university degrees.  
        
Skilled non-graduate 
workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications) 
        
Unskilled workers         
Administrative Staff         
Other         
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2. Please complete the following table for members of the Board of Management: 
 Number 
Are full time members?  
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) 
University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
3. Please complete the following table for Board of Directors: 
 Number 
Are full time members?  
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) 
University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
4. What percentage of skilled workers with a science degree (graduate or post-graduate): 
a. Has experience working in an FIE in the same field_____  
b. Was trained in a foreign University______ 
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5. What proportion of skilled workers: 
a. Has experience working in an FIE in the same field_____  
b. Was trained in a foreign University______ 
6. Please complete the following table (Please tick box): 
Category 










Board of Management     
Management (e.g. Directors)     
Workers (non-management) with science 
based university degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
    
Workers (non-management) with non-
science based university degrees.  
    
Skilled non-graduate workers (with 
relevant experience or qualifications) 
    
Unskilled workers     
Administrative Staff     






















firm in     
Vietnam 
Training courses/ 
Study Tours in 
foreign country 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with 
science based university degrees 
(e.g. Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with 
non-science based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with 
relevant experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
 
8. Please indicate the importance of training for the following (1 – Very important, 5 – 
Not important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Bring new staff to required level      
Raising standard of existing skill sets      
Learning to use new equipment      
Learning new business processes      



















Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with 
science based university degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with non-
science based university degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with 
relevant experience or qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative staff    
Other    
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Section 7: Relationship with state institutions  
 
1. Rate state involvement in the following decisions (if member company of a 
corporation, please also fill out second column) (Please tick box): 
Decision 
State Involvement Parent Company Involvement 
Very 
High 
High Medium Low None 
Very 
High 
High Medium Low None 
Business plan and 
strategies                     
Investment                      
Hiring senior 
management           
Hiring new staff                     
Firing existing staff                     
Determining staff 
wages                     
Product 
diversification                     
Business 
Diversification           
Sourcing raw 
materials and inputs 
                    
Price paid for raw 
materials and inputs 
                    
Importing                     
Exporting                     
Determining prices 










2. Please indicate state involvement in the following activities and if involved, which 
state institution(s) (Please tick box): 
 Very High High Medium Low None State institution(s) 
Provide brand 
name            
Find business 
partners            
Assist in exporting            
Assist in importing            
Provide financing            
Guarantee firm 
loans from banks            
Provide land            
Guarantee buyers 
of firm output            
Assist in 
acquisition of new 

















3. If a member company of a corporation, please fill out in relation to parent company 
involvement (Please tick box): 
  Very High High Medium Low None 
Provide brand name          
Find business partners          
Assist in exporting          
Assist in importing          
Provide financing          
Guarantee firm loans from banks          
Provide land          
Guarantee buyers of firm output          
Assist in acquisition of new technology          
 
4. If an SOE, does the firm have plans to transform into an entity operating under the 
Enterprise Law? Yes ___, No ____, Already transformed _____ 
If yes, what is the anticipated ownership type following transformation? 
__________________________________________________________ 
If yes, is this plan approved? Yes _____, No _____ 
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Section 8: Finances 
 
1. Please complete the following table: 
 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenues    
Total Assets    
Turnover from sales, service    
 of which:    
Domestic sales, service    
International sales, service    
 
2. How much did the firm remit to the state (taxes, returns to state capital, other) in:  
2003 _______________, 2004_______________ and 2005_______________? 
3. Did the firm benefit from any tax incentives in (Yes/No): 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________ and 2005_______________? 
4. If a member company, how much do you remit to the parent company (management 
fees, dividends, capital usage fees, other) in: 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________ and 2005_______________? 
5. If the firm did not pay Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in the following years, please 
indicate why not: 
Year 
Reason 
Made a loss Broke even Tax incentive Other 
2003     
2004     
2005     
 
6. Please complete the following table: 
Share of Total Debt (Short and Long should equal 100%) Percent 
Short term  
% short term debt secured by government  
Long term  
% long term debt secured by government  
7. Is securing a loan easier ____ or more difficult ____ now than five years ago? 
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8. Please indicate how the importance of the following when securing credit has 










Collateral        
Financial 
statements   
 
    
Feasibility study        
Company audit        
 
9. Please rank the following in order of importance for sourcing funds for capital 
investments (1 – Most Important, 11 – Least Important): 
Source 5 Years Ago Now In 5 Years 
Retained earnings        
Central State budget       
Local State budget       
SOCB loan       
JSC bank loan       
Foreign bank loan       
DAF (VDB)       
Sale of assets       
Equity offerings       
Bonds       
Transfer from parent company       
 
10. Please provide the debt/asset ratio for: 1995 ______, 2000 ______, 2005 ______  
11. Please indicate the percentage of state capital in total capital ________ 
12. If a member company of a corporation, please indicate the percentage of parent 
company capital in total firm capital ________ 
13. Does the firm plan to list on the stock market? Yes ___, No ___  
If the firm is already listed, please provide the code: _______ 




15. Please complete (percentage not value): 
Revenue Source 
Percentage of total revenues 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales       
Financial investments       
Renting, leasing land       
Other ______________________       
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
16. Please complete (percentage not value): 
Expenditures 
Percentage of total expenditure 
2003 2004 2005 
    
Wages    
Staff training    
Research and development    
Marketing    
Product distribution    
Market research    
Raw materials and inputs    
Maintenance of equipment    
Other _________________    





















Please list values in Vietnam dong 
Definitions: 
Corporation: all units of the corporation, including: head office, dependent accounting  
 units, independent accounting units 
Head office: the administrative office and departments of the corporation only 
Corporation Name (English): ________________________________________________ 
Corporation Name (Vietnamese): ____________________________________________ 
Website address: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 1: General Information 
 
1. Current Legal Operating Structure of the corporation:  
  Corporation Type Supervising Agency 
GC 90     
GC 91     
Parent-Subsidiary Model     
Economic Group    
Other ______________________     
 
2. When was the corporation founded (Year)? ________________________ 
If already transformed, please indicate the year of transformation? _____ 
Does the corporation have plans to transform into an entity operating under the 
Enterprise Law? Yes ___, No ____,  
If yes, what is the anticipated transformation year? ______________________ 
If yes, what is the anticipated transformation model? 




3. Did the head office exist prior to becoming the head office of the corporation?  
Yes ___ No ___, If yes, was it a: SOE ___, Government Agency ___, Other ___ 
If yes, please provide the name of the former organization: _____________________ 








5. Is the corporation classified as operating in a state sector according to Decision 
155/QD-TTg of 2004? Yes ___, No ___ 
6. Please list the corporation’s major activities and record total value: (million VND) 
Activity 2003 2004 2005 
Primary activity: _____________________    
Secondary activity: ___________________    
Other: _____________________________    
    
* Rank the firm‟s activities by total value added. If this is not possible rank according to 











7. If the corporation’s Primary Activity is product-diversified please complete the 
following in percent for the products which contributed most by value to the Primary 
Activity in 2005 (if not product-diversified, please complete for Primary Activity as 
Product 1): 
  









FIE SOE Private Other 
Product 1: 
__________        
Product 2: 
__________        
Product 3: 
__________        
Product 4: 
__________        
Product 5: 
__________        
 
8. If the corporation’s Secondary Activity is product-diversified please complete the 
following in percent for the products which contributed most by value to the 
Secondary Activity in 2005 (if not product-diversified, complete for Secondary 
Activity as Product 1): 
  









FIE SOE Private Other 
Product 1: 
__________               
Product 2: 
__________               
Product 3: 
__________               
Product 4: 
__________               
Product 5: 







9. Please complete the following table for the corporation: 
 
Domestic Market Share 
(percent) 
Share of Vietnam Exports 
(percent) 
Primary Activity   
   of which:   
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5   
 
 
Domestic Market Share 
(percent) 
Share of Vietnam Exports 
(percent) 
Secondary Activity   
   of which:   
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5   
 
10. Indicate which of the following are your major competitors for your corporation’s 






Other state corporations    
Domestic private    
Joint-ventures    
FIEs    
Imports    
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11. Please indicate the numbers of head office staff in the following categories: 
Category Male Female Total 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with science based university 
degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with non-science based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
Total    
 
12. Please indicate the numbers of corporation staff in the following categories: 
Category Male Female Total 
Board of Management     
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with science based university 
degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with non-science based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
Total    
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Section 2: History of Corporation 
 
Year Event* Reason 
      
      
      
      
      
   
 
*Please include: Major investments by value (production facilities, capital assets); Change in 
Senior Management; Organizational expansion (acquisition, subsidiary, joint-venture, domestic 
branch office, overseas office); Expansion into new markets; Changes in ownership; New or 
improved product or service; Financial changes: change in source of credit. 
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Section 3: Strategy and Planning 
 
1. Is your strategy set out in a business plan which is available as a document?  
Yes ___, No ___ 
2. Is the business plan: 
a. Available to the public? ____ 
b. Available to investors only? ____ 
c. For internal use only? ____ 
3. How does the business plan reflect the industry development plan?  
Mostly___ Partially____ Not at all_____ No Industry Plan _____ 
4. Does the business plan include subsidiaries and joint venture member companies of 
the corporation? Yes ___ No ____ 
5. What are the key performance indicators in your strategy/ business plan? __________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Please indicate if any of the following are planned or anticipated by the corporation 
in the next five years and indicate the reason: 
 Planned Reason 
















      
Create 
affiliates 
      
JV with FIE       
JV with VN 
firm 
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Section 4: Capital Equipment (please answer all questions in this section for the  
  corporation) 
 
1. Are there incentives for the corporation to buy capital equipment domestically?  
Yes ___, No ___ 
2. Please assess the quality of the corporation‟s main product or service in relation to 
(Please tick box): 
  Inferior Equal Superior Don't Know 
Vietnamese 
competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
 
3. Please assess the price of the corporation‟s main product or service in relation to 
(Please tick box): 
  Lower Equal Higher Don't Know 
Vietnamese competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
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Section 5: Innovation (improvements to existing processes, or actions undertaken to  
  incorporate new equipment or processes) 
 
1. Please indicate whether the corporation has improved or will improve production 
processes and/ or business processes in the last five years/ next five years in response 
to the following factors (Please tick box): 
  Last 5 Years Next 5 Years 
 N/A* No Yes N/A* No Yes 
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese private 
firms       
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese state 
corporations       
Competitive pressure from FIEs       
Competitive pressure from imports       
To match quality of competitors in export 
markets       
Quality regulations in new export markets        
To meet quality requirements of foreign 
partner       
New government regulation       
Government sectoral strategy and development 
policies       














2. Please indicate importance of the following when improving production processes, 




1 2 3 4 5 
Internal R&D department      
Suggestions from workers and managers      
Cooperation with domestic R&D institutions      
Reverse engineering      
Buy technology from domestic sources      
Buy technology from foreign sources      
Joint venture with domestic enterprises      
Joint venture with foreign enterprises      
Hiring domestic consultants      
Hiring foreign consultants      
Domestic training      
Training/ study tour abroad      
Google      
 
3. Please rank the following activities in order of priority for the corporation (1 – Most 
Important, 8 – Least Important) in the last five years and the next five years: 
Activities 









Product improvement  
    
Improvement of production process  
    
New production facilities 
    
New product models  
    
Upgrade existing production 
facilities 
    
Increase market share in existing 
markets 
    
Enter new foreign market 
    
Others 
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Section 6: Labour (please complete all questions in this section for the head office) 
 
1. Please indicate the percentage of staff who have the following length of time with the head office, and please indicate the percentage of staff who 
joined the firm within the last three years and their previous employment with the following institutions (%):  
Category 
Length of time with firm 
(Percent of each category) 
If recruited within last 3 years recruited from 


















         
Board of Directors          










university degrees.  






         
Unskilled workers          
Administrative 
Staff 
         
Other          
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2. Please complete the following table for members of the Board of Management of the 
head office: 
 Number 
Are full time members?  
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) 
University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
3. Please complete the following table for managers (e.g. Directors) of the head office: 
 Number 
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) 
University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
4. What percentage of skilled workers of the head office with a science degree (graduate 
or post-graduate): 
a. Has experience working in an FIE in the same field_____  
b. Was trained in a foreign University______ 
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5. Please complete the following table for the head office (Please tick box): 
Category 










Board of Management     
Board of Directors     
Line Managers     
Workers (non-management) with science 
based university degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
    
Workers (non-management) with non-
science based university degrees.  
    
Skilled non-graduate workers (with 
relevant experience or qualifications) 
    
Unskilled workers     
Administrative staff     























firm in     
Vietnam 
Training courses/ 
Study Tours in 
foreign country 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with 
science based university degrees 
(e.g. Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with 
non-science based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with 
relevant experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative staff    
Other    
 
7. Please indicate the importance of training for the following (1 – Very important, 5 – 
Not important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Bring new staff to required level      
Raising standard of existing skill sets      
Learning to use new equipment      
Learning new business processes      


















Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with 
science based university degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with non-
science based university degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with 
relevant experience or qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
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Section 7: Relationship between state institutions and the corporation, and the head  
  office and independent accounting member companies 
 
1. Rate state involvement in the following corporation decisions (Please tick box): 
Decision 
State Involvement 
Very High High Medium Low None 
Business plan and strategies      
Investment       
Hiring senior management      
Hiring new staff      
Firing existing staff      
Determining staff wages      
Product diversification      
Business Diversification      
Sourcing raw materials and inputs      
Price paid for raw materials and inputs      
Importing      
Exporting      
Determining prices of products      
 
2. Please indicate state involvement in the following corporation activities and if involved, 
which state institution(s) (Please tick box): 
  Very High High Medium Low None State institution(s) 
Provide brand name       
Find business partners       
Assist in exporting       
Assist in importing       
Provide financing       
Guarantee firm loans from 
banks       
Provide land       
Guarantee buyers of firm 
output       
Assist in acquisition of 
new technology       
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3. Rate head office involvement in the following independent accounting member 
company decisions (Please tick box): 
Decision 
Head Office Involvement 
Very High High Medium Low None 
Business plan and strategies      
Investment       
Hiring senior management      
Hiring new staff      
Firing existing staff      
Determining staff wages      
Product diversification      
Business Diversification      
Sourcing raw materials and inputs      
Price paid for raw materials and inputs      
Importing      
Exporting      
Determining prices of products      
 
4. Please indicate head office involvement in the following independent accounting 
member company activities (Please tick box): 
  Very High High Medium Low None 
Provide brand name      
Find business partners      
Assist in exporting      
Assist in importing      
Provide financing      
Guarantee firm loans from banks      
Provide land      
Guarantee buyers of firm output      
Assist in acquisition of new technology      
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Section 8: Finances 
 
1. Does the corporation maintain consolidated accounts for the entire corporation? 
Yes ___ No ___ 
2. Does the corporation have a financial member company(s)? Yes __ No ___ 
3. Please complete the following table for the head office and dependent accounting 
units: (million VND) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenues    
Total Assets    
Turnover from sales, service    
 of which:    
Domestic sales, service    
International sales, service    
 
4. Please complete the following table for the corporation: (million VND) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenues    
Total Assets    
Turnover from sales, service    
 of which:    
Domestic sales, service    
International sales, service    
 
5. How much did the head office and dependent accounting units remit to the state 
(taxes, returns to state capital, other) in: (million VND) 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________ and 2005 ______________? 
6. How much did the corporation remit to the state (taxes, returns to state capital, other) 
in:  
2003 _______________, 2004_______________ and 2005 ______________? 
7. Did the corporation benefit from any tax incentives in (Yes/No): 




8. If the head office and dependent accounting units did not pay Corporate Income Tax 
(CIT) in the following years, please indicate why not: 
Year 
Reason 
Made a loss Broke even Tax incentive Other 
2003     
2004     
2005     
 
9. Please complete the following table for the corporation: 
Share of Total Debt (Short and Long should equal 100%) Percent 
Short term  
% short term debt secured by government  
Long term  
% long term debt secured by government  
 
10. Is securing a loan easier ____ or more difficult ____ now than five years ago? 
11. Please indicate for the corporation how the importance of the following when 










Collateral      
Financial 
statements   
 
  
Feasibility study      












12. Please rank the following in order of importance for sourcing funds for capital 
investments for the corporation (1 – Most Important, 11 – Least Important): 
Source 5 Years Ago Now In 5 Years 
Retained earnings     
Central State budget    
Local State budget    
SOCB loan    
JSC bank loan    
Foreign bank loan    
DAF (VDB)    
Sale of assets    
Equity offerings    
Bonds    
Transfers from member companies    
 
13. Please provide corporation debt/asset ratio for: 1995 ____, 2000 ____, 2005 ____  
14. Please indicate the percentage of state capital in the total capital of the corporation 
________________________________________ 
15. Does the corporation plan to list on the stock market? Yes ___, No ___ 
If the firm is already listed, please provide the code: _______ 
a. If not plan to list, why not? 
16. Does the head office have investments in other companies outside of the corporation?  
Yes ___ No ___ 
17. Please complete for the head office and dependent accounting units: 
Revenue Source 
Percentage of total revenues 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales      
Remittances from members    
Other financial investments    
Renting, leasing land      
Other ______________________      
Total (should equal 100%)    
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18. Please complete for the corporation: 
Revenue Source 
Percentage of total revenues 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales    
Contribution from members    
Financial investments    
Renting, leasing land    
Other ______________________    
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
19. Please complete for the head office and dependent accounting units: 
Expenditures 
Percentage of total expenditure 
2003 2004 2005 
Wages    
Staff training    
Research and development    
Marketing    
Product distribution    
Market research    
Other _________________    
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
